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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON RAILROAD COST 
by 
Azrina Abdullah Al-Hadi 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014 
Under the Supervision of Professor James H. Peoples 
 
 
The railroad industry has traditionally been a major source for transporting bulk 
products in the United States. Prior to deregulation this industry faced fairly stringent 
economic regulation and stringent work-rules.  However, with passage of the Staggers 
Act in 1980, railroad carriers now had greater opportunity to legally abandon 
unprofitable short-haul service.  Carriers were also able to negotiate more flexible 
work-rules as well as take advantage of greater freedom setting competitive shipping 
rates. These policy changes facilitated significant changes to the cost of providing 
shipping service in the railroad industry.  This dissertation examines three different 
aspects of railroad cost in the current period of a more market-oriented business 
environment.  Coverage includes analysis of economies of scope, allocative use of 
factor inputs and determinants of productivity growth.    
The first essay examines cost results from estimating a normalized quadratic 
cost function for the US rail industry to empirically test whether maintenance of 
short-haul services contributes to economies of scope for Class-1 rail carriers. The 
analysis examines the existence of economies of scope in the railroad industry with 
respect to different types of services provided by carriers, namely; unit train, way 
train and through train services.  Special attention is given to the (dis)economies of 
scope associated with providing way train service, since routes for this service cover 
small distances and, therefore, depict short-haul shipping that has traditionally been 
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associated with cost inefficiencies. The parameter estimates obtained from estimating 
the normalized quadratic cost function are used to simulate hypothetical firms that 
provide various combinations of outputs, since there is no available data to compare 
rail firms that provide different combinations of transport service. Findings suggest 
that the majority of the observations exhibit economies of scope. Without imposing 
concavity, more than 95 percent of observations display economies of scope, while 
more than 70 percent of observations display economies of scope when input price 
concavity is imposed. The findings on diseconomies of scope also suggest that 
providing way service is not the primary source, rather all three services equally 
contribute to diseconomies for the non-substantial number of observations when this 
occurs. 
The second essay explores the possibility of railroad input market distortion in 
the form of allocative inefficiency due to labor market regulation and union work-
rules. Rail carriers have consistently negotiated less rigid work-rules which may 
create a business environment that enhances carriers’ ability to employ an allocatively 
efficient mix of inputs. Using labor as the benchmark of comparison when examining 
usage of factor inputs suggests that indeed carrier do employ an allocatively efficient 
combination of equipment and labor, material and labor, and way and structures and 
labor. Findings suggest carriers over invest in fuel with respect to labor.  This latter 
finding is interpreted as suggesting that relative to shadow fuel prices, low shadow 
wages due to work-rule restrictions and due to the use of fuel efficient locomotives 
that facilitate the overuse of fuel relative to labor.  Nonetheless, efficient use of labor 
relative to non-fuel inputs is consistent with the notion that less restrictive work-rules 
promotes a business environment contributing to allocative efficient use of those 
inputs. 
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The third essay examines factor price effects on productivity in the railroad 
industry. Findings suggest that price effects are not the main source of changes in 
productivity. Among the price effects, the price of material and price of way and 
structures show larger and significant magnitudes in explaining the sources of 
changes in productivity compared to other prices. Interestingly, price of labor and 
price of fuel are the input prices that contribute the least to changes in unit cost. 
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ESSAY 1: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIES OF SCOPE IN THE 
UNITED STATES RAILROAD INDUSTRY 
1.1 Introduction 
Railroad service has traditionally been a common modal choice for transporting bulk 
products in the United States.1 Products primarily transported by rail include coal, 
grain, lumber and automobile parts. Given the economic importance of providing 
consumers’ access to these vital products the federal government, since the passage of 
the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), has regulated the operations of class-1 rail 
carriers. Part of this regulation included requiring these large carriers to provide long-
haul and short-haul service.2   Achieving universal service for customers, especially 
agricultural firms in rural areas, explained part of the rational for stipulating class-1 
carriers provide both freight services.   While providing rail service to rural areas was 
key to agricultural producers having access to the US transportation network, class-1 
carriers faced serious challenges making a profit on short-haul lines.  Stepped-up 
competition from trucking starting in the early 20th century and a lack of traffic 
density on short-haul routes contributed to class-1 carriers difficulties operating 
profitable short-haul service during the period of regulation by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC).These carriers also faced difficulties abandoning  
short-haul lines in part because abandonment approval from the ICC often meant 
contending with substantial delays, and high cost associated with labor protection 
                                                 
1 The most up to date data of freight hauled in the US indicates that in 2007 39.5 percent of freight was 
moved by rail compared to 28.6 percent hauled by trucks, the next largest transporter of freight in the 
US.  Source: USDOT Federal Railroad Administration, https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0362. 
2 U.S. Class I Railroads are line haul freight railroads with $250 million or more in revenue adjusted for 
inflation.  Currently there are seven US class-1 rail carriers.  Regional and short-line carriers depict the 
two remaining rail categories.  Short-line operators are generally classified as operating less than 250 
miles of track, and regional carriers typically operate more than 350 miles of track, or generate more 
than $40 million in revenue adjusted for inflation since 1991.  Often regional carriers are classified as 
short-haul carriers. 
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rules (Due, 1987).  Furthermore, the ICC often considered the loss of business to 
shippers over the potential gain to rail carriers when ruling on route abandonment 
requests (Due, 1987). 
Passage of the 1980 Staggers Act addressed the financial challenges facing 
class-1 carriers by allowing them to abandon or sell costly lines. Following this act 
the application process for abandonment was streamlined and the burden of proof was 
transferred from the class-1 carrier to the protestant (Due, 1987).  Most of the 
abandoned lines provided short-haul services and were sold to short-line carriers who 
were better able to operate a profitable business.  Short-line carriers employed a non-
union work force compared to the near total unionization of the class-1 non-
management workforce.  Hence, short-line carriers operated with lower labor costs 
and less rigid work-rules (Fischer et al., 2001). In addition, the slower speeds used to 
transport short-haul relative to the speeds used for long distance routes allowed short-
line operators to invest less in capital to maintain track and pay for expensive motive 
power (Due, 1984).  Evidence of this change in business ownership is revealed by the 
increase of 157 short-line rail carriers in the seven years following the passage of the 
Staggers Act, compared to a total of 93 new short-line carriers for the preceding 50 
years (Mielke, 1988).  In contrast, the number of class-1 carriers fell from 73 prior to 
regulatory reform to the current count of seven.  
Even though the abandonment of short-haul service by class-1 carriers 
accelerated following the passage of the Staggers Act, these carriers may still 
continue to provide the service if the line is economically viable. Given the fact that 
they provide multiple services such as short-haul and long-haul, an examination of 
economies of scope during the post Staggers period allows for testing if class-1 
carriers have taken advantage of this abandonment provision to achieve cost 
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efficiency by selling or abandoning cost inefficient lines and continuing to service 
cost efficient profitable short-haul lines. While data is not available that specifically 
identifies information on class-1 carriers providing short-line service, class-1 annual 
reports (R1 reports) do present information on the types of train service.  These 
services are classified as unit, way, and through service. Unit train service is dedicated 
to the transportation of a single commodity for a specific originating-destination 
location pair (Bitzan 1999; Growitsch and Wetzel 2009). Way train service is 
characterized by the gathering of cars from differing originating locations and 
bringing them to a major freight terminal (Bitzan 1999; Growitsch and Wetzel 2009).  
Through train service transports goods between two or more major freight terminals 
(Bitzan 1999;   Growitsch and Wetzel 2009). Of these three services, the operations of 
way service most often includes providing short-haul delivery (Bitzan, 1999). Indeed, 
information on average distance hauled by class-1 carriers presented in Table-1 
suggest that way train service is a good proxy for short-hauls.  For instance, the 
average distance of a unit train is between 5 to 30 times longer than the average 
distance of a way train, and the average distance of a through train is between 5 to 15 
times longer than the average distance of a way train. For purposes of this study, the 
significant observation gleaned form Table-1 is the fact that the share of freight 
hauled by way train service, based on number of cars loaded, is a non-trivial 29.49 
and 21.48 percent of the freight hauled for carriers servicing the eastern and western 
part of the US, respectively by 2011. This distribution of shares among freight 
services is fairly constant for the entire observation sample. At issue is whether these 
carriers continue to provide this service in part because they benefit from economies 
of scope.    
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While several studies examine economies of scale, there is a dearth of research 
examining economies of scope as an approach for analyzing cost efficiency in the 
post Staggers era.  Those that do examine economies scope do not base their analysis 
exclusively on the type of freight services provided to shippers. For instance, Ivaldi 
and McCullough (2004) examine joint production between infrastructure companies 
and competing operating firms as a test of economies of scope.  Kim (1987) examines 
the joint production of passenger and freight service. Rail service considered by these 
papers represents the type of unit hauled, whereas this essay will be examining the 
type of services that hauls the unit.  Past research that does examine the cost effect of 
providing different freight services examines whether the condition for subadditivity 
is satisfied (Bitzan, 2003).  While findings from this research do not directly test for 
economies of scope, the author suggests that the cost conditions of class-1 carriers 
providing unit, way and through train service satisfy the conditions of a natural 
monopoly most of the time. From this finding he concludes that economies of scope 
likely exists in this industry. Since the subadditivity condition is not met for all the 
observations, there is the possibility that diseconomies of scope exists.  Nonetheless, a 
direct test of economies of scope associated with providing unit, way and through 
train service has not been provided by past research. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
  
 
5
 
Table-1: Average distance3 of unit train service (U), way train service (W) and through train service (T) 
Carrier Year car miles (U) car miles (W) car miles (T) cars loaded (U) cars loaded (W) cars loaded (T) Ave-U Ave-W Ave-T 
BN 2011 6385717 177053 4828145 4262000 2634000 5935000 1.50 0.07 0.81 
CN 2011 229186 141624 875531 1184000 2313000 3180000 0.19 0.06 0.28 
CP 2011 165602 33606 615141 258937 601535 1142000 0.64 0.06 0.54 
CSXT 2011 1763933 206679 3039401 2469000 3894000 11708000 0.71 0.05 0.26 
EAST 2011 3143290 660597 6819335 6128000 11288000 20858000 0.51 0.06 0.33 
KCS 2011 188564 26674 416033 229577 362472 740229 0.82 0.07 0.56 
NS 2011 1150171 312294 2904403 2474000 5079000 5969000 0.46 0.06 0.49 
UP 2011 5284217 178232 7726715 2869000 3098000 9036000 1.84 0.06 0.86 
WEST 2011 12024100 415565 13586034 7620000 6697000 16854000 1.58 0.06 0.81 
BN 2010 6547019 171298 4580714 4256000 2432000 5589000 1.54 0.07 0.82 
CN 2010 220368 131689 853759 1238000 2234000 3069000 0.18 0.06 0.28 
CP 2010 139045 30999 607187 274674 568916 1120000 0.51 0.05 0.54 
CSXT 2010 1790737 219182 2927003 2618000 3809000 11426000 0.68 0.06 0.26 
EAST 2010 3082736 670889 6506212 6215000 11013000 20209000 0.50 0.06 0.32 
KCS 2010 185256 42151 385736 613143000 185256000 42151000 0.00 0.00 0.01 
NS 2010 1071631 320018 2725450 2358000 4970000 5713000 0.45 0.06 0.48 
UP 2010 4970684 173730 7447218 2714000 2800000 8547000 1.83 0.06 0.87 
WEST 2010 11842004 418178 13020855 7471000 6190000 15932000 1.59 0.07 0.82 
BN 2009 6043229 168589 4125610 3856000 2157000 4914000 1.57 0.08 0.84 
CN 2009 168251 90192 791276 969668.1 1511000 2866000 0.17 0.06 0.28 
CP 2009 87566 14476 370726 178968 292326 589188 0.49 0.05 0.63 
CSXT 2009 1682376 215225 2699019 2584000 3582000 10493000 0.65 0.06 0.26 
EAST 2009 2836013 581952 5942109 5566000 9472000 18456000 0.51 0.06 0.32 
                                                 
3 Average distance is calculated by dividing car miles by number of cars loaded. 
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KCS 2009 207434 52348 331496 250759 400052 554942 0.83 0.13 0.60 
NS 2009 985386 276535 2451814 2012000 4378000 5096000 0.49 0.06 0.48 
UP 2009 4609283 156771 6587035 2688000 2626000 7603000 1.71 0.06 0.87 
WEST 2009 10947512 392184 11414867 6975000 5476000 13662000 1.57 0.07 0.84 
BN 2008 6353259 219554 4599499 4627000 2868000 5795000 1.37 0.08 0.79 
CN 2008 201682 88345 1006501 1179000 1543000 3278000 0.17 0.06 0.31 
CP 2008 105112 14853 421845 178585 300354 617884 0.59 0.05 0.68 
CSXT 2008 1944808 236297 3288920 2851000 4122000 12300000 0.68 0.06 0.27 
EAST 2008 3357049 664375 7227138 6618000 11073000 21846000 0.51 0.06 0.33 
KCS 2008 182236 60565 392866 238200 498124 633436 0.77 0.12 0.62 
NS 2008 1210559 339733 2931717 2587000 5406000 3267000 0.47 0.06 0.90 
UP 2008 5579064 181314 7867452 3201000 3037000 9207000 1.74 0.06 0.85 
WEST 2008 12219671 476286 13281662 8245000 6704000 16253000 1.48 0.07 0.82 
Note. Data retrieved from http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/urcs.html    
Key: In column 1 BN represents Burlington Northern, CN represents Canadian National, CP represents Canadian Pacific, CSXT represent CSX Transportation, EAST 
represents the east regional Class 1 carriers, KCS represents Kansas City Southern, NS represents Norfolk Southern, UP represent Union Pacific, WEST represents the west 
regional Class 1 carriers. In column 3, 4, 5 represents the car miles for unit, way and through services respectively, in column 6, 7, 8 represents number of loaded cars for 
unit, way and through services respectively, and in column 9, 10, 11, the variables ave1, ave2 and ave3 represent the average distance for unit train, way train and through 
train respectively. The freight service as explanatory variables. 
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This essay contributes to our understanding of cost efficiencies in the US rail 
industry by estimating a flexible form cost equation that includes the three types of train 
transport services. If economies of scope exists, having multi-service railroad carriers 
would be efficient, whereas, if economies of scope does not exist, divestiture of transport 
operations would be advantageous (Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009). Results from this 
study’s estimations suggest that 96.7 percent and 70.44 percent of observations display 
economies of scope before and after imposing input price concavity, respectively. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the majority of observations satisfy the 
condition for economies of scope except for a small subset of observations for some 
class-1 carriers. 
 
1.2 Identifying Economies of Scope 
Economies of scope is an important concept for use in examining the existence of natural 
monopoly in an industry with multiple products. In a multiproduct setting, economies of 
scale are neither necessary nor sufficient for natural monopoly (Baumol et al., 1982; 
Sharkey, 1982). An industry is considered to be a natural monopoly if it satisfies the 
conditions of subadditivity. The sufficient conditions for subadditivity are economies of 
scope and declining average incremental cost (Evans and Heckman, 1984, p. 616). 
Whereas Sharkey (1982) argues the existence of economies of joint production and 
economies of scale are conditions necessary to attain subadditivity in a multiproduct 
setting. For economies of scope, however, it is not enough to only observe economies of 
joint production as it is also necessary to satisfy the condition of cost complementarity.   
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Economies of scope is defined as cost savings associated with joint production, 
such that it is less costly to produce multiple products jointly rather than to produce each 
product separately (Waldman and Jensen, 2013; Carlton and Perloff, 2005).  For the two 
product case (𝑌1 and 𝑌2) as presented by Baulmol et al. (1982) economies of scope is 
specified using the following equation: 
𝐶(𝑌1, 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑌2) − 𝐶(𝑌1, 𝑌2) > 0       (1) 
where 𝐶(𝑌1, 0) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶(0, 𝑌2) depict separate firms’ cost accrued from specializing in the 
production of products 𝑌1 and 𝑌2  and  𝐶(𝑌1, 𝑌2)  depicts the joint production cost of 
producing the same two products.  The degree to which cost savings accrue from 
economies of scope is measured using the following equation suggested by Baumol et al. 
(1982): 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑌1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌2 =
𝐶(𝑌1,0)+𝐶(0,𝑌2)−𝐶(𝑌1,𝑌2)
𝐶(𝑌1,𝑌2)
  (2) 
where the degree of cost savings is associated with a positive value for equation (2). This 
concept of economies of scope for a two good model is depicted geometrically using 
Figure-1 (Baumol et al., 1982).  This graph allows for visually comparing the cost of 
separately producing a specific amount of goods 𝑌1
∗ and 𝑌2
∗ at cost 𝐶(𝑌1
∗, 0)𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶(0, 𝑌2
∗), 
with the cost of jointly producing the same quantity of these two goods at cost 𝐶(𝑌1
∗ , 𝑌2
∗).  
Graphically, 𝐶(𝑌1
∗, 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑌2
∗) is the sum of the heights of the cost surface over the 
corresponding coordinates on the axes and 𝐶(𝑌1
∗ , 𝑌2
∗)  is the height of the cost surface at 
coordinate (𝑌1
∗ , 𝑌2
∗) .  The two separate rays that include the cost of producing the two 
goods separately are used to construct the hyper-plane 0AB, such that the limit of the 
plane is reached at the production level derived when producing both products at the 
specified output levels (𝑌1
∗ , 𝑌2
∗).     Hence, the cost associated with producing both 
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products separately at these levels is depicted by coordinate D and depicts cost 
𝐶(𝑌1
∗, 0)  +  𝐶(0, 𝑌2
∗). Economies of scope is achieved if the height of the cost surface at 
the output levels (𝑌1
∗ , 𝑌2
∗) coordinate derived when producing the two goods jointly 
𝐶(𝑌1
∗ , 𝑌2
∗) lies beneath the hyper-plane. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-1: Economies of scope. Adapted from Contestable Markets and the Theory of 
Industry Structure (p.72), Baumol, W. J., Panzar, J. C., & Willig, R. D., 1988, New York, 
Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 
 
 
An often cited source of economies of scope is the presence of ‘public inputs’ in 
the production process.4  Baumol et al. (1982, pp. 75-76) explain that while these public 
inputs can be used to produce one good, they are available without additional cost for use 
                                                 
4 The term ‘public input’ is taken from Marshall (1925), as he identifies these inputs as factors that are 
readily shared by the processes used to produce several different outputs.  He points to the use of sheep for 
wool and mutton, cows for the production of beef and hides, and grain for the production of wheat and 
straw.  
𝐶(𝑌1
∗ , 𝑌2
∗) 
A 
D 
B 
Y2 
222 
𝐶(0 , 𝑌2
∗) 
C(Y1,Y
2) 
Y1 222 
𝐶(𝑌1
∗, 0) 
(0, 𝑌2
∗) 
(𝑌1
∗ , 𝑌2
∗)                             (𝑌1
∗, 0) 
Y
1 
22
2 
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in the production of other goods.  As an example, these authors observe generating 
capacity of utility companies as a public input that can be used to provide energy services 
during peak and off-peak period without additional cost from using the capacity of the 
plant.  Indeed, the cost of the plant itself is fixed.  This thread of logic can be easily 
applied to rail, as Pepall et al. (1999, p.93) reveal railroad tracks are fixed cost whose use 
does not vary if service is provided to haul freight or to haul passengers.  In contrast, 
additional cost is incurred if two separate firms built their own tracks such that one 
company provided freight service and the other provided passenger service. 
For the purposes of this study the relevance of economies of scope as an approach 
for analyzing cost efficiency associated with rail abandonment is it allows for examining 
the cost effect of jointly providing unit (U), way (W) and through (T) train service. 
Consistent with Pepall, Richard and Norman’s observation, a contributing reason for 
economies of scope in unit, way and through train service is sharing the existing railroad 
tracks. Another reason given by Growitsch and Wetzel (2009, p.5) is the “potential 
transaction cost savings within an integrated organization since railroad services are 
characterized by a high level of technological and transactional interdependence between 
infrastructure and operations”. Economies of scope can also arise from sharing “use of 
headquarters services such as management, marketing or communication services” 
(Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009, p.2).  There is also the possibility that joint production 
does contribute to higher cost faced when separate companies provide disjointed 
production of these transportation services.  For example, Allen et al. (2002) indicate that 
following regulatory reform in the rail industry class-1 carriers emphasized operating a 
wholesale type of business requiring greater use of high speed unit trains and intermodal 
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trains for longer distances.  Hence, the retail part of the business that provides service to 
smaller customers, such as rural farmers, required costly time intensive switching and 
slow speed operations, especially given the high-wage, highly unionized class-1 work 
force.5  In contrast, the work force of shortline carriers is non-union employees. Allen et 
al. (2002) also observe shortline carriers enjoy a cost advantage focusing on short-haul 
(way) service because their operation requires less capital investment because of the low 
speeds associated with this service allows for less investment in track and motive power. 
Testing whether economies of scope providing different types of hauling services 
suggests using a conceptual framework that allows analysis of more than two services, 
however thus far for simplicity the theoretical description of economies of scope has 
focused on the two goods model. More generally for N products the description of 
economies of scope can be viewed as  mirroring the condition for subadditivity, but 
applied to a restricted set of output vectors (Sharkey, 1982) as depicted by equation (3) 
below.6 
𝐶(𝑌) + 𝐶(𝑌′) ≥ 𝐶(𝑌 + 𝑌′)        (3) 
Where 𝑌 and 𝑌′ are output vectors for N products 𝑌 = (𝑦1,𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑛) and 𝑌′ =
(𝑦′
1,
𝑦′
2
, … , 𝑦′
𝑛
) and these vectors consist of disjointed outputs such that when 𝑦𝑖, > 0, 
then 𝑦′𝑗, = 0.  Within this theoretical framework of economies of scope for unit, way and 
through train service is depicted as follows:  
𝐶(𝑌𝑈, 0,0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑌𝑊, 0) + 𝐶(0,0, 𝑌𝑇) > 𝐶(𝑌𝑈, 𝑌𝑊, 𝑌𝑇)    (4) 
                                                 
5 Peoples (2013) reports unionization rates exceeding 75 percent in the rail industry as late as 2012. 
6 While the condition for economies of scope closely resemble the condition for subaddditivity, Baumol, 
Panzar, and Willig prove that achieving economies of scope is not sufficient to satisfy the condition of 
subadditivity.  Joint production requires cost complementarity to achieve subadditivity. 
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where U: unit train service, W: way train service and T: through train service. This essay 
will refer to equation (4) as the basis for empirically testing the prevalence of economies 
of scope in the class-1 railroad sector. 
 
1.3 Empirical Tests of Economies of Scope in Rail  
Research specifically examining economies of scope for the United States railroad 
industry is relatively scarce.  One such paper by Kim (1987) empirically examines 
whether the US railroad industry’s operations satisfy the conditions for economies of 
scale and scope. He uses a generalized translog form with two categories of output of 
railroad firms, which are freight service (𝑌𝑓) measured in revenue ton-miles and (𝑌𝑝) 
measured in passenger-miles. The inputs prices used in the model are capital (𝑊𝑘), 
labour (𝑊𝑙)  and fuel or energy (𝑊𝑒). The data used for the study comprised of 56 Class I 
US railroads in 1963. The generalized translog multiproduct joint cost function used by 
Kim (1987, p.734) for the railroad industry is specified as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 [
(𝑌
𝑖
𝜆𝑖−1)
𝜆
]𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑘 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜕𝑖𝑗 [(𝑌𝑖
𝜆𝑖 − 1) /𝜆𝑖] [(𝑌𝑗
𝜆𝑗 − 1) /𝑗𝑖
𝜆𝑗] +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑙 + ∑ ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑘 [(𝑌𝑖
𝜆𝑖 − 1) /𝜆𝑖] 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑘    (5) 
where 𝜕𝑖𝑗 = 𝜕𝑗𝑖 and 𝛾𝑘𝑙 = 𝛾𝑙𝑘 and 𝜆 = a power of parameter
7.  
Kim follows Panzar and Willig’s (1977) definition of a local measure of aggregate scale 
economics for the multiproduct firms presented by the scale elasticity as follows: 
                                                 
7 In Kim’s paper, the two types of outputs, freight services and passenger service, are entered into the cost 
function using box-cox transformation where 𝑌𝑡 =
(𝑌
𝑖
𝜆𝑖−1)
𝜆
 if 𝜆𝑖 ≠ 0 and 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡  if 𝜆𝑖 = 0. 
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𝑆𝐿(𝑌,𝑊) =
[𝐶(𝑌,𝑊)]
[∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑖 ]
= 1/[∑ 𝜀𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑖 ]       (6) 
where 𝑀𝐶𝑖 is the marginal cost with respect to the ith output and 𝜀𝐶𝑌𝑖=
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖
 is the cost 
elasticity of the ith output. The cost elasticity is later expressed as 
𝜀𝐶𝑌𝑖=(𝛼𝑖) + ∑ 𝜕𝑖𝑗 [(𝑌𝑖
𝜆𝑖 − 1) /𝜆𝑗] + ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑘)𝑌𝑖
𝜆
𝑘𝑗     (7) 
At the approximation point where 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑊𝑘 = 1, the aggregate scale economies is reduced 
to    
𝑆𝐿 = 1/[∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑖 ]          (8) 
To measure the degree of economies of scope, Kim incorporates Panzar and Willig’s 
(1981) definition which is given by: 
𝑆𝐶 = [∑ 𝐶(𝑌𝑖,𝑊) − 𝐶(𝑌,𝑊)𝑖 ]/𝐶(𝑌,𝑊)      (9) 
where SC measures the percentage cost savings (increase) resulting from joint 
production. If economies of scope is present, the term SC will have a positive sign. From 
here, Kim measures the degree of economies of scope for his railroad model as the 
following: 
𝑆𝐶 = [𝐶(𝑌𝐹 , 0,𝑊) + 𝐶(0, 𝑌𝑃,𝑊) − 𝐶(𝑌𝐹, 𝑌𝑃,𝑊)]/𝐶(𝑌𝐹, 𝑌𝑃,𝑊)   (10) 
At the point of approximation, Kim (1987, p.736) derives the scope economies as the 
following: 
𝑆𝐶 = [𝑒
(𝛼0−
𝛼𝐹
𝜆𝐹
+
𝛿𝐹𝐹
2𝜆𝐹
2 )
+ 𝑒
(𝛼0−
𝛼𝑃
𝜆𝑃
+
𝛿𝑃𝑃
2𝜆𝑃
2 )
− 𝑒(𝛼0)] /𝑒(𝛼0)    (11) 
Kim’s analysis on the railroads carriers in the 1963 shows estimated aggregate 
scale economies is 1.063 implying the existence of mild overall economies of scale for 
US railroads. Furthermore, the estimated degree of scope economies shows a value of      
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-0.410 implying the presence of diseconomies of scope. He interprets these results as 
suggesting that “the cost of providing freight and passenger services separately would be 
41% smaller than the cost of producing them jointly” (Kim, 1987, p.738). Kim 
emphasizes that both of these findings “cast doubt” on the possibility that US railroad 
industry exhibits the characteristics of a natural monopoly, at least when jointly providing 
freight and passenger service.  Even though these results are somewhat dated, this 
information is significant to the overall analysis on economies of scope, in part because 
they indicate cost-savings are far from guaranteed when transporting different types of 
loads,  Even if shared track and terminals would seem to provide cost advantages of a 
‘public inputs’.  
Cost research using more recent data to examine whether the US rail industry 
exhibits characteristics of a natural monopoly is provided by Bitzan (2003).  He 
empirically test whether the condition for subadditivity is satisfied to class-1 rail carriers, 
and uses these results to make observations regarding economies of scale and scope for 
this industry. He uses the following generalized quasi-cost function as the basis for his 
analysis. 
𝑄𝐶 = 𝑄𝐶 (
𝑤𝑙, 𝑤𝑚+𝑠, 𝑤𝑓 , 𝑤𝑒 , 𝑈𝑇𝐺𝑇𝑀,𝑊𝑇𝐺𝑇𝑀, 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝑇𝑀,
𝑀𝑂𝑅, 𝐴𝐿𝐻, 𝑇𝑅𝐾,𝑊𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
)     (12) 
where 𝑄𝐶 is the cost excluding way and structure costs, 𝑤𝑙 is the price of labor, 𝑤𝑚+𝑠 is 
the price of materials and supplies, 𝑤𝑓 is the price of fuel, 𝑤𝑒 is the price of equipment, 
𝑈𝑇𝐺𝑇𝑀  is the adjusted unit train gross ton miles, 𝑊𝑇𝐺𝑇𝑀  is the adjusted way train 
gross ton miles, 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝑇𝑀  is the adjusted through train gross ton miles, 𝑀𝑂𝑅  is the route 
miles, 𝐴𝐿𝐻 is the average length of haul, 𝑇𝑅𝐾  is the miles of track per mile of road, 
𝑊𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃  is the net investment in way and structures per mile of track. 
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He identifies two basic cost issues addressed in the paper. Firstly, whether 
efficiency decreases resulting from roadway maintenance separation from transport 
service.  Secondly, whether economies of scale and scope exist in providing transport 
services. For the first cost issue, he tested the cost function for separability. His 
estimation results suggest that there are cost savings resulting from jointly producing the 
roadway and the transport services over it. Thus, multiple firm operations over the rail 
line will probably produce an increase in costs. To address the second cost issue, the 
output-cost relationships estimated from this function are then used to test the condition 
of cost subadditivity by simulating single firm and two firms under various output 
combinations. He follows Shin and Ying’s (1992) simulation approach used to test 
whether the condition of subadditivity is met.  This approach tests whether monopoly 
cost designated by the term 𝐶(𝑞𝑀) is less than the summation of total cost accrued by 
smaller hypothetical firms a and b producing the same aggregate output as the monopoly 
firm.  This subadditivity condition is designated by the following inequality: 
𝐶(𝑞𝑀) < 𝐶(𝑞𝑎) + 𝐶(𝑞𝑏)  where 𝐶(𝑞𝑀) = 𝐶(𝑞1
𝑀, 𝑞2
𝑀, 𝑞3
𝑀); 
𝐶(𝑞𝑎) = 𝐶(𝜑𝑞1
𝑀, 𝜌𝑞2
𝑀, 𝛾𝑞3
𝑀);  𝐶(𝑞𝑏) = 𝐶((1 − 𝜑)𝑞1
𝑀, (1 − 𝜌)𝑞2
𝑀, (1 − 𝛾)𝑞3
𝑀)     (13) 
where  𝜑, 𝜌, 𝛾 = (0.1, 0.2, … ,0.9); 𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3 = unit train, way train and through train gross 
ton miles. 
Parameter results derived from estimating quasi-cost function is then used to 
estimate one-firm and two-firm quasi-costs, where all variables besides outputs, time and 
miles of road are placed at their sample means. Bitzan (2003, p.218) further mentions that 
“the single-firm and two-firm costs are estimated by splitting the three outputs into a 
unique vector combination of 365 for each of the observations that have positive 
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marginal quasi-costs associated with each type of output”. From the subadditivity 
simulations for costs for observations having positive marginal costs, between the years 
1983 to 1997, the range of percentage for cost subadditivity condition met is between 1.3 
percent and 73.4 percent of the simulations where before the year 1990, less than 50 
percent of the simulations in the year met the condition for cost subadditivity. The 
condition for cost subadditivity is satisfied for more than half the simulations for the 
observation sample covering the years 1991 onwards. It is important to note, initially, he 
claimed that if economies of scale and scope are realized in providing transport service 
over this network, after way and structures costs are eliminated, then “multiple-firm 
operation over a single network will result in an increase in costs” (Bitzan, 2003, p.204). 
Testing directly the condition for subadditivity through simulation, he suggests that 
railroads are natural monopolies in providing transport services over their own network 
and thus suggesting that “multiple-firm competition over a single rail network would lead 
to cost increases” (Bitzan, 2003, p.218). While satisfying subadditivity suggests the 
strong possibility of economies of scope, Baumol et al. (1982) and Sharkey (1982) prove 
that economies of scope is not a necessary or sufficient condition for subadditivity.  
Rather, these researchers show trans-ray convexity or cost complementarities are 
necessary to ensure subadditivity for multiple outputs. Cost complementarity requires 
that a decline in marginal or incremental costs of any output as the output or any other 
output increase.  Nonetheless, findings using more recent cost data than that used in 
Kim’s study suggests greater possibility of cost-saving through joint production 
following deregulation in the US railroad industry. 
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Succeeding research by Ivaldi and McCullough (2004) extends the work of Bitzan 
by directly testing for economies of scope. They use regulatory reports filed by 22 major 
US freight railroads for the period 1978-2001 in order to evaluate the technological 
feasibility of separating vertically integrated firms into an infrastructure company and 
competing operating firms. Two tests are conducted which are an infrastructure 
separation test and an operational separation test. The first tests whether the cost function 
is subadditive between network operations and infrastructure, whereas, the second tests 
whether the cost function is subadditive across types of operations.  Ivaldi and 
McCullough (2004) definition for both separations are as follows: 
 
Definition of infrastructure separation: Let 𝑦𝑆 and 𝑦𝑇 represent an orthogonal 
partition of the output vector y into operational activities (𝑦𝑆) and infrastructure-
related activities (𝑦𝑇). The cost function is subadditive between operations and 
infrastructure costs if and only if 𝐶(𝑦) < 𝐶(𝑦𝑆, 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑇). 
Definition of operational separation: The cost function for operations is 
subadditive between operations if for any and all vectors 𝑦𝑖 ≠ 𝑦   𝑠. 𝑡 , 𝐶(𝑦𝑠, 0) <
∑𝐶(𝑦𝑖, 0). (Ivaldi and McCullough, 2004, p.5-6). 
 
A multiproduct generalized McFadden cost function is estimated that includes 
both operational and infrastructure outputs. A vertical production process is assumed in 
which “quasi –fixed land and other inputs (fuel, materials, labor, and equipment) are first 
transformed into infrastructure outputs and then into differentiated car-miles” (Ivaldi and 
McCullough, 2004, p.11). The general rail cost model is given by 
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𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝐵, 𝑦𝐸 , 𝑦𝐼 , 𝑤𝐿 , 𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝐹, 𝑤𝑀; 𝐻, 𝑅, 𝑇, 𝑈, 𝜃) + 𝜌𝑅    (14) 
where 𝑦𝐵is the car-miles of bulk traffic (i.e. open hopper, closed hopper, tank), 𝑦𝐸 is the 
car-miles of general traffic (i.e. intermodal, auto-carriers, gondolas and box cars), 𝑦𝐼 is 
the replacement ties installed in a given year, 𝑤𝐿is the index of labor prices, 𝑤𝐸is the 
index of equipment prices, 𝑤𝐹 is the index of fuel prices, 𝑤𝑀 is the index of material 
prices and other input prices, 𝐻 is the average length of haul, 𝑅 is the miles of road 
operated, 𝑇 is the years, 𝑈 is the percent car-miles moving in unit trains, 𝜃 is the fixed 
effect and 𝜌 is the opportunity cost of capital. Fixed capital quantity is land which is 
measured by miles of road (R). Furthermore H and U allow differentiating railroads in 
terms of their network structures. The variable 𝑦𝐼 represents measure of infrastructure 
department activities. The variables 𝑦𝐵 and 𝑦𝐸represent bulk operational output and 
general freight operational output respectively.  
Among major findings from Ivaldi and McCullough’s paper is the existence of 
significant cost complementarities between outputs 𝑦𝐵 and 𝑦𝐸, and also between 𝑦𝐼 and 
both of the operational outputs. The second-order output related parameter estimates 
between 𝑦𝐵and 𝑦𝐸, and between 𝑦𝐸and 𝑦𝐼 are negatively siginificant whereas between  
𝑦𝐵and 𝑦𝐼 is positively significant. Furthermore, they propose a testing method based on 
definition of cost subaditivity to measure the technical cost of separating network 
technologies into infrastructure components and operating components. Two simulations 
are done. Firstly is the infrastructure separation where the subadditivity condition is given 
by 𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝐵, 𝑦𝐸 , 𝑦𝐼) ≤ 𝜕𝐶
0 + 𝐶𝑉(𝑦𝐵, 𝑦𝐸 , 0) + 𝐶
𝑉(0,0, 𝑦𝐼) where 𝜕𝐶
0 is the degree to which 
start-up costs are duplicated when production is unbundled. Secondly, is the operational 
separation where the subadditivity condition is given by𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝐵, 𝑦𝐸 , 0) ≤ 𝜕𝐶
0 +
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𝐶𝑉(𝛼𝑦𝐵 , 𝛽𝑦𝐸 , 0) + 𝐶
𝑉([1 − 𝛼]𝑦𝐵, [1 − 𝛽]𝑦𝐸 , 0). A vertical production process is 
assumed where land, fuel, materials, labor, equipment are first transformed into 
infrastructure outputs and then into differentiated car- miles. This assumption allows 
them to examine the technological aspects of vertical and horizontal integration.  
The result for infrastructure separation suggests complementarities exist between 
infrastructure-related activities and train operations and the result from operational 
separation suggests complementarities exist between types of freight hauled. This essay 
contributes to the empirical literature on economies of scope in the US rail industry by 
directly testing whether for economies of scope exist when jointly providing different 
types of hauling service in contrast to Ivaldi and McCullough (2004) test on the different 
types of product hauled.  As mentioned earlier in the essay the motivation for such an 
analysis is it allows for examining whether providing short-haul service  is cost efficient 
for those class-1 carriers that continue to offer this service, even when evidence suggests 
that carriers specializing in short-haul service experience cost saving advantages relative 
to the class-1 carriers.  
1.4 Data 
To examine the possibility of short-haul (way) transport services contributing to 
economies of scope in the post deregulation US rail industry, this essay uses data from 
Class I Annual Reports (R-I reports) covers the observation period from 1983 until 2008. 
The overall data are collected in three forms. Firstly, from 1983 to 1995, the data are 
available in the form of raw file. SAS statistical package is used to extract the needed 
data. Secondly, from 1996 to 2004, the data are available in the form of EXCEL files 
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uploaded in the Surface Transportation Board (STB) website. However these data are not 
comprehensive since only selected schedules are available.  
To complete the schedule, two trips to the STB library in Washington DC were 
made and remaining schedules were obtained from taking snapshots on the library 
microfiche collections and their information saved into a pdf file. Thirdly, from 2005 to 
2008, the data collected are in the form of pdf files uploaded in the STB website. For 
these years, the whole annual reports are uploaded. From these three different forms, the 
needed data were extracted, gathered and constructed into a common Excel file. The 
variables’ sources and constructions are adapted from Bitzan and Keeler (2003) and 
summarized in Appendix A. 
Data from eight schedules are gathered namely Schedule 335, Schedule 352B, 
Schedule 410, Schedule 415, Schedule 700, Schedule 720, Schedule 750 and Schedule 
755 from all R1 railroad carriers. The cost function is represented by  C = C(w, y, a, T) 
where C is the real total cost, w is the five factor prices (labor, equipment, fuel, material 
and supply, way and structures), y is the three output variables or three types of train 
services provided by the railroad carriers (unit train service, way train service, through 
train service), a is the technological conditions and T is the time trend representing the 
technology. The real total cost variable is calculated as follows: 
real total cost =
(opercost−capexp+roird+roilcm+roicrs)
gdppd
       (15) 
where  opercost = railroad operating cost,  
capexp = capital expenditures,  
roird = return on investment in road,  
roilcm = return on investment in locomotives,  
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roicrs = return on investment in cars and  
gdppd = GDP price deflator  
Each of the components in equation (15) are initially constructed using the following 
equations multiplied with the cost of capital available from Association of American 
Railroads (AAR) railroad facts.  
roird = (roadinv − accdepr) ∗ costkap      (16) 
where roadinv = road investment , 
accdepr = accumulated depreciation  
 
roilcm = [(iboloco + locinvl) − (acdoloco + locacdl)] ∗ costkap  (17) 
where iboloco = investment base in owned locomotives,                                             
locinvl = investment base in leased locomotives,                                                                  
acdoloco = accumulated depreciation of owned locomotives,                                           
locacdl = accumulated depreciation of leased locomotives  
   
roicrs = [(ibocars + carinvl) − (acdocars + caracdl)] ∗ costkap   (18) 
where ibocars = investment base in owned cars ,    
carinvl = investment base in leased cars     
acdocars = accumulated depreciation of owned cars    
caracdl =  accumulated depreciation of leased cars    
 
An adjusted factor is multiplied with each of the output variable. The adjusted factor is 
given as:   
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rtm
utgtm+wtgtm+ttgtm
         (19) 
where   rtm = revenue ton miles, 
utgtm =  unit train gross ton miles,    
wtgtm = way train gross ton miles and 
ttgtm =  through train gross ton miles    
The labor price per hour is calculated by: 
labor price per hour =
swge+fringe−caplab
lbhrs
      (20) 
where swge =  total salary and wages,                       
fringe = fringe benefits,                                                                                                     
caplab = labor portion of capital expenditure classificationas operation         
lbhrs = labor hours  
 
Equipment price is the weighted average equipment price. This takes into account the 
return on investment, annual depreciation, lease/rental payments per car and locomotive 
weighted by the type of equipment’s share in the total equipment cost. Further, the fuel 
price is measured as price per gallon. The material and supply price is calculated from the 
AAR material and supply index. The last input price in the cost function is the way and 
structure price. This is shown by the following equation: 
 way and structures price =
roird+anndeprd
mot
       (21) 
where  annedeprd = annual depreciation of road and  
mot = miles of track 
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The factor prices are in real term after dividing by the gross domestic product price 
deflator. For the technological condition, the speed variable measuring train miles per 
train hour in road service is firstly constructed shown by the following equation:  
speed =
trnmls
trnhr−trnhs
         (22) 
where  trnmls = total train miles 
trnhr = train hours in road service includes train switching hours 
trnhs = train hours in train switching     
   
The average length of haul is constructed by dividing revenue ton miles with 
revenue tons and caboose variable representing the fraction of train miles with cabooses 
is constructed by dividing caboose miles with total train miles. Table-2 represents merger 
information taken from Bitzan and Keeler (2003, p. 240) which allow for appropriately 
addressing the carrier fixed effects.  
Table-2: Merger information on railroad carriers 
 
Railroad  
Burlington Northern (BN) 1983-2008 
 Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe (ATSF) 1983-1995, then merged into BN 
 
Boston & Maine (BM) 1983-1986 
 
Consolidated Rail Corporation (CR) 1983-1997 
 
CSX Transportation (CSX) 1986-2008 
 Baltimore & Ohio (BO) 1983-1985, then merged with CO SCL to form CSX 
 Chesapeake & Ohio (CO) 1983-1985, then merged with BO SCL to form CSX 
 Seaboard Coast Line (SCL) 1983 – 1985, then merged with BO and CO to form CSX 
 
Delaware & Hudson (DH) 1983-1987 
 
Duluth Missabe & Iron Range (DMIR) 1984 
 
Florida East Coast (FEC) 1985-1991 
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Grand Trunk & Western (GTW) 1983-1997 
 Detroit Toledo & Ironton 1983 (DTI), then merged into GTW 
 
Illinois Central Gulf (ICG) 1983-1998 
 
Kansas City Southern (KCS) 1983-2008 
 
Norfolk Southern (NS) 1985-2008 
 Norfolk & Western (NW) 1984, then merged with SRS to form NS 
 Southern Railway System (SRS) 1983-1984, then merged with NW to form NS 
 
Pittsburgh Lake Erie (PLE) 1983-1984 
 
SOO Line (SOO) 1984-2008 
 Milwaukee Road (MILW) 1983-1984, then merged into SOO 
 
Union Pacific (UP) 1983-2008 
 Chicago & Northwestern (CNW) 1983-1994, then merged into UP 
 Missouri Pacific (MP) 1983-1985, then merged into UP 
 Missouri-Kansas-Texas (MKT) 1983-1987, then merged into UP 
 Southern Pacific (SP) 1983-1996, merged into UP 
o Saint Louis Southwestern (SSW) 1983-1989, then merged into SP 
o Denver Rio Grande & Western (DRGW) 1983-1993, then merged into SP 
 Western Pacific (WP) 1984-1985, then merged into UP 
 
Note. Adapted from “Productivity growth and some of its determinants in the deregulated US 
railroad industry.” by Bitzan, J. D., & Keeler, T. E., 2003, Southern Economic Journal, p.240. 
 
1.5 Empirical Approach 
The quadratic cost function is commonly used to analyze economies of scope. Baumol et 
al. (1982) suggested it as an appropriate specification to examine economies of scope 
since it allows for zero outputs in the estimation.  The popular method of translog 
specification in estimating multi-product cost function becomes a drawback when the 
objective is to obtain a direct estimate for economies of scope. Substituting zero outputs 
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will give undefined estimations for log values.8 Further, the practice of using Box-Cox 
transformation for zero outputs are seen as inherently non-robust in examining economies 
of scope (Pulley and Humphrey, 1991). This robustness problem when using translog 
specification is due to its degenerate limiting behavior (Roller, 1990). To get a direct test 
for economies of scope, a well-behaved cost function must be chosen and resolve the in-
built interpolation problem (Pulley and Humphrey, 1993). To find a well suited cost 
function in examining economies of scope, Pulley and Braunstein (1992) estimated a set 
of alternative functional forms.9 They suggested the composite cost function as the 
chosen specification but admit that no attempt was done to impose regularity conditions. 
The composite cost function was selected based on its highest log-likelihood value rather 
than satisfying regularity conditions, since 45 percent of observations violated concavity 
in prices. They argued that regularity condition and statistical fit are most unlikely to be 
well-matched in selecting the right functional form. In addition, due to the non-linear in 
parameters and meaningless interpretation for the coefficients this form is less commonly 
used (Triebs et al., 2012).   
The quadratic cost function is widely used as direct estimation for economies of 
scope when firstly introduced by Lau (1974), recommended by Baumol et al. (1982) and 
further developed by Mayo (1984). However, the quadratic cost function does not 
necessarily satisfy the condition of homogeneity in input prices. Any parametric 
constraints to impose homogeneity leads the function to loss its flexibility form (Caves et 
                                                 
8 Cowing and Holtmann (1983) examined the economies of scope for various groups of hospital outputs. 
Translog cost function was used where ln e = ln y when y = 0. The values of e were 0.1, 0.01 and 0.001.  
However they reported the results as instable and should be given limited considerations.  
9 A general specification is developed which nested the translog cost function, generalized translog cost 
function, separable quadratic cost function and composite cost function. Economies of scope in banking was 
examined for these five specifications using 205 banks sample of year 1988. 
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al., 1980).10 This violation in regulatory condition of any cost function can be overcome 
by normalizing the cost and factor input variable with one of the factor prices.  This essay 
uses the normalized quadratic cost function introduced by Diewert and Wales (1988).11 
The condition for linear homogeneity of this form is said to be satisfied by construction.12 
Besides being the simplest form of Taylor series expansion of second order, its Hessian 
matrix contains only constant numbers. Therefore, the normalized quadratic function has 
a distinctive feature whereby it can impose the desired curvature in a parsimonious way 
without sacrifice its flexibility (Diewert and Fox, 2009). It is common that most 
estimated flexible functional forms have a tendency of failing the curvature condition 
(Diewert and Wales, 1987). Since regularity conditions are important and should be 
satisfied by all observations in the estimation, this unique characteristic serves as a reason 
for this essay to use the normalized quadratic cost function as an approximation of the 
true underlying cost function.13  
In this essay, the cost structure introduced by Bitzan and Keeler (2003) is used to 
construct the normalized quadratic cost function. The total cost function14 is specified as   
𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑦𝑘, 𝑎𝑚, 𝑡)          (23)  
                                                 
10 A function is considered flexible if “there are no restrictions on its free parameters” (Diewert and Wales, 
1988, p. 303).  
11 Prior of using normalized quadratic cost function, this essay has also estimated a generalized translog cost 
function introduced by Caves et al. (1980) which accommodates zero output values through Box-Cox 
transformation. However, the results were disappointing when analyzing economies of scope. The values are 
unreliable which Pulley and Humphrey (1991, p. 12) mentioned that “the difficulties with the translog cost 
behavior in the neighborhood of zero will remain”. Furthermore, even when substituting a very small positive 
value for zero in a translog cost function, the form will still “badly behaved in a region around zero” (Pulley 
and Humphrey, 1993, p.440)   
12 Proof for linear homogeneity is shown in Appendix B. 
13 It is common to impose global curvature rather impose monotinicity for normalized quadratic function 
(Barnett and Usui, 2006). 
14 The total cost function is a long run specification as it is reasonable to assume that the rail carriers are 
able to optimally adjust their capital stock to output changes. 
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 𝑤𝑖 = (𝑤𝐿 , 𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝐹 , 𝑤𝑀, 𝑤𝑊𝑆)15 
 𝑦𝑘 = (𝑦𝑈, 𝑦𝑊, 𝑦𝑇) 
𝑎𝑚 = (𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠, 𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑, 𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑢𝑙 , 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒) 
where  𝐶 is the total cost, 𝑤𝐿 is the labor price, 𝑤𝐸 is the equipment price, 𝑤𝐹 is the fuel 
price, 𝑤𝑀 is the material and supplies price, 𝑤𝑊𝑆 is the way and structures price, 𝑦𝑈 is the 
adjusted unit train gross ton miles, 𝑦𝑊 is the adjusted way train gross ton miles, 𝑦𝑇 is the 
adjusted through train gross ton miles, 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 is the miles of road, 𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 is the train 
miles per train hour, 𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑢𝑙 is the average length of haul, 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 is the fraction of train 
miles operated with caboose and  𝑡 represent time trend capturing the changes in 
technology. The above cost function can be estimated by incorporating the second order 
Taylor series expansion. Following the usual practice, the mean16 is used as base point for 
the approximation. The Taylors expansion is shown in the following equation: 
𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑦𝑘, 𝑎𝑚, 𝑡) =
𝐶(?̅?𝑖, ?̅?𝑘, ?̅?𝑚, 𝑡) 
0!
 
                                                 
15 The issue of endogeneity may arise when estimation includes input prices as cost determinants. This 
concern is highlighted by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) when estimating the production function. They 
propose the use of intermediate inputs as proxy variables to overcome the endogeneity problem between 
input levels and unobserved productivity shock. On the other hand, the vast literature on cost functions 
used to examine the transportation industry does not consider input prices as endogenous (Bitzan and 
Peoples, 2014; Bitzan and Keeler, 2014; Mizutani and Uranishi, 2013; Bereskin, 2009; Bitzan and Wilson, 
2007; Farsi et al., 2007a; Ivaldi and McCullough, 2004; Bitzan and Keeler, 2003; Bitzan, 2003; Bitzan, 
2000; Bitzan 1999; Kim, 1987). The absence of such analysis is due in part to the mechanism by which 
input prices such as labor are determined. Most transportation labor markets are unionized and over 80 
percent of rail workers are unionized. Among the major union rail workers are United Transportation 
Union (UTU), Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE), Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way 
Employees (BMWE) and Transportation Communication Union (TCU). Rail unions have used their 
negotiation leverage to heavily discount productivity as a determinant of wages. In addition, the concern 
regarding input price as an exogenous variable has been highlighted by Bitzan and Keeler (2014). They 
argue that individual railroad firms purchase a relatively small percentage of factor inputs from the supply 
side, which makes it plausible to conclude that rail carriers might not influence input price movements and 
therefore these companies are price takers of factor inputs. Handling factor input prices as exogenous when 
estimating the cost function has been universally accepted as the norm by other transportation research. 
Nonetheless, addressing the possibility of endogeneity in factor price variables in succeeding work presents 
a path for future research on cost estimation for the transportation industry. 
16 The median can be another base point of approximation in the Taylors series expansion. 
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The partial derivatives in equation (24) are replaced with parameters from the cost 
estimation as presented in equation (25).  Applying the symmetry of second derivatives 
by Young’s theorem17, simplifying and rearranging the terms, the resulting equation is 
the quadratic cost function as shown in the following equation18: 
𝐶 = 𝛼0 + +∑ 𝛼𝑖(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖) + ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘)𝑘𝑖 + ∑ 𝜎𝑚(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚)𝑚 + 𝜃(𝑡 − 𝑡̅) 
+
1
2
∑∑𝛼𝑖𝑗(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)(𝑤𝑗 − ?̅?𝑗)
𝑗𝑖
+
1
2
∑∑𝛽𝑘𝑙(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘)(𝑦𝑙 − ?̅?𝑙)
𝑙𝑘
 
+
1
2
∑∑𝜎𝑚𝑛(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚)(𝑎𝑛 − ?̅?𝑛)
𝑛𝑚
+
1
2
𝛾(𝑡 − 𝑡̅)2 
+∑∑𝜏𝑖𝑘(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘)
𝑘𝑖
 
+∑∑𝜗𝑖𝑚(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚) + ∑∑𝜑𝑘𝑚(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚)(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘)
𝑚𝑘𝑚𝑖
 
+∑ 𝜕𝑖(𝑡 − 𝑡̅)(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖) + ∑ 𝜋𝑘(𝑡 − 𝑡̅)(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘)𝑘 + ∑ 𝜇𝑚(𝑡 − 𝑡̅)(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚) + 𝜖𝑚𝑖  
           (25) 
Tovar et al. (2007) mentioned two reasons why the variables deviation from the 
sample mean are commonly applied in research. It gives an immediate estimation of 
marginal costs and factor demand. Furthermore it increases the variables’ variations that 
avoid multicollinearity between linear, square and cross terms. The properties of any cost 
function are monotonic in factor prices and outputs, homogenous of degree one in factor 
                                                 
17 For example  
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝜕𝑦𝑘
=
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑘𝜕𝑤𝑖
 
18 This quadratic cost function with variables deviated from the means has been explained by Jara-Diaz 
(2000) as analogous with the translog form when the variables are in logs. He mentioned the quadratic and 
translog forms are flexible because no priori functions are assumed for technology or costs. Furthermore, the 
quadratic form can directly obtain the marginal costs valued at the sample mean. Farsi et al. (2007b) also 
used the procedure of demeaning all the explanatory variables from the sample mean in their cost function. 
They inferred the intercept as the production total cost at the sample mean.    
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prices and concave in factor prices. Normalization is done by choosing one of the factor 
prices as the denominator when dividing the cost and all other factor prices. This allows 
estimation of relative prices and preserves linear homogeneity in factor prices (Diaz-
Hernandez et al., 2005). In matrix form, this equation can be illustrated as follow19: 
𝐶(𝑊, 𝑌, 𝐴, 𝑇) = 𝛼0 + [𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼3 𝛼4] [
𝑤𝐿
𝑤𝐸
𝑤𝐹
𝑤𝑊𝑆
] + [𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3] [
𝑦𝑈
𝑦𝑊
𝑦𝑇
] 
+[𝜎1 𝜎2 𝜎3 𝜎4] [
𝑎𝑀
𝑎𝑆
𝑎𝐻
𝑎𝐶
] + 𝜃[𝑡] 
+
1
2
[𝑤𝐿 𝑤𝐸 𝑤𝐹 𝑤𝑊𝑆] [
𝛼11 𝛼12 𝛼13 𝛼14
𝛼21 𝛼22 𝛼23 𝛼24
𝛼31 𝛼32 𝛼33 𝛼34
𝛼41 𝛼42 𝛼43 𝛼44
] [
𝑤𝐿
𝑤𝐸
𝑤𝐹
𝑤𝑊𝑆
] 
+
1
2
[𝑦𝑈 𝑦𝑊 𝑦𝑇] [
𝛽11 𝛽12 𝛽13
𝛽21 𝛽22 𝛽23
𝛽31 𝛽32 𝛽33
] [𝑦𝑈 𝑦𝑊 𝑦𝑇] 
+
1
2
[𝑎𝑀 𝑎𝑆 𝑎𝐻 𝑎𝐶] [
𝜎11 𝜎12 𝜎13 𝜎14
𝜎21 𝜎22 𝜎23 𝜎24
𝜎31 𝜎32 𝜎33 𝜎34
𝜎41 𝜎42 𝜎43 𝜎44
] [
𝑎𝑀
𝑎𝑆
𝑎𝐻
𝑎𝐶
] 
+
1
2
𝛾[𝑡][𝑡] +[𝑤𝐿 𝑤𝐸 𝑤𝐹 𝑤𝑊𝑆] [
𝜏11 𝜏12 𝜏13
𝜏21 𝜏22 𝜏23
𝜏31 𝜏32 𝜏33
𝜏41 𝜏42 𝜏43
] [
𝑦𝑈
𝑦𝑊
𝑦𝑇
] 
+[𝑤𝐿 𝑤𝐸 𝑤𝐹 𝑤𝑊𝑆] [
𝜗11 𝜗12 𝜗13 𝜗14
𝜗21 𝜗22 𝜗23 𝜗24
𝜗31 𝜗32 𝜗33 𝜗34
𝜗41 𝜗42 𝜗43 𝜗44
] [
𝑎𝑀
𝑎𝑆
𝑎𝐻
𝑎𝐶
] 
                                                 
19 The demeaning process is not shown in the matrix form for simplicity. 
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+[𝑎𝑀 𝑎𝑆 𝑎𝐻 𝑎𝐶] [
𝜑11 𝜑12 𝜑13
𝜑21 𝜑22 𝜑23
𝜑31 𝜑32 𝜑33
𝜑41 𝜑42 𝜑43
] [
𝑦𝑈
𝑦𝑊
𝑦𝑇
] 
+[𝑡][𝛿1 𝛿2 𝛿3 𝛿4] [
𝑤𝐿
𝑤𝐸
𝑤𝐹
𝑤𝑊𝑆
] + [𝑡][𝜋1 𝜋2 𝜋3] [
𝑦𝑈
𝑦𝑊
𝑦𝑇
] 
+[𝑡][𝜇1 𝜇2 𝜇3 𝜇4] [
𝑎𝑀
𝑎𝑆
𝑎𝐻
𝑎𝐶
]        (26) 
The above equation can also be expressed as  
𝐶(𝑊, 𝑌, 𝐴, 𝑡) = 𝛼0 + (𝐴 ∗ 𝑊
′) + (𝐵 ∗ 𝑌′) + (𝐶 ∗ 𝑍′) + (𝐷 ∗ 𝑡) 
+(
1
2
∗ 𝑊 ∗ 𝐸 ∗ 𝑊′) + (
1
2
∗ 𝑌 ∗ 𝐹 ∗ 𝑌′) + (
1
2
∗ 𝑍 ∗ 𝐺 ∗ 𝑍′) + (
1
2
∗ 𝑡 ∗ 𝐻 ∗ 𝑡) 
+(𝑊 ∗ 𝐼 ∗ 𝑌′) + (𝑊 ∗ 𝐽 ∗ 𝑍′) + (𝑍 ∗ 𝐾 ∗ 𝑌′) + (𝑡 ∗ 𝐿 ∗ 𝑊′) + (𝑡 ∗ 𝑀 ∗ 𝑌′) + (𝑡 ∗ 𝑁 ∗ 𝑍′) 
           (27) 
where  
𝑊 = [𝑤𝐿 𝑤𝐸 𝑤𝐹 𝑤𝑊𝑆] ; 𝑌 = [𝑦𝑈 𝑦𝑊 𝑦𝑇] ; 𝑍 = [𝑎𝑀 𝑎𝑆 𝑎𝐻 𝑎𝐶] 
𝐴 = [𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼3 𝛼4] ; 𝐵 = [𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3] ; 𝐶 = [𝜎1 𝜎2 𝜎3 𝜎4] ; 𝐷 = [𝜃] 
𝐸 = [
𝛼11 𝛼12 𝛼13 𝛼14
𝛼21 𝛼22 𝛼23 𝛼24
𝛼31 𝛼32 𝛼33 𝛼34
𝛼41 𝛼42 𝛼43 𝛼44
] ; 𝐹 = [
𝛽11 𝛽12 𝛽13
𝛽21 𝛽22 𝛽23
𝛽31 𝛽32 𝛽33
] ; 𝐺 = [
𝜎11 𝜎12 𝜎13 𝜎14
𝜎21 𝜎22 𝜎23 𝜎24
𝜎31 𝜎32 𝜎33 𝜎34
𝜎41 𝜎42 𝜎43 𝜎44
] 
𝐻 = [𝑡] ; 𝐼 = [
𝜏11 𝜏12 𝜏13
𝜏21 𝜏22 𝜏23
𝜏31 𝜏32 𝜏33
𝜏41 𝜏42 𝜏43
] ; 𝐽 = [
𝜗11 𝜗12 𝜗13 𝜗14
𝜗21 𝜗22 𝜗23 𝜗24
𝜗31 𝜗32 𝜗33 𝜗34
𝜗41 𝜗42 𝜗43 𝜗44
] ;  
𝐾 = [
𝜑11 𝜑12 𝜑13
𝜑21 𝜑22 𝜑23
𝜑31 𝜑32 𝜑33
𝜑41 𝜑42 𝜑43
] 
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𝐿 = [𝛿1 𝛿2 𝛿3 𝛿4] ; 𝑀 = [𝜋1 𝜋2 𝜋3] ; 𝑁 = [𝜇1 𝜇2 𝜇3 𝜇4] 
Furthermore, when expanding the brackets with matrices with 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗𝑖  , 𝛽𝑘𝑙 = 𝛽𝑙𝑘 and 
𝜎𝑚𝑛 = 𝜎𝑛𝑚 , the cost function is illustrated in the following equation. 
𝐶(𝑊, 𝑌, 𝐴, 𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑤𝐿 + 𝛼2𝑤𝐸 + 𝛼3𝑤𝐹 + 𝛼4𝑤𝑊𝑆+𝛽1𝑦𝑈 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑊 + 𝛽3𝑦𝑇 
+𝜎1𝑎𝑀 + 𝜎2𝑎𝑆 + 𝜎3𝑎𝐻 + 𝜎4𝑎𝐶 + 𝜃𝑡 
+
1
2
𝛼11𝑤𝐿
2 +
1
2
𝛼22𝑤𝐸
2 +
1
2
𝛼33𝑤𝐹
2 +
1
2
𝛼44𝑤𝑊𝑆
2 +
1
2
𝛽11𝑦𝑈
2 +
1
2
𝛽22𝑦𝑊
2 +
1
2
𝛽33𝑦𝑇
2 
+
1
2
𝜎11𝑎𝑀
2 +
1
2
𝜎22𝑎𝑆
2 +
1
2
𝜎33𝑎𝐻
2 +
1
2
𝜎44𝑎𝐶
2 +
1
2
𝛾𝑡2 
+𝛼12𝑤𝐿𝑤𝐸 + 𝛼13𝑤𝐿𝑤𝐹 + 𝛼14𝑤𝐿𝑤𝑊𝑆+𝛼23𝑤𝐸𝑤𝐹 + 𝛼24𝑤𝐸𝑤𝑊𝑆+𝛼34𝑤𝐹𝑤𝑊𝑆 
+𝛽12𝑦𝑈𝑦𝑊 + 𝛽13𝑦𝑈𝑦𝑇+𝛽23𝑦𝑊𝑦𝑇 + 𝜎12𝑎𝑀𝑎𝑆 + 𝜎13𝑎𝑀𝑎𝐻 + 𝜎14𝑎𝑀𝑎𝐶 
+𝜎23𝑎𝑆𝑎𝐻 + 𝜎24𝑎𝑆𝑎𝐶+𝜎34𝑎𝐻𝑎𝐶 + 𝜏11𝑤𝐿𝑦𝑈 + 𝜏12𝑤𝐿𝑦𝑊 + 𝜏13𝑤𝐿𝑦𝑇 
+𝜏21𝑤𝐸𝑦𝑈 + 𝜏22𝑤𝐸𝑦𝑊 + 𝜏23𝑤𝐸𝑦𝑇 + 𝜏31𝑤𝐹𝑦𝑈 + 𝜏32𝑤𝐹𝑦𝑊 + 𝜏33𝑤𝐹𝑦𝑇 
+𝜏41𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑦𝑈 + 𝜏42𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑦𝑊 + 𝜏43𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑦𝑇 
+𝜗11𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑀 + 𝜗12𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑆 + 𝜗13𝑤𝐿𝑎𝐻 + 𝜗14𝑤𝐿𝑎𝐶 
+𝜗21𝑤𝐸𝑎𝑀 + 𝜗22𝑤𝐸𝑎𝑆 + 𝜗23𝑤𝐸𝑎𝐻 + 𝜗24𝑤𝐸𝑎𝐶 
+𝜗31𝑤𝐹𝑎𝑀 + 𝜗32𝑤𝐹𝑎𝑆 + 𝜗33𝑤𝐹𝑎𝐻 + 𝜗34𝑤𝐹𝑎𝐶 
+𝜗41𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑎𝑀 + 𝜗42𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑎𝑆 + 𝜗43𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑎𝐻 + 𝜗44𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑎𝐶 
+𝜑11𝑎𝑀𝑦𝑈 + 𝜑12𝑎𝑀𝑦𝑊 + 𝜑13𝑎𝑀𝑦𝑇 + 𝜑21𝑎𝑆𝑦𝑈 + 𝜑22𝑎𝑆𝑦𝑊 + 𝜑23𝑎𝑆𝑦𝑇 
+𝜑31𝑎𝐻𝑦𝑈 + 𝜑32𝑎𝐻𝑦𝑊 + 𝜑33𝑎𝐻𝑦𝑇 + 𝜑41𝑎𝐶𝑦𝑈 + 𝜑42𝑎𝐶𝑦𝑊 + 𝜑43𝑎𝐶𝑦𝑇 
+𝛿1𝑤𝐿𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑤𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑤𝐹𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑡 + 𝜋1𝑦𝑈𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑦𝑊𝑡 + 𝜋3𝑦𝑇𝑡 
+𝜇1𝑎𝑀𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑎𝑆𝑡 + 𝜇3𝑎𝐻𝑡 + 𝜇4𝑎𝐶𝑡       (28) 
Applying Shephard’s Lemma obtains each factor demand equations. This is done 
by differentiating the cost function with respect to its price as shown below: 
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𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 𝑥𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑗 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑦𝑘 + ∑ 𝜗𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑚 +𝑚𝑘𝑗 𝛾𝑖𝑡     (29) 
The factor demand equations together with the cost function are estimated in a seemingly 
unrelated regression system. In testing for the concavity, the Hessian matrix is used and 
since one of the factor prices is used for normalizing, the Hessian matrix consists of only 
four factor prices. To satisfy the condition of concavity in factor prices, the Hessian 
matrix which is matrix E should be negative semi definite.20 For normalized quadratic 
cost function, its Hessian matrix consists of only scalars. The condition for concavity in 
input prices represents all observations in the sample in which global concavity is 
investigated rather than local concavity. This is different compared to translog cost 
function where each observation has its own calculated Hessian matrix.21 When global 
concavity is violated, curvature imposition can be achieved using the Cholesky 
decomposition technique. Curvature imposition can be carried out by rerun the cost 
function replacing the matrix of input prices parameters for the cost function. From 
equation before, to ensure a negative semi-definite Hessian, matrix E can be 
reparameterized by  E= −𝐾𝐾′  where K is a lower triangular matrix K such that  
𝐸 = −𝐾𝐾′ = −[
𝑘11 0 0 0
𝑘21 𝑘22 0 0
𝑘31 𝑘32 𝑘33 0
𝑘41 𝑘42 𝑘43 𝑘44
] [
𝑘11 𝑘21 𝑘31 𝑘41
0 𝑘22 𝑘32 𝑘42
0 0 𝑘33 𝑘43
0 0 0 𝑘44
] 
                                                 
20 The Hessian matrix is negative semi definite when every principal minor with odd order is ≤ 0 and every 
principal with even order is ≥ 0. 𝐻𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤1
2
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤1𝜕𝑤2
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤1𝜕𝑤3
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤1𝜕𝑤4
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤2𝜕𝑤1
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤2
2
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤2𝜕𝑤3
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤2𝜕𝑤4
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤3𝜕𝑤1
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤3𝜕𝑤2
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤3
2
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤3𝜕𝑤4
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤4𝜕𝑤1
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤4𝜕𝑤2
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤4𝜕𝑤3
𝜕2𝑐
𝜕𝑤4
2 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21Local concavity can be imposed when estimating a translog cost function. This imposition ensures that 
concavity holds at one data point. Chua et al. (2005) imposed local concavity and found a significant increase 
in the number of observations that satisfies local concavity after the imposition of curvature.  
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=
[
 
 
 
 
−𝑘11
2 −𝑘11𝑘21 −𝑘11𝑘31 −𝑘11𝑘41
−𝑘11𝑘21 −(𝑘21
2 + 𝑘22
2 ) −(𝑘21𝑘31 + 𝑘22𝑘32) −(𝑘21𝑘41 + 𝑘22𝑘42)
−𝑘11𝑘31 −(𝑘21𝑘31 + 𝑘22𝑘32) −(𝑘31
2 + 𝑘32
2 + 𝑘33
2 ) −(𝑘31𝑘41 + 𝑘32𝑘42 + 𝑘33𝑘43)
−𝑘11𝑘41 −(𝑘21𝑘41 + 𝑘22𝑘42) −(𝑘31𝑘41 + 𝑘32𝑘42 + 𝑘33𝑘43) −(𝑘41
2 + 𝑘42
2 + 𝑘43
2 + 𝑘44
2 ) ]
 
 
 
 
 
           (30) 
The elements of matrix above replaces the parameters in the cost function and factor 
demand equations which represents the curvature imposition. This actually made the 
system of equations no longer linear in parameters.   
The use of normalized quadratic function enables testing the existence of 
economies of scope for the rail carriers since it allows evaluation at zero outputs. 
Following Baumol et al. (1982), the global economies of scope for the production of the 
three train services is shown in the following equation22: 
𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 = C(yU, 0,0) + C(0, yW, 0) + C(0,0, yT) − C(yU, yW, yT)     
= 2 *(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑤𝐿 + 𝛼2𝑤𝐸 + 𝛼3𝑤𝐹 + 𝛼4𝑤𝑊𝑆 + 𝜎1𝑎𝑀 + 𝜎2𝑎𝑆 + 𝜎3𝑎𝐻 + 𝜎4𝑎𝐶 + 𝜃𝑡 
+
1
2
𝛼11𝑤𝐿
2 +
1
2
𝛼22𝑤𝐸
2 +
1
2
𝛼33𝑤𝐹
2 +
1
2
𝛼44𝑤𝑊𝑆
2 +
1
2
𝜎11𝑎𝑀
2 +
1
2
𝜎22𝑎𝑆
2 +
1
2
𝜎33𝑎𝐻
2  
+
1
2
𝜎44𝑎𝐶
2 +
1
2
𝛾𝑡2 + 𝛼12𝑤𝐿𝑤𝐸 + 𝛼13𝑤𝐿𝑤𝐹 + 𝛼14𝑤𝐿𝑤𝑊𝑆+𝛼23𝑤𝐸𝑤𝐹 
+𝛼24𝑤𝐸𝑤𝑊𝑆+𝛼34𝑤𝐹𝑤𝑊𝑆 + 𝜎12𝑎𝑀𝑎𝑆 + 𝜎13𝑎𝑀𝑎𝐻 + 𝜎14𝑎𝑀𝑎𝐶+𝜎23𝑎𝑆𝑎𝐻 
+𝜎24𝑎𝑆𝑎𝐶+𝜎34𝑎𝐻𝑎𝐶 + 𝜗11𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑀 + 𝜗12𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑆 + 𝜗13𝑤𝐿𝑎𝐻 + 𝜗14𝑤𝐿𝑎𝐶 + 𝜗21𝑤𝐸𝑎𝑀 
+𝜗22𝑤𝐸𝑎𝑆 + 𝜗23𝑤𝐸𝑎𝐻 + 𝜗24𝑤𝐸𝑎𝐶 + 𝜗31𝑤𝐹𝑎𝑀 + 𝜗32𝑤𝐹𝑎𝑆 + 𝜗33𝑤𝐹𝑎𝐻 
+𝜗34𝑤𝐹𝑎𝐶+𝜗41𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑎𝑀 + 𝜗42𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑎𝑆 + 𝜗43𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑎𝐻 + 𝜗44𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑎𝐶 + 𝛿1𝑤𝐿𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑤𝐸𝑡 
                                                 
22 Pulley and Humphrey (1991) generalized the calculation for economies of scope in the case of m firms as 
𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 = [(𝑚 − 1)𝛼0 − ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑞𝑗]/ℎ(𝑞)𝑗>𝑖𝑖=1 . The former term in the right hand side of the equation 
measures the fixed cost and the latter measures cost complementarity contributions to economies of scope.   
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+𝛿3𝑤𝐹𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑤𝑊𝑆𝑡  +𝜇1𝑎𝑀𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑎𝑆𝑡 + 𝜇3𝑎𝐻𝑡 + 𝜇4𝑎𝐶𝑡 ) +𝛽12𝑦𝑈𝑦𝑊 +
𝛽13𝑦𝑈𝑦𝑇+𝛽23𝑦𝑊𝑦𝑇            (31) 
 
Farsi et al. (2007a) uses the following formula (SCm) to calculate the degree of product-
specific economies of scope. 
𝑆𝐶𝑚 =
𝐶(𝑦𝑚)+𝐶(𝑦−𝑚)−𝐶(𝑦)
𝐶(𝑦)
        (32) 
This measures the proportional increase in cost due to production of all outputs 
excluding the mth output. Fraquelli et al. (2004) defines it as cost advantage 
(disadvantage) of one particular ‘stand-alone’ output in the production. In other words, it 
examines whether economies of scope still prevails when separating the production of 
mth output from the rest. Fraquelli et al. (2004) further use another measure for degree of 
product-specific economies of scope. It examines the proportional increase in cost due to 
production of certain combination of outputs where the other combinations exhibit zero 
output. Their measure is showed in the following equation. 
𝑆𝐶𝑚𝑛 =
𝐶(𝑦𝑚)+𝐶(𝑦𝑛)−𝐶(𝑦(𝑚),𝑦(𝑛))
𝐶(𝑦(𝑚),𝑦(𝑛))
        (33) 
Unfortunately, the contribution from research on economies of scope for this area 
is very limited. There is an absence of data providing information on the stand-alone cost 
of producing one of the outputs or any combinations of the three outputs. Information is 
not provided revealing the value of products shipped when class-1 carriers only provide 
one or two of the freight train service.23 Observations that have zero outputs for the unit 
                                                 
23Gabel and Kennet (1994) examined economies of scope in the local telephone exchange market without 
having observations producing a stand-alone outputs or combinations of them. Engineering optimization 
model is used that enable them to estimate the cost of stand-alone telecommunications networks. 
Simulation is done as such the optimization model chooses combination and placement of facilities that 
minimizes the production cost.  
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train service are deleted from the sample as normally practiced by other researchers. 
Therefore in this essay, a hypothetical output vector is simulated and a direct approach is 
made by calculating the expected cost of every individual firm if it has produced 
specialized output or any combination of outputs. For example, one of the outputs is set 
at its actual value and the other outputs are given values equal to zero.24 As a result, it 
permits tractable tests for economies of scope in the railroad industry.  
Applying to the three train services, economies of scope can be tested by 
hypothetically simulating railroad firms producing zero outputs. Equation (4) provides a 
direct test of test economies of scope for all the three services. It gives the estimated cost 
of producing all the train services through one network. Specifically, equation (4) 
examines whether economies of scope exists if there is specialization in producing the 
train services. This analysis can be further extended in finding out whether economies of 
scope still exists when separating the production of one of the train services from the rest. 
This is shown from equation (34) to equation (36). 
SCOPE-U:  𝐶(𝑦𝑈, 0, 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑤, 𝑦𝑇) > 𝐶(𝑦𝑈, 𝑦𝑊, 𝑦𝑇)    (34) 
SCOPE-W: 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑊, 0) + 𝐶(𝑦𝑈, 0, 𝑦𝑇) > 𝐶(𝑦𝑈, 𝑦𝑊, 𝑦𝑇)    (35) 
SCOPE-T : 𝐶(0, 0, 𝑦𝑇) + 𝐶(𝑦𝑈, 𝑦𝑤, 0) > 𝐶(𝑦𝑈, 𝑦𝑊, 𝑦𝑇)    (36) 
SCOPE-U measures the proportional increase in cost due to production of all train 
services except unit train. SCOPE-W and SCOPE-T imply the same definition for way 
train and through train respectively.  Equation (37) to equation (39) is included for 
completeness in the analysis. These equations are used to test economies of scope for any 
                                                 
24 Bloch et al. (2001) used simulation for three different output paths in examining the ray-average cost in a 
given year. The ray-average cost is subject to the variables values and parameters estimated and this cost 
behavior is observed through the simulation. An output or combination of outputs are scaled down to zero 
by increment of 0.1 while the remaining output are fixed at the actual level.   
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combination of pair of train services, which are between unit and way train, between unit 
and through train and between way and through train. The cost function exhibiting 
economies of scope for any two train services can be shown in the following: 
SCOPE-U-W:  𝐶(𝑦𝑈, 0, 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑊, 0) > 𝐶(𝑦𝑈, 𝑦𝑊, 0)    (37) 
SCOPE-U-T:  𝐶(𝑦𝑈, 0, 0) + 𝐶(0, 0, 𝑦𝑇) > 𝐶(𝑦𝑈, 0, 𝑦𝑇)    (38) 
SCOPE-W-T:  𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑊, 0) + 𝐶(0,0, 𝑦𝑇) > 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑊, 𝑦𝑇)    (39) 
SCOPE-U-W investigates whether producing a combination of unit train and way train 
exhibits economies of scope. SCOPE-U-T and SCOPE-W-T examines whether 
economies of scope prevails when combination of unit-through train and way-through 
train are produced respectively while zero output for others. Baumol et al. (1982) 
mentioned that weak cost complementarities are considered as a sufficient condition of 
presence of economies of scope in contestable market. In the analysis, the economies of 
scope can be calculated for every firm from the cost function estimation. The predicted 
value for cost producing all outputs and individually is based on the estimates of the cost 
function. This is then substituted in the formula for economies of scope.  
1.6 Cost Results 
The system of equations consisting of the cost function and factor demand equations is 
estimated using a seemingly unrelated regression technique first introduced by Zellner 
(1962). The variables in the system are deviations from the sample mean with the price of 
material as the normalizing factor.25 The monotonicity condition for output and input 
                                                 
25 The sample mean is commonly used as the point of approximation. Martinez-Budria et al. (2003) used 
sample mean as point of approximation for their normalized quadratic cost function when apply to the 
electric sector in Spain.   
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prices is validated by looking at whether total cost increases as outputs increase 
(
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑖
> 0) 26and also whether total cost increases as input prices increase (
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖
> 0)  .27 
The test shows that between 67-93 percent of observations fulfill the condition for 
monotonicity as shown in the following Table-3.  
Table-3: Summary of monotonicity condition for outputs and input prices 
Monotonicity condition Percentage 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑦𝑈⁄ > 0 93 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑦𝑊⁄ > 0 67 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑦𝑇⁄ > 0 72 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝐿⁄ > 0 71 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝐸⁄ > 0 70 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝐹⁄ > 0 75 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝑊𝑆⁄ > 0 85 percent of observations 
 
Another regularity condition to be satisfied by an estimated cost function is the 
condition for concavity in input prices. For normalized quadratic cost function, the 
concavity condition is not data dependent and therefore can be tested globally rather than 
locally.  The Hessian matrix is negative semi definite when all principal minors of the 
Hessian should alternate in signs starting with less than zero. Unfortunately, the estimated 
cost function fails to satisfy the curvature conditions in input prices. Violation of 
                                                 
26 For example, derivative of cost with respect to unit train service is shown as:  
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑈
= 𝛽1 +
𝛽11𝑦𝑈+𝛽12𝑦𝑊 + 𝛽13𝑦𝑇 + 𝜏11𝑤𝐿 + 𝜏21𝑤𝐸 + 𝜏31𝑤𝐹 + 𝜏41𝑤𝑊𝑆 + 𝜑11𝑎𝑀 + 𝜑21𝑎𝑆 + 𝜑31𝑎𝐻 + 𝜑41𝑎𝐶 + 𝜋1𝑡 
27 For example, derivative of cost with respect to price of labor is shown as:  
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝐿
= 𝛼1 + 𝛼11𝑤𝐿 + 𝛼12𝑤𝐸 +
𝛼13𝑤𝐹 + 𝛼14𝑤𝑊𝑆 + 𝜏11𝑦𝑈 + 𝜏12𝑦𝑊 + 𝜏13𝑦𝑇 + 𝜗11𝑎𝑀 + 𝜗12𝑎𝑆 + 𝜗13𝑎𝐻 + 𝜗14𝑎𝐶 + 𝛿1𝑡 
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concavity in input prices is often found in past studies and highlighted since it is a firm’s 
rational behavior to minimize cost (Ogawa, 2011). Nonetheless, imposing global 
curvature can be done relatively easily28 when estimating the normalized quadratic cost 
function. If the concavity in input prices is not imposed, the empirical model is not 
consistent with the economic theory and any linear combination in the price space can 
further minimize cost. In consideration of this problem this essay imposes concavity in 
the cost estimation by means of Cholesky decomposition discussed previously. The 
parameter estimates obtained from estimating the normalized quadratic cost function 
without imposing concavity becomes the initial values used for the non-linear 
estimation29.   
Table-4 below shows the estimated coefficients for the equation systems before 
and after imposing concavity in input prices. The intercept depicts the total fixed cost that 
occurs at the sample mean. The second column in Table-4 represents the results before 
imposing concavity in input prices. The first order output coefficients are positive and 
significant. The coefficients for input prices are also positive and significant. The 
coefficient for the price of material is not in the results since it is used as the numeraire in 
the estimation. The negative coefficient of the time trend suggests that cost decreases 
with technology. Three variables show unexpected result: The estimated coefficient on 
the variables milesroad and speed are negative and statistically significant, the estimated 
                                                 
28  Featherstone and Moss (1994) carried out estimations with and without imposition of curvature. 
Comparing the two estimations, the results of economies of scope were opposite between each other.   
29 Initially, non-converging result is greatly expected since convergence highly depends on initial values. 
The specification consists of a large number of explanatory variables and hence an educated guess for the 
starting values from the functional form is not feasible. Many trials were made with defaults values and 
randomly different initial values with varying convergence criterion. Convergence is met when the 
parameters obtained without imposing concavity is chosen to be the appropriate and plausible initial values. 
It should also be noted that very few studies impose concavity in transportation research as pursued by this 
essay.    
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coefficient on the variable avehaul is positive and statistically significant, and caboose 
shows a positive but not statistically significant coefficient. The third column in Table-4 
shows the result after imposing concavity in input prices. The latter results varies where 
34 coefficients show changes in signs and 58 coefficients become insignificant after 
impose concavity. All coefficients for input prices are positive and all of them are 
significant except fuel.  The first order output coefficients are positive with only unit train 
is significant. The time trend coefficient still suggests that cost decreases with 
technology.  All technological variables are found insignificant except for milesroad. 
However, the sign of milesroad is still not as expected.  
 
Table-4: Parameter estimates for the normalized quadratic cost function 
 Without concavity With concavity 
Variables Coefficient s.e. Coefficient Aprox s.e. 
Intercept  59052.21*** 3674.778 5209527** 2445709 
𝒘𝑳 19337425*** 830899.7 35330212*** 2845360 
𝒘𝑬 1093.011*** 268.007 9784.998*** 1232.1 
𝒘𝑭 4.00E+08*** 31835309 2.98E+08 2.73E+09 
𝒘𝑾𝑺 12137.46*** 199.9104 16557.98*** 589.9 
𝒚𝑼 0.000364*** 0.000057 0.095018** 0.0416 
𝒚𝑾 0.003745*** 0.000299 0.204913 0.2293 
𝒚𝑻 0.000546*** 0.000049 0.034689 0.0281 
𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔  -1.65865*** 0.237675 -432.175** 173.1 
𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 -249.267*** 84.19541 -83183.7 84037.5 
𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 24.42795*** 7.312301 5454.166 6676 
𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 522069 2559789 -2.82E+08 2.25E+09 
𝒕 -2121.99*** 178.884 -315368** 154310 
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒚𝑼)
𝟐 -2.99E-13 5.09E-13 -5.63E-10* 3.07E-10 
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒚𝑾)
𝟐 -1.24E-09*** 4.65E-11 -6.87E-08 4.29E-08 
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒚𝑻)
𝟐 7.19E-12*** 5.84E-13 -2.39E-10 4.11E-10 
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𝟎. 𝟓(𝒘𝑳)
𝟐 -4.20E+09*** 1.94E+08 -23914515.1  
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒘𝑬)
𝟐 48.54731*** 4.279762 -41.5190675  
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒘𝑭)
𝟐 -6.88E+11*** 4.45E+10 -23991831.7  
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒘𝑾𝑺)
𝟐 -76.382*** 10.1424 -81.4304148  
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔)
𝟐 0.000595*** 0.000041 0.05656** 0.0244 
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅)
𝟐
 -33.5235*** 6.097911 -2377.71 7423.7 
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍)
𝟐 -0.28017*** 0.034789 23.27947 33.2802 
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆)
𝟐 -8.44E+09*** 3.11E+09 -6.17E+11 3.18E+12 
𝟎. 𝟓(𝒕)𝟐 68.04709*** 13.3609 17465.62 10789.6 
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒘𝑬 798090.7*** 46101.71 -28769.7678  
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒘𝑭 -3.58E+10*** 3.19E+09 23953114.14  
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒘𝑾𝑺 -525085*** 39094.04 -9829.24964  
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒚𝑼 0.139759*** 0.011143 -0.14232*** 0.0245 
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒚𝑾 -3.29477*** 0.127369 -0.40688 0.3871 
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒚𝑻 0.253375*** 0.011565 0.076465** 0.0341 
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔  337.9932*** 81.88123 3486.44*** 288.4 
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 1000907*** 57102.85 59734.72 196506 
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 3009.409 3183.987 -10478.7 8574.9 
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 9.35E+09*** 1.14E+09 2.11E+09 3.07E+09 
𝒘𝑳 ∗ 𝒕 -709356*** 74962.77 -241409 261000 
𝒘𝑬 ∗ 𝒘𝑭 4112048*** 314702.7 28809.09453  
𝒘𝑬 ∗ 𝒘𝑾𝑺 228.76*** 7.244396 2.192292028  
𝒘𝑬 ∗ 𝒚𝑼 -3.50E-06 3.75E-06 -0.00004*** 0.000014 
𝒘𝑬 ∗ 𝒚𝑾 -0.00037*** 0.000045 -0.0001 0.000211 
𝒘𝑬 ∗ 𝒚𝑻 0.000047*** 4.11E-06 0.000021 0.00002 
𝒘𝑬 ∗ 𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔  -0.08531*** 0.023706 0.824577*** 0.132 
𝒘𝑬 ∗ 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 8.434251 15.43111 -75.8357 72.6614 
𝒘𝑬 ∗ 𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 8.056295*** 0.754206 -11.6018*** 4.2458 
𝒘𝑬 ∗ 𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 3394215*** 368263.9 2399180 1483523 
𝒘𝑬 ∗ 𝒕 70.6142*** 23.69644 -106.02 97.1288 
𝒘𝑭 ∗ 𝒘𝑾𝑺 -9282573*** 332709.8 9908.487763  
𝒘𝑭 ∗ 𝒚𝑼 -2.7989*** 0.388153 3.744043 40.6422 
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𝒘𝑭 ∗ 𝒚𝑾 -43.2156*** 3.47669 -53.744 568.5 
𝒘𝑭 ∗ 𝒚𝑻 13.57421*** 0.396995 3.088161 40.2762 
𝒘𝑭 ∗ 𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔  -52675.6*** 2738.005 25834.21 327255 
𝒘𝑭 ∗ 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 -2.01E+07*** 1493029 24270326 1.53E+08 
𝒘𝑭 ∗ 𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 -100275 103735.9 -1712228 7168538 
𝒘𝑭 ∗ 𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 1.32E+11*** 3.32E+10 3.75E+11 3.15E+12 
𝒘𝑭 ∗ 𝒕 -1.96E+07*** 2705368 12578500 2.44E+08 
𝒘𝑾𝑺 ∗ 𝒚𝑼 0.000033*** 2.22E-06 -0.00004*** 6.75E-06 
𝒘𝑾𝑺 ∗ 𝒚𝑾 -0.00067*** 0.00003 -4.92E-06 0.000114 
𝒘𝑾𝑺 ∗ 𝒚𝑻 0.000061*** 2.47E-06 8.41E-06 7.11E-06 
𝒘𝑾𝑺 ∗ 𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔  0.62076*** 0.018547 1.618261*** 0.0816 
𝒘𝑾𝑺 ∗ 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 233.3992*** 14.42347 -22.6337 37.212 
𝒘𝑾𝑺 ∗ 𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 7.050127*** 0.727568 -2.51739 1.774 
𝒘𝑾𝑺 ∗ 𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 599798.4** 268094.8 -1550330** 675866 
𝒘𝑾𝑺 ∗ 𝒕 -263.895*** 17.89458 -109.753** 54.1955 
𝒚𝑼 ∗ 𝒚𝑾 -3.06E-11*** 3.88E-12 -2.98E-09 2.34E-09 
𝒚𝑼 ∗ 𝒚𝑻 -1.43E-12*** 4.43E-13 1.48E-10 2.87E-10 
𝒚𝑼 ∗ 𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔  2.27E-08*** 4.67E-09 -5.56E-06* 2.94E-06 
𝒚𝑼 ∗ 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 0.000029*** 1.86E-06 -0.00021 0.00134 
𝒚𝑼 ∗ 𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 1.48E-07 1.12E-07 0.000173* 0.000091 
𝒚𝑼 ∗ 𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 0.219255*** 0.041383 -23.361 31.6284 
𝒚𝑼 ∗ 𝒕 2.00E-06 2.55E-06 0.002668 0.00166 
𝒚𝑾 ∗ 𝒚𝑻 2.75E-11*** 3.14E-12 6.21E-09*** 2.22E-09 
𝒚𝑾 ∗ 𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔  4.79E-07*** 3.34E-08 2.55E-06 0.000023 
𝒚𝑾 ∗ 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 -0.00019*** 0.00002 -0.00055 0.0162 
𝒚𝑾 ∗ 𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 -3.81E-06*** 8.01E-07 -0.00078 0.000664 
𝒚𝑾 ∗ 𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 2.826311*** 0.412587 227.0504 307.3 
𝒚𝑾 ∗ 𝒕 -0.00021*** 0.000025 -0.00025 0.0172 
𝒚𝑻 ∗ 𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔  -9.33E-08*** 4.29E-09 -3.02E-06 2.53E-06 
𝒚𝑻 ∗ 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 -0.00003*** 2.13E-06 0.002181 0.00139 
𝒚𝑻 ∗ 𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 1.01E-06*** 1.34E-07 -0.00011 0.000079 
𝒚𝑻 ∗ 𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 -0.32476*** 0.045829 59.18539** 27.4095 
𝒚𝑻 ∗ 𝒕 -0.00003*** 3.02E-06 0.003372** 0.00149 
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𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔 ∗ 𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 -0.01797 0.016516 -25.4535** 11.776 
𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔 ∗ 𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 -0.00156** 0.000776 0.134324 0.6032 
𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔 ∗ 𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 -430.326 260.7547 -328421 204482 
𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒔 ∗ 𝒕 0.225063*** 0.021707 -42.1698** 16.2978 
𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 ∗ 𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 6.215739*** 0.386726 3.687197 354.3 
𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅 ∗ 𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 1198683*** 120814.9 1.16E+08 1.17E+08 
𝒂𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 ∗ 𝒕 -15.0218** 6.626258 2568.9 6621.7 
𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 ∗ 𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 20183.95*** 5399.54 -3182217 5377594 
𝒂𝒉𝒂𝒖𝒍 ∗ 𝒕 -0.70175 0.548849 -651.032 433.7 
𝒂𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒆 ∗ 𝒕 -904903*** 197655.3 1.04E+08 1.85E+08 
Note. The variable 𝑤𝐿  is the labor price, 𝑤𝐸  is the equipment price, 𝑤𝐹  is the fuel price𝑤𝑊𝑆 is the way and 
structures price, 𝑦𝑈 is the unit train gross ton miles, 𝑦𝑊 is the way train gross ton miles, 𝑦𝑇  is the through 
train gross ton miles, 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠  is the miles of road, 𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑  is the train miles per train hour, 𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑢𝑙  is the average 
length of haul, 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒  is the fraction of train miles operated with caboose and t for time. The notation *** 
means significant at 1% level, ** is significant at 5% level and * is significant at 10% level. 
 
A weak test for economies of scope examines the coefficient sign for the 
interaction variables between outputs.   The presence of cost complementarities between 
outputs may suggest the existence of economies of scope. Before concavity is imposed, 
the interaction terms between unit train and way train and also between unit train and 
through train show negative coefficients and significant. The negative sign 
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑈𝜕𝑦𝑊
< 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑈𝜕𝑦𝑇
< 0) suggest that these outputs are cost 
complementarities30between each other. The presence of cost complementarity is one of 
the contributors for economies of scope31. However, the coefficient for interaction 
                                                 
30 Any combination of train services are said to be cost complementarities (cost substitutabilities) if the 
marginal cost of one output decreases (increases) when there is an increase in the production of the other 
output. 
31 Pulley and Humphrey (1991) mentioned two factors as contribution to economies of scope which are 
complementarity and fixed cost. The ability to spread the fixed cost over the broader mix of output may as 
well contribute to economies of scope. 
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variable between way train and through train is positive and significant implying cost 
discomplementarities (
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑊𝜕𝑦𝑇
> 0) between these two train services. After concavity is 
imposed, the result changes a little bit. Unit train and way train still suggest cost 
complementarities between each other. However, unit train and through train show cost 
discomplementarities even though the key parameter estimates are not statistically 
significant. Only the interaction term between way train and through train is found 
positive and significant which also suggesting cost discomplementarites. The reason for 
the presence of cost complementarites between unit and way before and after concavity is 
imposed may due to the fact that unit train and way train has the same feature, as such 
most origin-destination switches are done by unit and way trains (Tolliver et al., 2014). 
This may contribute to the jointly utilized inputs for both train services.32Therefore, this 
essay further examines the economies of scope by simulating hypothetical production of 
output combinations with and without imposing concavity. 
 Table-5 presents the percentage of firms exhibiting economies of scope. Table-6 
and Table-7 show the simulation results obtained in examining economies of scope for all 
observations without and with imposing concavity respectively. In Table-6 and Table-7, 
the expected cost savings when jointly providing the train services rather than by 
                                                 
32 The level of efficiency for three types of train services are known to be different. Tolliver et al. (2014) 
suggest that efficiency is mainly influenced by the type of train services. They consider way train and 
through train as ‘non-unit train’ since their movements are related and percentage of way train is very small 
compared to through train. Way train often stops to pick up and drop cars along the route. Through trains 
moving between yards, therefore perform limited switching activities. Unit train operates in a cycling 
pattern from origin to destination, least switching activities that suggest the most energy efficient train 
services. Bitzan (2000) explained the relationship of each train service with respect to efficiency. The unit 
train service is considered as the most efficient train service since it involves smaller switching requirement 
with high volume of shipments. The way train service involves high switching requirements, small volume, 
short distance and slow speed which makes it the most expensive service for railroad carrier. Through train 
is more efficient than way train but less than unit train even though it comprises the largest service in terms 
of gross ton mile. 
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specialized firm are calculated. A positive value suggests a firm’s operations exhibits 
economies of scope and negative value suggests the presence of diseconomies of scope. 
Without imposing concavity, around 96 percent of the firms exhibit economies of scope 
except for CR between year 1995 and year 1997,  GTW in year 1998, ICG in year 1998, 
NS in year 1996 and year 1997, and SOO in year 1991. These companies depict 
diseconomies of scope for all the equations proposed. When concavity is imposed, more 
than 70 percent of firms exhibit economies of scope. Even though the percentage dropped 
by more than 20 percent compared before concavity is imposed, it is reasonable to 
suggest that the percentage of firms exhibiting economies of scope is substantial.  The 
firms that exhibit diseconomies of scope are BN between year 1986 and year 2008, CSX 
in year 1986 and 1987 and between year 1992 and year 2008, NS between year 1994 and 
year 2008, SP for year 1995 and year 1996 and UP between 1986 and year 2008. These 
findings suggested that providing way train service is not the primary source for 
diseconomies of scope. Even though the number of carriers that exhibit diseconomies of 
scope are not substantial, all the three services are equally likely to contribute for the rare 
case when it occurs. The result gives some insight for any future intention to unbundle 
the multi-service train. Since the way train is not the primary source for diseconomies of 
scope, any type of train services to be unbundle may also be equally likely to contribute 
to efficiency due to the market competition.33   
 
 
                                                 
33 Unbundling decision on which type of train services need further examination especially way train 
service incurs the highest cost. Farsi et al. (2007a) emphasized that efficiency gains attained by lowering 
barriers of market entry is questionable when unbundling a transport mode that has high infrastructure cost. 
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Table-5: Percentage of firms exhibiting economies of scope 
 scope  scopeU  scopeW  scopeT  scopeUW  scopeUT  scopeWT  
Without imposing 
concavity 
96.7 96.7 96.7 96.7 96.7 97.1 97.1 
With imposing 
concavity 
70.44 72.63 70.8 70.43 72.26 71.5 70.07 
 
Table-6: Analysis on economies of scope at firm level (without concavity imposed) 
Yr Rr scope34 scopeU35 scopeW36 scopeT37 scopeUW38 scopeUT39 scopeWT40 
1983 ATSF 159789 80898 79910 79413 80376 79879 78891 
1984 ATSF 149271 75287 74989 74157 75114 74282 73984 
1985 ATSF 142522 72138 71328 70858 71664 71193 70384 
1986 ATSF 140984 71665 70640 69840 71144 70344 69319 
1987 ATSF 123149 62387 61864 61051 62098 61285 60762 
1988 ATSF 122849 61904 61871 60963 61886 60977 60945 
1989 ATSF 127872 64209 64696 63423 64449 63176 63664 
1990 ATSF 101830 51563 51603 50250 51580 50228 50267 
1991 ATSF 96907 48114 48042 48888 48019 48865 48794 
1992 ATSF 95949 47215 47222 48657 47292 48727 48734 
1993 ATSF 91931 44966 44778 46685 45247 47154 46965 
1994 ATSF 103097 50885 50415 51694 51404 52683 52213 
1995 ATSF 132884 67478 66843 64757 68126 66041 65406 
1983 BM 163436 88200 76289 79024 84412 87147 75236 
1984 BM 130490 71942 60041 62323 68168 70449 58549 
1986 BM 172823 92987 80893 83668 89155 91930 79836 
1984 BN 232312 118309 117170 114874 117438 115142 114003 
1985 BN 232486 116866 116715 115753 116733 115771 115619 
1986 BN 192132 97132 97552 94670 97462 94580 95000 
1987 BN 181073 92818 93222 87950 93123 87851 88255 
1988 BN 179766 92735 92329 87351 92415 87438 87031 
1989 BN 185051 94621 93716 91221 93830 91334 90430 
                                                 
34 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 = 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 0,0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑊 , 0) + 𝐶(0,0, 𝑦𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑊 , 𝑦𝑇) 
35 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑈 = 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 0, 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑤 , 𝑦𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑊 , 𝑦𝑇)  
36 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑊 = 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑊 , 0) + 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 0, 𝑦𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑊 , 𝑦𝑇)  
37 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑇 = 𝐶(0, 0, 𝑦𝑇) + 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑤 , 0) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑊 , 𝑦𝑇) 
38 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑈𝑊 = 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 0, 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑊 , 0) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑊 , 0) 
39 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑈𝑇 = 𝐶(𝑌𝑈 , 0, 0) + 𝐶(0, 0, 𝑌𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑌𝑈 , 0, 𝑌𝑇) 
40 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑊𝑇 = 𝐶(0, 𝑌𝑊 , 0) + 𝐶(0,0, 𝑌𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑌𝑊 , 0, 𝑌𝑇) 
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1990 BN 192030 97124 96341 95645 96385 95689 94907 
1991 BN 115456 58050 57770 57679 57778 57687 57406 
1992 BN 164201 84806 84100 79960 84241 80101 79395 
1993 BN 165307 87212 86488 78614 86694 78820 78095 
1994 BN 170336 90441 88787 81171 89165 81549 79896 
1996 BN 714290 1579424 24425 -403249 1117539 689865 -865134 
1997 BN 445752 259256 206479 219563 226189 239273 186496 
1998 BN 442621 263420 200408 223070 219552 242214 179201 
1999 BN 464948 273648 208916 240170 224778 256032 191300 
2000 BN 472268 282276 211678 239458 232810 260589 189992 
2001 BN 456478 278630 203802 230276 226203 252676 177848 
2002 BN 461280 290017 209430 219513 241767 251851 171263 
2003 BN 451500 284746 200821 219945 231555 250679 166754 
2004 BN 467735 303461 200851 236437 231298 266884 164275 
2005 BN 467156 306688 195325 241176 225980 271831 160468 
2006 BN 463892 316701 185959 244104 219788 277933 147191 
2007 BN 454096 316901 179986 239648 214448 274110 137194 
2008 BN 451992 321221 180030 235961 216031 271962 130771 
1983 BO 118209 61537 57448 59566 58643 60760 56672 
1984 BO 110945 57437 54075 56177 54768 56871 53509 
1985 BO 111336 57785 54179 56281 55056 57157 53552 
1983 CNW 119805 62198 58028 60354 59452 61777 57607 
1984 CNW 110423 57394 53491 55739 54684 56932 53028 
1985 CNW 115780 60547 55861 57900 57880 59919 55233 
1986 CNW 135539 70337 65842 67745 67794 69697 65203 
1987 CNW 128605 66988 62419 64096 64509 66186 61617 
1988 CNW 134683 71350 64581 65526 69157 70102 63333 
1989 CNW 129273 68798 61519 62821 66452 67754 60475 
1990 CNW 120542 64146 57095 58674 61868 63447 56396 
1991 CNW 153309 78819 71731 76704 76605 81578 74490 
1992 CNW 127057 67151 60199 62103 64954 66859 59907 
1993 CNW 140269 73115 66480 69199 71069 73788 67154 
1994 CNW 168460 86888 80810 83386 85074 87650 81572 
1983 CO 114825 61265 55975 56048 58776 58849 53560 
1984 CO 117057 61867 57539 57444 59614 59519 55190 
1985 CO 125079 65928 61463 61426 63654 63616 59151 
1983 CR 118812 59643 59241 59553 59259 59571 59169 
1984 CR 113463 56770 56585 56893 56571 56878 56694 
1985 CR 107933 54288 53955 53924 54009 53977 53644 
1986 CR 113344 57066 56797 56484 56860 56547 56278 
1987 CR 108284 54124 54191 54094 54190 54093 54160 
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1988 CR 101642 50656 50898 50731 50911 50744 50985 
1990 CR 87331 43783 44009 43366 43965 43322 43548 
1991 CR 88425 44315 44419 44021 44405 44007 44110 
1992 CR 81611 40783 40991 40634 40977 40620 40829 
1993 CR 72171 36439 36908 35395 36776 35263 35732 
1994 CR 36884 18571 19369 17626 19257 17514 18313 
1995 CR -4421 -3860 -3497 -1059 -3362 -923 -561 
1996 CR -22218 -14270 -13734 -8561 -13657 -8484 -7948 
1997 CR -129986 -66083 -65345 -64658 -65328 -64641 -63903 
1986 CSX 156860 79883 74489 75947 80913 82371 76977 
1987 CSX 143775 76310 64935 66651 77125 78841 67466 
1988 CSX 163878 82623 80790 79881 83997 83088 81255 
1989 CSX 163629 81801 81629 80401 83228 82001 81828 
1990 CSX 150566 75210 75056 73758 76808 75510 75356 
1991 CSX 165934 82539 83471 81659 84276 82464 83396 
1992 CSX 153756 76690 76558 75056 78700 77198 77066 
1993 CSX 152206 75344 76620 74782 77424 75586 76862 
1994 CSX 129074 66776 63341 62667 66407 65733 62298 
1995 CSX 117191 61879 58692 55916 61274 58499 55312 
1996 CSX 72877 7771 5300 65647 7230 67577 65106 
1997 CSX 30986 6496 2890 25295 5691 28096 24489 
1998 CSX 220967 114589 110873 107177 113791 110094 106378 
1999 CSX 295921 149044 141368 148389 147532 154553 146876 
2000 CSX 215680 112928 102184 105279 110401 113496 102752 
2001 CSX 239647 124801 115722 117195 122453 123925 114846 
2002 CSX 271654 144726 129690 130470 141184 141964 126928 
2003 CSX 248014 134690 117874 117069 130945 130140 113324 
2004 CSX 253035 144619 123815 113324 139711 129220 108416 
2005 CSX 245476 138519 120568 112095 133381 124908 106957 
2006 CSX 216981 121692 104520 101140 115841 112460 95288 
2007 CSX 219391 121600 106070 103223 116169 113321 97791 
2008 CSX 216245 119634 104691 102296 113949 111554 96611 
1983 DH 164882 89216 77693 79404 85478 87189 75667 
1984 DH 232022 122801 111317 112929 119093 120705 109222 
1985 DH 156620 85436 73744 74909 81711 82876 71183 
1986 DH 46290 30491 18598 19571 26718 27692 15799 
1984 DMIR 150482 84355 72184 69969 80513 78297 66127 
1983 DRGW 172224 92698 83106 82694 89530 89118 79525 
1984 DRGW 153513 83895 74331 72716 80796 79182 69617 
1985 DRGW 155129 84665 74888 73669 81460 80241 70464 
1986 DRGW 173091 93730 83459 82593 90498 89632 79361 
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1987 DRGW 168719 91552 81166 80436 88283 87552 77167 
1988 DRGW 159869 86994 76640 76096 83773 83229 72875 
1989 DRGW 157617 85493 75508 75269 82347 82109 72123 
1990 DRGW 151252 82195 72270 72169 79082 78982 69057 
1991 DRGW 54414 36593 26529 20858 33556 27885 17822 
1992 DRGW 101670 58295 48499 46283 55387 53171 43375 
1993 DRGW 99511 56849 47251 45434 54078 52260 42662 
1983 DTI 141366 78147 66630 67083 74284 74736 63219 
1985 FEC 143274 80493 69197 66541 76733 74077 62781 
1986 FEC 158921 88248 76688 74399 84522 82233 70673 
1987 FEC 161228 89208 77625 75738 85490 83603 72020 
1988 FEC 164961 91173 79718 77468 87493 85243 73788 
1989 FEC 161162 89458 77965 75371 85791 83197 71703 
1990 FEC 142018 80275 68664 65428 76590 73354 61742 
1991 FEC 131466 76997 65274 58176 73289 66191 54469 
1983 GTW 142032 78256 66739 67507 74525 75293 63776 
1984 GTW 128070 71278 60374 60416 67653 67696 56791 
1985 GTW 124879 69823 58550 58714 66165 66329 55056 
1986 GTW 144328 79064 67851 68910 75418 76477 65264 
1987 GTW 164827 89645 78378 78841 85986 86449 75181 
1988 GTW 147083 80545 69294 70185 76898 77789 66537 
1989 GTW 141890 77695 66408 67833 74057 75482 64195 
1990 GTW 128022 70664 59330 61002 67020 68692 57358 
1991 GTW 142477 75597 64233 70527 71950 78244 66881 
1992 GTW 125945 69106 57804 60464 65481 68141 56838 
1993 GTW 138777 75017 63847 67330 71447 74930 63760 
1994 GTW 138983 74556 63481 67992 70991 75501 64427 
1995 GTW 86479 77547 66457 12490 73989 20022 8932 
1996 GTW 625259 274476 263759 354158 271100 361500 350783 
1997 GTW 625351 282219 271559 346493 278858 353791 343132 
1998 GTW -204171 -85279 -95976 -115516 -88655 -108195 -118892 
1983 ICG 110397 58207 53509 54835 55561 56887 52189 
1984 ICG 113966 58879 55568 57608 56358 58398 55087 
1985 ICG 127732 66668 62305 63609 64123 65427 61064 
1986 ICG 143131 76158 69495 69800 73330 73636 66972 
1987 ICG 138561 74418 67116 67144 71418 71445 64143 
1988 ICG 136864 73599 66275 66255 70610 70589 63265 
1989 ICG 133514 71195 63902 65249 68265 69612 62319 
1990 ICG 118783 64010 56431 57705 61078 62352 54773 
1991 ICG 179802 93029 85786 89530 90273 94016 86773 
1992 ICG 151150 79651 72464 74288 76862 78686 71499 
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1993 ICG 167323 87739 80824 82303 85019 86498 79584 
1994 ICG 172993 91769 84168 83834 89158 88824 81224 
1996 ICG 526578 278500 270797 250591 275987 255781 248078 
1998 ICG -146283 -71105 -78879 -72759 -73524 -67404 -75178 
1983 KCS 119827 66916 56424 56070 63757 63403 52911 
1984 KCS 149907 81600 71527 71423 78484 78379 68306 
1985 KCS 158636 85388 75759 76384 82252 82877 73248 
1986 KCS 173959 94147 83829 82960 90999 90131 79812 
1987 KCS 166830 89872 79736 80099 86731 87094 76958 
1988 KCS 166662 89431 79471 80380 86282 87191 77231 
1989 KCS 161354 86836 76794 77658 83695 84560 74518 
1990 KCS 134471 73252 63306 64344 70127 71165 61220 
1991 KCS 64355 41831 31919 25636 38719 32435 22524 
1995 KCS 92408 51347 43972 43886 48522 48436 41061 
1996 KCS 86462 48157 40977 41181 45282 45485 38305 
1997 KCS 85724 47471 40687 41067 44657 45037 38253 
1998 KCS 82946 46225 39409 39383 43562 43536 36720 
2000 KCS 77984 42800 37064 37981 40003 40920 35184 
2001 KCS 66776 37430 31466 32102 34674 35310 29346 
2002 KCS 33878 20192 15173 16481 17397 18705 13686 
2003 KCS 51640 29118 24074 25327 26313 27566 22522 
2004 KCS 51741 28539 24172 25833 25908 27569 23202 
2005 KCS 72070 38284 34426 36163 35907 37643 33786 
2006 KCS 63504 33573 30435 31994 31510 33069 29931 
2007 KCS 50121 27449 23470 24731 25390 26650 22672 
2008 KCS 47036 25417 22092 23720 23316 24944 21619 
1983 MILW 152152 82973 72965 72514 79638 79187 69179 
1984 MILW 145777 79498 70039 69502 76274 75737 66278 
1983 MKT 142961 77391 67636 69090 73871 75325 65570 
1984 MKT 136822 74183 64829 66124 70699 71994 62640 
1985 MKT 147695 79078 69458 72001 75694 78237 68617 
1986 MKT 154141 82564 72615 75011 79130 81526 71577 
1987 MKT 151158 81169 71441 73284 77875 79718 69989 
1983 MP 115739 57980 57430 59242 56498 58310 57760 
1984 MP 102204 50904 50748 52623 49581 51456 51299 
1985 NS 110796 54752 54815 55640 55157 55981 56045 
1987 NS 120333 59464 59464 60305 60027 60869 60868 
1988 NS 115931 57093 56249 58191 57741 59683 58839 
1989 NS 113288 56221 56756 56333 56955 56532 57067 
1991 NS 109110 54165 53905 54375 54735 55205 54945 
1992 NS 101834 50236 49740 50927 50908 52094 51598 
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1993 NS 88799 43314 42271 44741 44059 46528 45485 
1994 NS 42006 18822 17730 22238 19768 24276 23184 
1995 NS -273 -4221 -5713 2866 -3139 5440 3948 
1996 NS -207697 -124989 -126731 -83869 -123829 -80967 -82709 
1997 NS -261786 -169448 -172494 -93583 -168203 -89292 -92339 
1998 NS 205319 110523 107713 93712 111607 97606 94796 
1999 NS 222361 108970 100517 113168 109193 121844 113390 
2000 NS 114189 59742 43629 55420 58769 70560 54447 
2001 NS 150991 78787 65277 72748 78243 85714 72204 
2002 NS 189017 97687 84865 91711 97306 104153 91330 
2003 NS 183798 95028 80244 89162 94635 103554 88770 
2004 NS 237550 137133 117145 101203 136346 120405 100416 
2005 NS 218122 127354 106658 91714 126408 111465 90768 
2006 NS 202515 115354 95974 88440 114076 106541 87161 
2007 NS 205451 115074 98455 91482 113969 106996 90377 
2008 NS 201876 113558 97150 89604 112272 104727 88319 
1984 NW 108792 57482 53871 52914 55878 54921 51310 
1984 PLE 129067 72009 60254 60930 68137 68813 57058 
1984 SOO 179031 94766 85382 87649 91382 93649 84266 
1985 SOO 132329 70511 62796 64746 67583 69534 61819 
1986 SOO 138133 73411 65824 67582 70550 72308 64722 
1987 SOO 133259 66573 65899 69643 63617 67360 66686 
1988 SOO 129471 64975 63957 67526 61945 65514 64496 
1989 SOO 128064 63916 63914 67188 60876 64150 64148 
1990 SOO 128932 64144 64656 67700 61233 64276 64789 
1991 SOO -19041 -11051 -12213 -5127 -13913 -6828 -7990 
1992 SOO 52498 27365 24824 27967 24531 27675 25133 
1993 SOO 54813 28950 26002 28662 26151 28811 25863 
1994 SOO 60623 33540 28694 29921 30702 31928 27082 
1995 SOO 61106 36219 29307 27413 33693 31799 24887 
1996 SOO 62464 36669 29933 28343 34121 32531 25795 
1997 SOO 67852 39448 31690 31085 36767 36162 28404 
1998 SOO 47093 29351 21243 20471 26622 25849 17742 
1999 SOO 50092 30635 22489 22145 27947 27603 19457 
2000 SOO 50138 30460 22414 22272 27866 27724 19678 
2001 SOO 41251 26124 18037 17666 23585 23214 15127 
2002 SOO 45449 28277 20038 19706 25743 25411 17172 
2003 SOO 37608 24283 16176 15828 21780 21432 13325 
2004 SOO 42252 26361 18374 18281 23971 23878 15891 
2005 SOO 53763 32072 24071 24182 29582 29693 21691 
2006 SOO 33830 22466 14359 13834 19996 19471 11364 
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2007 SOO 42223 26482 18612 18175 24048 23611 15740 
2008 SOO 41764 26415 18403 17889 23875 23361 15349 
1983 SOU 56120 30348 27554 27533 28587 28566 25772 
1984 SOU 63289 33926 31277 30959 32330 32012 29363 
1983 SP 140378 69583 69332 71638 68739 71046 70795 
1984 SP 120017 58733 58744 61810 58207 61273 61285 
1985 SP 136284 67487 67308 69573 66711 68976 68797 
1986 SP 132825 65922 65649 67765 65059 67176 66903 
1988 SP 117864 60332 59109 58124 59740 58755 57532 
1989 SP 112376 57338 56429 55492 56884 55947 55038 
1990 SP 87052 43751 44057 43116 43935 42994 43300 
1991 SP 129859 65829 66272 63792 66067 63587 64029 
1992 SP 93313 46828 48324 45686 47627 44989 46485 
1993 SP 89556 44603 46647 43893 45662 42908 44953 
1994 SP 97089 47891 49305 47969 49121 47784 49198 
1995 SP 104932 51930 53144 52306 52626 51788 53002 
1996 SP 98121 48358 49888 49089 49032 48233 49763 
1988 SSW 162108 87504 78227 77705 84403 83881 74604 
1989 SSW 134679 73378 64465 64304 70376 70214 61302 
1983 UP 198782 100602 97627 99069 99714 101155 98180 
1984 UP 158870 80558 78096 79008 79862 80774 78312 
1985 UP 176062 88437 86388 88098 87964 89674 87625 
1986 UP 171235 87722 86113 83572 87663 85122 83513 
1987 UP 145841 75321 71953 70899 74942 73888 70521 
1988 UP 175340 92585 87006 83837 91502 88334 82755 
1989 UP 167081 88329 83328 80257 86823 83752 78752 
1990 UP 157315 83684 77784 75405 81910 79531 73631 
1991 UP 158642 82845 76766 78251 80391 81877 75797 
1992 UP 144727 77497 70176 70107 74620 74551 67230 
1993 UP 133539 71859 64536 65447 68092 69004 61680 
1994 UP 136735 78121 65325 63345 73390 71411 58614 
1995 UP 223963 146327 107636 89574 134389 116327 77635 
1996 UP 211542 141303 102123 84511 127031 109419 70239 
1997 UP 511433 321641 233678 226971 284461 277754 189791 
1998 UP 484599 297759 222378 219803 264796 262221 186840 
1999 UP 505583 322865 228303 225120 280462 277280 182718 
2000 UP 501551 303793 225236 243835 257716 276314 197757 
2001 UP 529852 320254 238195 261577 268275 291657 209598 
2002 UP 538424 325178 240103 269204 269220 298321 213246 
2003 UP 525148 317705 231609 267766 257382 293539 207443 
2004 UP 503446 309184 218078 257784 245662 285368 194263 
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2005 UP 505417 314361 218738 255200 250218 286679 191056 
2006 UP 491224 308208 209127 252892 238332 282097 183016 
2007 UP 501109 308898 215339 261796 239313 285770 192211 
2008 UP 497112 304956 214234 262780 234332 282877 192156 
1984 WP 189337 101146 89984 91819 97519 99354 88191 
1985 WP 173149 93510 82304 83247 89902 90846 79639 
Note. Observations with zero values for unit train gross ton miles is deleted as usually practiced by those 
using R-1 data. The missing values for some of the particular years are due to the microfiche that are not 
found at STB library (BM-1988, BN-1983, 1995, CR-1989, 1998, DH-1987, DMIR-1983, FEC-1983, 
1984, ICG-1995, 1997, KCS-1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, MP-1985, NS-1986, 1990, NW-1983, PLE-1983, 
SCL-1983, 1984, 1985, SOO-1983, SP-1987, SSW-1983,1984,1985, 1986, 1987, WP-1983) 
 
Table-7: Analysis on economies of scope at firm level (with concavity imposed) 
yr Rr scope41 scopeU42 scopeW43 scopeT44 scopeUW45 scopeUT46 scopeWT47 
1983 ATSF 9345351 4777969 4726802 4513211 4832140 4618549 4567383 
1984 ATSF 9408879 4775152 4764731 4615805 4793073 4644147 4633727 
1985 ATSF 8612468 4382770 4356042 4180551 4431916 4256426 4229698 
1986 ATSF 8492823 4366119 4306287 4072640 4420183 4186536 4126704 
1987 ATSF 7387189 3780459 3757704 3576697 3810492 3629485 3606729 
1988 ATSF 6431094 3290103 3288768 3139076 3292018 3142326 3140991 
1989 ATSF 8147259 4152153 4182965 4020059 4127201 3964295 3995107 
1990 ATSF 7314037 3772690 3775973 3543146 3770891 3538064 3541347 
1991 ATSF 8472244 4210056 4225042 4252368 4219875 4247201 4262188 
1992 ATSF 9392698 4638162 4614442 4762517 4630181 4778256 4754536 
1993 ATSF 9484765 4692799 4557605 4821110 4663656 4927161 4791966 
1994 ATSF 9201845 4612692 4335425 4643017 4558827 4866420 4589153 
1995 ATSF 5665113 2887077 2529805 2845343 2819770 3135308 2778036 
1983 BM 26608818 14274466 12832335 11941171 14667647 13776484 12334352 
1984 BM 21433907 11688428 10244224 9353701 12080206 11189682 9745479 
1986 BM 19590587 10780789 9311813 8412027 11178560 10278774 8809798 
1984 BN 5550159 2902634 2932510 2557084 2993075 2617649 2647525 
1985 BN 1353993 720261 730074 619879 734113 623919 633732 
1986 BN -643734 -194779 -208461 -414774 -228960 -435274 -448956 
1987 BN -359445 43531 34449 -371393 11948 -393894 -402976 
1988 BN -28511 212382 226134 -274123 245612 -254645 -240894 
                                                 
41 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 = 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 0,0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑊 , 0) + 𝐶(0,0, 𝑦𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑊 , 𝑦𝑇) 
42 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑈 = 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 0, 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑤 , 𝑦𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑊 , 𝑦𝑇)  
43 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑊 = 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑊 , 0) + 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 0, 𝑦𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑊 , 𝑦𝑇)  
44 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑇 = 𝐶(0, 0, 𝑦𝑇) + 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑤 , 0) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑊 , 𝑦𝑇) 
45 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑈𝑊 = 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 0, 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑦𝑊 , 0) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑈 , 𝑦𝑊 , 0) 
46 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑈𝑇 = 𝐶(𝑌𝑈 , 0, 0) + 𝐶(0, 0, 𝑌𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑌𝑈 , 0, 𝑌𝑇) 
47 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐸 𝑊𝑇 = 𝐶(0, 𝑌𝑊 , 0) + 𝐶(0,0, 𝑌𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑌𝑊 , 0, 𝑌𝑇) 
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1989 BN -1166800 -470775 -414311 -778103 -388696 -752488 -696024 
1990 BN -2955310 -1450116 -1383333 -1581850 -1373460 -1571977 -1505194 
1991 BN -4580814 -2273089 -2246579 -2336027 -2244787 -2334235 -2307725 
1992 BN -6345010 -2936397 -2909570 -3467254 -2877756 -3435440 -3408613 
1993 BN -5411144 -2283194 -2275909 -3181740 -2229404 -3135234 -3127949 
1994 BN -5716035 -2446232 -2399122 -3402224 -2313811 -3316913 -3269803 
1996 BN -229900951 19401258 -179622214 -297246811 67345860 -50278736 -249302209 
1997 BN -4087793 -668373 -1689047 -6851827 2764033 -2398746 -3419420 
1998 BN -6847441 -2590791 -2362398 -8810269 1962828 -4485043 -4256650 
1999 BN -11396033 -5662489 -4173310 -10806440 -589592 -7222723 -5733544 
2000 BN -15413106 -6934618 -6574343 -13613123 -1799983 -8838762 -8478488 
2001 BN -16486737 -7269864 -6888726 -14658942 -1827796 -9598011 -9216873 
2002 BN -21152645 -7742155 -10039622 -18418998 -2733646 -11113022 -13410490 
2003 BN -22714972 -9138250 -10560640 -19098050 -3616923 -12154332 -13576722 
2004 BN -25444582 -11382387 -10770755 -21552791 -3891791 -14673827 -14062196 
2005 BN -27134789 -12728727 -11276883 -22783761 -4351028 -15857907 -14406062 
2006 BN -31580793 -15191615 -12774740 -26448982 -5131811 -18806054 -16389178 
2007 BN -34846530 -16861559 -14012518 -28619888 -6226643 -20834012 -17984972 
2008 BN -37244135 -17712258 -14927035 -30450847 -6793288 -22317100 -19531877 
1983 BO 16070806 8068320 8098765 7702090 8368716 7972041 8002486 
1984 BO 17116024 8528156 8648376 8310883 8805141 8467648 8587868 
1985 BO 17783540 8886420 8971656 8613879 9169661 8811884 8897120 
1983 CNW 12362111 6252152 6215624 5824844 6537267 6146487 6109959 
1984 CNW 13203565 6639975 6651731 6282265 6921300 6551834 6563590 
1985 CNW 13584954 6953713 6774162 6354448 7230505 6810791 6631241 
1986 CNW 15423799 7871777 7694742 7288087 8135711 7729057 7552022 
1987 CNW 14851271 7608740 7393832 6985203 7866068 7457439 7242531 
1988 CNW 14819996 7976139 7169889 6616231 8203765 7650107 6843858 
1989 CNW 14214817 7717636 6846645 6253655 7961162 7368172 6497181 
1990 CNW 14423180 7794956 6953049 6391761 8031419 7470130 6628224 
1991 CNW 14463414 7829877 6958390 6403722 8059693 7505024 6633538 
1992 CNW 14873946 8026921 7180614 6618989 8254957 7693332 6847025 
1993 CNW 15096352 8117505 7293040 6766514 8329838 7803312 6978847 
1994 CNW 14338170 7698972 6923860 6450898 7887272 7414310 6639198 
1983 CO 16683326 8659939 8285431 7765068 8918258 8397895 8023387 
1984 CO 17953762 9201461 8966569 8518399 9435363 8987193 8752301 
1985 CO 19351888 9917635 9658865 9198172 10153716 9693023 9434253 
1983 CR 4206717 2090165 2126025 2076645 2130072 2080692 2116552 
1984 CR 5041223 2502369 2526325 2518208 2523015 2514898 2538854 
1985 CR 5555518 2786143 2803106 2740347 2815171 2752412 2769375 
1986 CR 5489357 2769572 2776756 2698381 2790976 2712601 2719785 
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1987 CR 5269057 2639447 2632856 2636467 2632590 2636201 2629610 
1988 CR 4175998 2098089 2068666 2104359 2071639 2107332 2077908 
1990 CR 2881653 1466160 1457203 1434428 1447225 1424449 1415492 
1991 CR 2828264 1430469 1424328 1407086 1421179 1403936 1397795 
1992 CR 3194078 1611993 1595051 1602268 1591810 1599027 1582085 
1993 CR 3309471 1691332 1686260 1653106 1656365 1623211 1618139 
1994 CR 4328202 2201361 2155446 2198069 2130132 2172755 2126841 
1995 CR 4679495 2358587 2276212 2372617 2306878 2403284 2320909 
1996 CR 3860077 1960146 1879105 1963527 1896550 1980972 1899930 
1997 CR 1183082 630813 548525 630676 552406 634557 552269 
1986 CSX -2326241 -667022 -2225383 -1552253 -773988 -100858 -1659219 
1987 CSX -874562 595774 -2242974 -1385721 511159 1368412 -1470336 
1988 CSX 3353346 2034624 1167479 1461348 1891998 2185867 1318722 
1989 CSX 3111104 1777282 1267694 1481982 1629122 1843410 1333822 
1990 CSX 794145 642250 80547 317742 476403 713599 151895 
1991 CSX 407234 365931 3803 221591 185644 403431 41303 
1992 CSX -273468 158618 -533980 -223472 -49996 260512 -432086 
1993 CSX -265793 45898 -351727 -95787 -170006 85933 -311691 
1994 CSX -2002653 -603019 -1257346 -1437971 -564682 -745307 -1399634 
1995 CSX -2517608 -865776 -1386491 -1714565 -803042 -1131117 -1651832 
1996 CSX -4978341 -2164053 -2543709 -2870530 -2107811 -2434632 -2814288 
1997 CSX -4350120 -1733040 -2282190 -2700695 -1649425 -2067930 -2617080 
1998 CSX -2844196 -976111 -1552329 -1950987 -893208 -1291866 -1868085 
1999 CSX -8872920 -3669945 -4905556 -5359974 -3512946 -3967364 -5202975 
2000 CSX -11584160 -4815272 -6409488 -7031205 -4552955 -5174671 -6768888 
2001 CSX -11806277 -5102645 -6379541 -6947411 -4858866 -5426736 -6703632 
2002 CSX -17995577 -7613885 -9843061 -10749357 -7246220 -8152516 -10381692 
2003 CSX -17666098 -7270948 -9835337 -10783908 -6882190 -7830761 -10395149 
2004 CSX -18398390 -7287383 -10369383 -11620401 -6777988 -8029007 -11111006 
2005 CSX -18407993 -7684954 -10046492 -11256364 -7151629 -8361501 -10723039 
2006 CSX -18106094 -7744723 -9694945 -10968773 -7137321 -8411149 -10361370 
2007 CSX -20358422 -9018697 -10736416 -11903536 -8454886 -9622006 -11339725 
2008 CSX -20839892 -9356448 -10858056 -12073521 -8766371 -9981836 -11483444 
1983 DH 20910900 11384606 10013775 9138332 11772568 10897126 9526294 
1984 DH 20549220 11205033 9833162 8959307 11589914 10716058 9344187 
1985 DH 21975405 11944056 10530711 9644640 12330766 11444694 10031349 
1986 DH 25457412 13699891 12256921 11365884 14091528 13200491 11757521 
1984 DMIR 25899058 13944172 12461396 11556075 14342984 13437662 11954886 
1983 DRGW 26429805 13971793 12849261 12129132 14300673 13580543 12458012 
1984 DRGW 24312871 12921807 11782664 11069386 13243485 12530207 11391064 
1985 DRGW 23712646 12635397 11483165 10744545 12968101 12229481 11077249 
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1986 DRGW 22323739 12009575 10754740 9978682 12345058 11569000 10314165 
1987 DRGW 21479833 11603534 10335175 9536898 11942934 11144658 9876299 
1988 DRGW 21938478 11843990 10566765 9760114 12178364 11371713 10094489 
1989 DRGW 21106074 11391472 10172731 9388042 11718032 10933343 9714602 
1990 DRGW 20542856 11106902 9890846 9112901 11429955 10652011 9435954 
1991 DRGW 22846787 12279216 11006792 10252387 12594400 11839995 10567571 
1992 DRGW 21833398 11758524 10504120 9773004 12060394 11329278 10074874 
1993 DRGW 21554417 11602320 10347653 9664429 11889987 11206764 9952097 
1983 DTI 27504715 14645895 13317798 12457758 15046957 14186917 12858820 
1985 FEC 22078133 11927847 10615463 9760052 12318081 11462670 10150285 
1986 FEC 21839492 11855456 10472233 9597320 12242172 11367260 9984036 
1987 FEC 22478356 12180832 10789687 9911656 12566700 11688668 10297524 
1988 FEC 22834466 12349909 10975136 10102619 12731846 11859329 10484556 
1989 FEC 23117033 12499409 11111975 10236916 12880117 12005058 10617624 
1990 FEC 24024589 12965896 11557790 10676137 13348452 12466799 11058692 
1991 FEC 25491993 13710073 12283990 11397096 14094897 13208004 11781921 
1983 GTW 28453146 15155880 13784013 12909945 15543200 14669132 13297265 
1984 GTW 28079274 14905434 13636988 12797552 15281721 14442285 13173840 
1985 GTW 28642230 15234162 13893289 13028377 15613853 14748941 13408068 
1986 GTW 28501750 15157557 13826393 12965733 15536017 14675357 13344193 
1987 GTW 29931852 15876626 14537565 13675376 16256476 15394287 14055225 
1988 GTW 27097445 14460710 13121429 12258116 14839328 13976016 12636735 
1989 GTW 27600799 14719777 13369127 12503424 15097375 14231671 12881022 
1990 GTW 27550291 14697825 13338631 12474244 15076047 14211660 12852467 
1991 GTW 28186687 15018501 13653464 12789691 15396996 14533223 13168186 
1992 GTW 28072188 14957376 13599147 12738507 15333681 14473041 13114811 
1993 GTW 27686529 14758303 13411790 12557664 15128865 14274739 12928226 
1994 GTW 28474319 15142952 13816280 12961317 15513003 14658039 13331367 
1995 GTW 28935783 15375870 14043500 13190566 15745217 14892283 13559913 
1996 GTW 27551572 14673125 13364764 12528038 15023533 14186807 12878447 
1997 GTW 28671722 15228636 13928564 13094182 15577540 14743158 13443086 
1998 GTW 29323625 15556043 14252494 13417168 15906457 15071131 13767582 
1983 ICG 13526683 6928942 6739926 6323114 7203568 6786757 6597741 
1984 ICG 14219062 7094494 7177731 6862866 7356196 7041331 7124567 
1985 ICG 16912623 8589693 8443282 8058702 8853920 8469340 8322929 
1986 ICG 19110942 9970355 9397393 8847024 10263918 9713549 9140587 
1987 ICG 19601505 10275598 9615178 9014446 10587059 9986327 9325906 
1988 ICG 20293443 10625126 9956092 9358016 10935427 10337351 9668316 
1989 ICG 20080784 10518001 9836655 9258561 10822222 10244129 9562782 
1990 ICG 21183430 11115881 10370466 9763180 11420249 10812964 10067549 
1991 ICG 18924889 9959359 9231837 8679446 10245443 9693052 8965530 
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1992 ICG 19799960 10381056 9677023 9129361 10670599 10122937 9418904 
1993 ICG 19909685 10414212 9748780 9213178 10696507 10160905 9495473 
1994 ICG 21554756 11350449 10494056 9933295 11621460 11060700 10204307 
1996 ICG 21686180 11443097 10531452 9982201 11703979 11154728 10243083 
1998 ICG 23362798 12306214 11347386 10805514 12557284 12015412 11056585 
1983 KCS 25547002 13653165 12324244 11565960 13981042 13222758 11893837 
1984 KCS 25439145 13545945 12297819 11569679 13869466 13141325 11893199 
1985 KCS 23982523 12745706 11604196 10911330 13071193 12378327 11236817 
1986 KCS 22319930 12013151 10719922 9980011 12339919 11600009 10306780 
1987 KCS 21800721 11729748 10475286 9745002 12055719 11325435 10070973 
1988 KCS 21823464 11714654 10502765 9781904 12041560 11320699 10108809 
1989 KCS 21973302 11802586 10569348 9844711 12128591 11403954 10170716 
1990 KCS 23694780 12654746 11438171 10715679 12979101 12256609 11040034 
1991 KCS 24420536 13014739 11801450 11082815 13337721 12619086 11405797 
1995 KCS 20833983 10928075 10193366 9612634 11221349 10640617 9905908 
1996 KCS 21690097 11316679 10642694 10074942 11615156 11047403 10373419 
1997 KCS 22038363 11445282 10840452 10300947 11737417 11197911 10593082 
1998 KCS 22603912 11762309 11100443 10565164 12038748 11503468 10841603 
2000 KCS 24838715 12695665 12322111 11852694 12986021 12516603 12143050 
2001 KCS 24927483 12778192 12339640 11863187 13064297 12587843 12149291 
2002 KCS 28120580 14232655 14020446 13597735 14522846 14100134 13887925 
2003 KCS 27590080 13972060 13757259 13326900 14263180 13832821 13618020 
2004 KCS 28439560 14324352 14205280 13842078 14597483 14234281 14115209 
2005 KCS 26498428 13329798 13242010 12921905 13576522 13256417 13168630 
2006 KCS 27262446 13670743 13641987 13377567 13884879 13620459 13591703 
2007 KCS 28924757 14617464 14397472 14093582 14831175 14527285 14307293 
2008 KCS 30458545 15287114 15228652 14953337 15505208 15229892 15171430 
1983 MILW 21806519 11708754 10547454 9751582 12054937 11259065 10097765 
1984 MILW 21900554 11697877 10623922 9867985 12032569 11276632 10202677 
1983 MKT 20129920 10785566 9742249 8978975 11150945 10387670 9344354 
1984 MKT 20398025 10868789 9904296 9167553 11230473 10493729 9529236 
1985 MKT 21167319 11300416 10242824 9515623 11651696 10924495 9866903 
1986 MKT 21510457 11510212 10394758 9643786 11866671 11115699 10000245 
1987 MKT 21998642 11743165 10631543 9913484 12085158 11367099 10255477 
1983 MP 7573559 3569735 3934168 3849969 3723590 3639392 4003824 
1984 MP 7300229 3408335 3809420 3754485 3545744 3490809 3891895 
1985 NS 2262585 1122081 1002944 1182519 1080066 1259641 1140504 
1987 NS 1987428 1000405 814587 1045470 941958 1172841 987024 
1988 NS 916653 483973 79593 499953 416699 837060 432680 
1989 NS 1943945 1012429 891218 1007754 936191 1052726 931516 
1991 NS 1698421 891154 644265 866458 831963 1054156 807267 
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1992 NS 1116676 628085 294690 558269 558407 821986 488591 
1993 NS 526233 379604 -101468 223892 302341 627702 146629 
1994 NS -1217194 -418204 -976860 -700794 -516401 -240335 -798991 
1995 NS -1226622 -362868 -1056806 -751439 -475183 -169815 -863754 
1996 NS -1918482 -672232 -1448359 -1125806 -792676 -470122 -1246250 
1997 NS -3305626 -1231443 -2330203 -1944988 -1360638 -975423 -2074183 
1998 NS -2084719 -667578 -1659877 -1304649 -780070 -424842 -1417141 
1999 NS -12402133 -5241115 -7224531 -7137881 -5264252 -5177602 -7161018 
2000 NS -15102186 -5755272 -9074811 -9447924 -5654261 -6027374 -9346913 
2001 NS -16937931 -6931750 -9804796 -10062612 -6875319 -7133135 -10006181 
2002 NS -17813715 -7451181 -10222607 -10402070 -7411645 -7591109 -10362534 
2003 NS -18364160 -7503798 -10714495 -10901144 -7463015 -7649665 -10860362 
2004 NS -19618420 -7544840 -11801295 -12155290 -7463130 -7817125 -12073580 
2005 NS -19411051 -7372005 -11736150 -12137235 -7273816 -7674901 -12039047 
2006 NS -19517158 -7579439 -11536432 -12070422 -7446736 -7980726 -11937719 
2007 NS -19300211 -7769348 -11159612 -11645610 -7654602 -8140600 -11530863 
2008 NS -19591300 -7907422 -11190568 -11817323 -7773978 -8400732 -11683878 
1984 NW 13069150 6823184 6536376 6079453 6989697 6532774 6245966 
1984 PLE 26598872 14223197 12844064 11973775 14625097 13754807 12375675 
1984 SOO 21850276 11622454 10618029 9876635 11973641 11232246 10227821 
1985 SOO 12629262 6874697 6097010 5450674 7178588 6532252 5754565 
1986 SOO 12170490 6641652 5870839 5231907 6938583 6299652 5528838 
1987 SOO 17371797 8196971 9019600 8867919 8503878 8352197 9174826 
1988 SOO 18383510 8738718 9507825 9330266 9053243 8875684 9644791 
1989 SOO 19133012 8967051 9968959 9850401 9282612 9164054 10165961 
1990 SOO 21731605 10216033 11291634 11213392 10518213 10439971 11515572 
1991 SOO 22611377 10908398 11589621 11405868 11205509 11021755 11702979 
1992 SOO 23272772 11446013 11806338 11532535 11740237 11466434 11826759 
1993 SOO 23044880 11399111 11655925 11355301 11689579 11388955 11645769 
1994 SOO 19723419 10005997 9847216 9422751 10300668 9876203 9717423 
1995 SOO 16149851 8594303 7865708 7293315 8856536 8284143 7555548 
1996 SOO 16719502 8849194 8167528 7605787 9113715 8551974 7870308 
1997 SOO 22020572 11615066 10746407 10127173 11893400 11274166 10405506 
1998 SOO 23579590 12434172 11502305 10862131 12717459 12077284 11145418 
1999 SOO 24161551 12730912 11776904 11151568 13009983 12384646 11430638 
2000 SOO 24773215 13038565 12076179 11465307 13307908 12697036 11734650 
2001 SOO 25658342 13496514 12506732 11898287 13760055 13151610 12161829 
2002 SOO 25531723 13452993 12427120 11815693 13716030 13104603 12078730 
2003 SOO 26498310 13926508 12920158 12311955 14186354 13578152 12571802 
2004 SOO 26670212 14006058 12989401 12416116 14254096 13680810 12664154 
2005 SOO 25000347 13164923 12178319 11576933 13423414 12822028 11835425 
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2006 SOO 27935768 14654133 13636821 13025294 14910474 14298947 13281635 
2007 SOO 27024357 14181012 13205464 12590673 14433684 13818892 12843345 
2008 SOO 27686282 14517371 13544669 12905278 14781004 14141613 13168911 
1983 SOU 12206513 6181169 6130745 5842495 6364017 6075768 6025344 
1984 SOU 12226415 6205764 6133442 5854985 6371430 6092973 6020651 
1983 SP 11715681 5670234 5891622 5957925 5757756 5824058 6045447 
1984 SP 10707097 5154566 5330397 5498014 5209083 5376700 5552531 
1985 SP 10260207 4938266 5153803 5241375 5018831 5106404 5321941 
1986 SP 10950213 5288988 5511694 5571681 5378532 5438519 5661225 
1988 SP 10232058 5249869 5168894 4920745 5311313 5063164 4982189 
1989 SP 9372745 4800860 4745112 4524766 4847979 4627633 4571885 
1990 SP 2864949 1477691 1486149 1406350 1458599 1378800 1387258 
1991 SP 2280797 1195430 1217187 1109996 1170801 1063610 1085367 
1992 SP 2827247 1456683 1531351 1453506 1373741 1295896 1370564 
1993 SP 3448364 1748623 1861183 1809716 1638648 1587180 1699741 
1994 SP 42990 69761 -16212 100847 -57858 59202 -26771 
1995 SP -2084345 -1057289 -1012577 -954789 -1129556 -1071767 -1027056 
1996 SP -1349805 -728335 -604807 -551502 -798303 -744998 -621470 
1988 SSW 22083692 11810159 10736830 9951575 12132118 11346862 10273534 
1989 SSW 23282474 12382033 11358203 10588837 12693637 11924271 10900441 
1983 UP 14956639 7768151 7389045 7096270 7860368 7567593 7188488 
1984 UP 14250524 7374498 7047869 6803749 7446775 7202655 6876026 
1985 UP 13382241 6914887 6607780 6418280 6963962 6774461 6467354 
1986 UP -3761237 -1694879 -2039054 -2072433 -1688804 -1722183 -2066358 
1987 UP -3609194 -1442229 -2078189 -2206247 -1402946 -1531004 -2166964 
1988 UP -4174030 -1512129 -2415618 -2774290 -1399739 -1758411 -2661901 
1989 UP -4266400 -1668792 -2302068 -2753916 -1512484 -1964332 -2597608 
1990 UP -5150900 -2053692 -2801683 -3281366 -1869534 -2349217 -3097208 
1991 UP -8155061 -3653674 -4217979 -4756139 -3398923 -3937082 -4501387 
1992 UP -9894384 -4441508 -5146838 -5751550 -4142834 -4747546 -5452876 
1993 UP -7029802 -3174987 -3587566 -4245807 -2783995 -3442236 -3854815 
1994 UP -8817741 -3450471 -4781518 -5858376 -2959364 -4036223 -5367270 
1995 UP -13077347 -2834539 -7639583 -11482040 -1595307 -5437764 -10242807 
1996 UP -15336433 -4211413 -8357508 -12606483 -2729950 -6978925 -11125020 
1997 UP -17047297 -2796049 -10410208 -18110570 1063274 -6637089 -14251248 
1998 UP -20377933 -5534435 -11696382 -18265142 -2112792 -8681552 -14843498 
1999 UP -30312680 -9438491 -16821422 -25275648 -5037032 -13491258 -20874189 
2000 UP -31726072 -13376731 -15931922 -23132298 -8593774 -15794150 -18349341 
2001 UP -32240310 -14133139 -15533525 -23502749 -8737560 -16706785 -18107170 
2002 UP -34366481 -15598767 -16368714 -24576266 -9790215 -17997767 -18767714 
2003 UP -33985143 -16131753 -15692861 -24115091 -9870052 -18292283 -17853390 
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2004 UP -34255351 -16242971 -15881268 -24606068 -9649283 -18374083 -18012380 
2005 UP -41219710 -19159744 -19613687 -28718195 -12501515 -21606023 -22059966 
2006 UP -39544999 -18897882 -18242874 -27900402 -11644597 -21302125 -20647116 
2007 UP -41440993 -20567497 -18760837 -28096607 -13344385 -22680156 -20873496 
2008 UP -44343580 -22549743 -19759382 -29124813 -15218767 -24584198 -21793837 
1984 WP 20599220 11203042 9877161 9019669 11579550 10722058 9396177 
1985 WP 17759570 9795785 8453673 7589222 10170349 9305897 7963785 
 
1.7 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
With the passage of the Staggers Act, some railroad Class-1 carriers took advantage of 
their ability to abandon unprofitable short-haul lines. Despite the post deregulation trend 
of abandonment, there are many carriers still maintaining their short-haul line service. 
Way train service resembles the short-haul line; therefore, a question remains whether 
those carriers are still satisfying the condition of economies of scope in the industry. If 
carriers are exhibiting economies of scope, then multi-service train operation promotes 
cost advantages for the railroad carriers, whereas single-service train operation is at a cost 
disadvantage.   
Few studies exam economies of scope in the railroad industry due, in part, to non-
availability of data to directly test this concept.  Bitzan (2003) directly runs the test of 
subadditivity proposed by Shin and Ying (1992), and concludes that a natural monopoly 
exists but generalizes that economies of scope also exist without testing directly for those. 
His data simulation does not show that the cost subadditivity condition is met for all the 
observations; therefore, a possibility exists for diseconomies of scope to prevail for some 
of the carriers. Ivaldi and McCullough (2004) run the test of subadditivity together with 
economies of scope between infrastructure companies and competing operating firms. 
These variables represent the type of output produced, whereas the variables used in this 
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essay represent on how the outputs are hauled from one destination to another 
destination. Kim (1987) did run analysis on economies of scope using a sample from 
1963, but again on the type of output produced where the joint production of passenger 
and freight in 1963 suggested diseconomies of scope. Therefore, this essay contributes to 
the existing literature because research has not been done yet on economies of scope in 
the railroad industry regarding how the outputs are hauled. The joint production of unit 
train service, way train service and through train service is examined to determine 
whether these three services together depict economies of scope or not.                                       
Due to non-availability of stand-alone cost data, testing directly the condition for 
economies of scope in the railroad industry for the three train services is not viable. 
Class-1 carriers are providing all three services for the entire observation period. 
Therefore, following common practice in subadditivity research, hypothetical firms are 
simulated to represent the carriers producing a given combination of outputs.  Two sets of 
results are presented depicting the expected cost savings from jointly producing the three 
train services. The first set does not impose concavity in input prices while the second set 
does using Cholesky decomposition. When concavity is imposed, the condition for 
economies of scope is satisfied for over 95 percent of the simulations and when the 
concavity is imposed, more than 70 percent of simulation exhibit economies of scope. 
The difference in the results is not unexpected since the cost function may lose its 
flexibility when imposing concavity and therefore should take caution in interpreting 
those results. More firms are found to exhibit diseconomies of scope and in general, these 
firms may still be revenue generating. Even though, before deregulation short-haul lines 
(way train services) were recognized as unprofitable line and most likely to be 
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abandoned, findings from this study provide interesting evidence on cost-savings 
attributable to the maintenance of short-haul service. Class-1 freight industry is non-
competitive (oligopolistic industry) and it engages in profit maximizing behavior while 
satisfying the condition of cost minimization. Therefore it is promising that class-1 rail 
carriers would possible operate in a business environment that experiences economies of 
scope while simultaneously maximizing profit. On another note, findings on 
diseconomies of scope for various years when concavity is not imposed; Conrail between 
year 1995 and year 1997, Grand Trunk and Western in year 1998, Illinois Central Gulf in 
year 1998, Norfolk Southern in year 1996 and year 1997, and Soo Line in year 1991, and 
findings on diseconomies of scope for various years when concavity is imposed; 
Burlington Northern between year 1986 and year 2008, CSX Transportation in year 1986 
and 1987 and between year 1992 and year 2008, Norfolk Southern between year 1994 
and year 2008, Southern Pacific for year 1995 and year 1996 and Union Pacific between 
1986 and year 2008, demonstrate that way train services is not the leading source, but 
rather all three services are equally contribute to diseconomies of scope. These findings 
present new information on railroad carrier efficiency in a post deregulation environment 
and may propose some policy implications. A majority of the class-1 rail carriers 
observed (more than 70 percent) depicts economies of scope48. With the passage of 
Staggers act, the less regulatory restrictive environment has enabled the class-1 carriers to 
provide efficient service to their customers. The non-substantial evidence of 
diseconomies of scope may suggest providing some of the train services or operations 
                                                 
48 Initially, class-1 rail carriers may seem likely to exhibit economies of scope compared to class-2. 
However, class-2 rail carriers do not face the cost constraints as with class-1 carriers whereby they employ 
low wage non-union worker. Hence, it is quite likely that they also experience economies of scope when 
providing short-haul services.  
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independently or outsourcing to another party any labor-intensive activities or selling 
branch lines to short line rail carriers. This may be the answer for the issue whether 
shippers located in low density areas have access to the efficient rail service. Even though 
class-1 carriers do not provide the universal access experienced prior to regulatory 
reform, short-line rail carriers as well as trucking firms have entered this market. As 
pointed out by Johnson et al. (2004), 46.9 percent of the short-line managers interviewed 
in the research believed that in future, class-1 carriers will highly specialize in mainline 
(long-haul) service where branch line operations or switching services are provided by 
the short-line carriers. Short-line carriers are more customer focused, better in low 
volume trackage and therefore be the ‘customer service arm’ (Johnson et al., 2004) for 
class-1 carriers. Furthermore, if there exist any attempt separating the multi-service train 
operation, the type of train services chosen to be specialized may also be equally likely to 
contribute to efficiency gain. Nonetheless, if there is any intention of unbundling the train 
services, the decision on which of the three train services contributes to efficiency gain 
due to increase in market competition needs further consideration.   
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Appendix A: Construction of variables 
Variable Construction 
 Real total cost = (opercost – capexp + roird + roilcm + roicrs)/gdppd 
opercost = railroad operating cost (schedule 410, line 620, column f) 
capexp = capital expenditures classified as operating in r1 (schedule 410, lines 12-30, 101-9, column f) 
roird = return on investment in road  = (roadinv – accdepr) * costkap 
roadinv: road investment (schedule 352b, line 31) + capexp from all previous years 
accdepr: accumulated depreciation in road (schedule. 335, line 30, column g) 
costkap: cost of capital (AAR railroad facts) 
roilcm = return on investment in locomotives = [(iboloco+locinvl) – (acdoloco + locacdl)] * costkap 
iboloco: investment base in owned locomotives (schedule 415, line 5, column g) 
locinvl: investment base in leased locomotives (schedule 415, line 5, column h) 
acdoloco: accumulated depreciation of owned locomotives (schedule 415, line 5, column i) 
locacdl: accumulated depreciation of leased locomotives (schedule 415, line 5, column j) 
roicrs = return on investment in cars = [(ibocars + carinvl) – (acdocars + caracdl)]*costkap 
ibocars: investment base in owned cars (schedule 415, line 24, column g) 
carinvl: investment base in leased cars (schedule 415, line 24, column h) 
acdocars: accumulated depreciation of owned cars (schedule 415, line 24, column i) 
caracdl: accumulated depreciation of leased locomotives (schedule 415, line 24, column j) 
gdppd = gdp price deflator 
 
Price of factor inputs 
 Price of labor = (swge + fringe – caplab)/lbhrs  
swge = total salary and wages (schedule 410, line 620, column b) 
fringe = fringe benefits (schedule 410, lines 112-14, 205, 224, 309, 414, 430, 505, 512, 522, 611, col. e) 
caplab = labor portion of capital expenditure classification as operating in R1 (schedule 410, lines 12-30, 
101-9, column b) 
lbhrs = labor hours (Wage form A, line 700, column 4 + 6)  
 Price of equipment = weighted average equipment price (schedule 415 and schedule 710)  
 Price of fuel (schedule 750) 
 Price of material = AAR materials and supply index 
 Price of way and structure = (roird + anndeprd) / mot 
anndeprd = annual depreciation of road (schedule 335, line 30, column c) 
mot = miles of track (schedule 720, line 6, column b) 
Factor input prices are divided by gdp price deflator 
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Outputs 
 Utgtm: unit train gross ton miles (schedule 755, line 99, column b) 
 Wtgtm: way train gross ton miles (schedule 755, line 100, column b) 
 Ttgtm: through train gross ton miles (schedule 755, line 101, column b) 
adjustment factor multiplied by each output variable = rtm/(utgtm + wtgtm + ttgtm) 
rtm: revenue ton miles (schedule 755, line 110, column b) 
 
Movement characteristics 
 Miles of road: (schedule 700, line 57, column c) 
 Speed = train miles per train hour in road service = trnmls/(trnhr-trnhs) 
 trnmls = total train miles (schedule 755, line 5, column b) 
 trnhr = train hours in road service – includes train switching hours (schedule 755, line 115, column b) 
 trnhs = train hours in train switching (schedule 755, line 116, column b) 
 Average length of haul = rtm/revtons 
revtons = revenue tons (schedule 755, line 105, column b) 
 Caboose = fraction of train miles with cabooses = cabmiles/trnmls 
cabmiles = caboose miles (schedule 755, line 89, column b) 
 
Note. Adapted from “Productivity growth and some of its determinants in the deregulated US 
railroad industry.” by Bitzan, J. D., & Keeler, T. E., 2003, Southern Economic Journal, p.250-251. 
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Appendix B: Algebra proof of linear homogeneity in input price for normalized 
quadratic cost function 
 
For illustration, suppose the cost function is represented by 𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑌). Two cases are 
shown, the quadratic cost function and normalized quadratic cost function. 
 
Case 1: Quadratic cost function 
𝐶(𝜆𝑤𝑖, 𝑌) ⇒ 𝐶 
= 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼𝑖
𝑖
𝜆𝑤𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑘
𝑘
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1
2
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𝑖
𝑌𝑘 
∴ 𝐶(𝜆𝑤𝑖, 𝑌) ≠ 𝜆𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑌) 
Case 2: Normalized quadratic cost function 
The quadratic cost function is normalized by dividing factor input prices and cost with 
one of the factor input prices where  𝑤?̃? =
𝑤𝑖
𝑤⏞
 , ?̃? =
𝐶
𝑤⏞
   and 𝑤⏞  is the numeraire: 
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Multiply both sides of equation by 𝑤⏞: 
𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 1, 𝑌) = 𝛼0 𝑤⏞ + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑖 +
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∴ 𝐶(𝜆𝑤𝑖, 1, 𝑌) = 𝜆
1𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 1, 𝑌)  indicating that the normalized cost function is 
homogeneous of degree 1 in input prices.
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ESSAY 2: ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY IN THE UNITED STATES RAILROAD 
INDUSTRY: CHANGING WORK-RULES AND MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 has brought major transformation to the 
railroad industry.  For instance, easing of rate restrictions presented railroad firms the 
flexibility to set competitive rates.  The ability to better compete with low cost trucking 
carriers helped contribute to a more profitable rail industry (Grimm and Windle, 1998). 
The Staggers act further promoted profitable and efficient operations of rail firms by 
easing regulations limiting class-1 carriers’ ability to abandon non-profitable rail lines 
(Winston, 1998).  Winston (1998) reveals evidence of significant efficiency gains as he 
observes real operating cost per ton-mile fell 60 percent immediately following 
regulatory reform in this industry.49  Productivity enhancing managerial decisions, 
however, were not limited to adjustments of network configurations as railroad 
companies negotiated efficiency enhancing contracts with shippers and with rail labor. 
Post deregulation contracts with shippers included provision making it easier for rail 
firms to align their cars and equipment with shipper demand to avoid the costly practice 
of operating at over capacity  (Winston, 1998). Post deregulation contract negotiations 
also focused on changing labor practices specified by rigid work-rules.  For instance, 
settlements reduced required crew sizes and increased miles hauled as a measure of a 
                                                 
49Bereskin (1996) argues that it is vital to note that deregulation did not begin with the Staggers Act but 
regulatory reform actually started before the passage due to the 4R Act. His estimation results for the pre-
Staggers act passage  (1978 4R act)  and post Staggers act passage suggest a change in productivity growth 
of 2.72 percent, 6.44 percent and 12.34 percent for 1978-1980, 1978-1982 and 1981-1982 respectively. 
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day’s work.  These changes enhanced rail companies’ ability to become more productive 
by addressing inefficiencies in the industry’s input market. Evidence of the efficiency 
enhancing effect associated with relaxed constraints on crew sizes reported by Bitzan and 
Keeler (2003) presents a direct test of changes in crew size and productivity.  Estimating 
a translog cost function for the railroad industry, they investigate the effect of post 
deregulation innovation on the rail freight productivity due to the elimination of cabooses 
and related crew member.  Their findings indicates that without cabooses and the 
associated crew members rail transport costs of class-1 carriers decreased by 5-8 percent  
from 1983 to 1987.  
While past work focuses on the effect of more lenient work-rules on productivity 
there is an absence of research examining whether these carriers use an allocatively 
efficient combination of factor inputs.  Such an analysis is significant in part because it 
helps identify a previously unexamined source of productivity gains and reveals whether 
there is opportunity for rail carriers to achieve greater productivity gains by negotiating 
less rigid work-rules.  If current work-rules are so rigid that they impede firms’ ability to 
satisfy the condition for allocative efficient use of factor inputs it is not obvious a priori 
whether these firms over or under-employ workers relative to non-labor inputs.  For 
instance, work-rules that mandate crew sizes might restrict firms’ ability to substitute 
labor saving technology for labor and thus create a work environment that promotes over-
employment of labor relative to other factor inputs (Bitzan and Peoples, 2014).  
Alternatively, work-rules that use miles of freight hauled as a measure of a workday 
might promote the under-employment of labor relative to other inputs by contributing to 
wage payments that exceed workers’ marginal productivity.  This essay estimates a 
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translog cost function to test whether rail firms use an allocatively efficient mix of labor 
and non-labor inputs for the observation period covering recent years of relatively 
flexible work-rule in the railroad industry. 
The remainder of the essay consists of five additional sections. The next section 
of the essay documents changing work-rules following deregulation and the potential for 
achieving allocative efficient use of factor inputs due to such change. Section 2.3 presents 
a conceptual framework for examining allocative efficiency. This is followed by a 
description of the data source and empirical approach used to test whether class-1 rail 
carriers use an allocative efficient combination of labor and non-labor inputs. Section 2.5 
presents cost results used to examine whether the combination of inputs satisfies the 
condition of cost minimization.  Last, concluding remarks are presented in section 2.6. 
 
2.2  Changing Work-Rules and Stepped Up Investment in Rail Infrastructure 
Rail has a long history of government oversight of its operations.  While regulation of 
rate and entry received substantial attention from past research, much less analysis 
examines regulatory oversight of this industry’s labor market.  However, major labor 
legislation was enacted as far back as the turn of the century. For instance, the Railroad 
Hours of Service Act was passed in 1907 primarily to avoid erosion of employee 
wellbeing associated with long hours of work. Maximum consecutive hours of work with 
minimum hours of rest were set.50 Provision (49 CFR 228) reported below, highlights the 
emphasis this act placed on working conditions. 
                                                 
50 Key railroad labor legislation following the Hours of Service Act of 1907 include the 1920 Esch-
Cummins Act that created the Railroad Labor Board to settle railroad labor disputes.  Following this act the 
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Limitation on Hours. The Act establishes two limitations 
on hours of service. First, no employee engages in train 
or engine service may be require or permitted to work in 
excess of twelve consecutive hours. After working a full 
twelve consecutive hours, an employee must be given at 
least ten consecutive hours off duty before being 
permitted to return to work. 
Second, no employee engaged in train or service engine 
may be required or permitted to continue on duty or go 
on duty unless he has had at least eight consecutive hours 
off duty within the preceding twenty-four hours. (49 
CFR Part 228, Appendix A to Part 228) 51 
Previous research suggests restrictions on working conditions were not necessarily 
opposed by rail companies as Davis and Wilson (2003) report that the imposition of 
work-rules from the point of view of the employer comports with the objective of 
creating discipline when bringing together inexperienced and undisciplined railroad 
workers.  Imposing work-rules was also seen as a mechanism to coordinate railroad 
workers for a large rail networks (Cappelli, 1985).  Nonetheless, enforcing hours of 
service regulations introduces unintended consequences by contributing to input market 
distortions (Kumbhakar, 1992).  Such distortion arises if hours of service regulation 
                                                 
passage of the 1926 Railway Labor Act required rail companies bargain collectively with labor and 
prohibited discrimination against unions. 
51 Requirement of the Hours of Service Act: Statement of Agency Policy and Interpretation. Retrieved from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/49/part-228/appendix-A 
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creates an incentive for railroad employers hiring additional workers to perform tasks that 
could be achieved with a smaller work force working longer hours.  
The potential for input market distortions seems even more likely when 
considering that work-rule stipulations are not limited to government mandated hours of 
service as influential rail unions imposed fairly rigid work-rules pertaining to the 
stipulation of a standard work day, the practice of deadheading and the standardization of 
crew sizes.   Negotiating the terms of a standard work day allowed rail unions the 
opportunity to enhance workers’ earnings without necessarily negotiating higher hourly 
wages.  Indeed, Talley and Schwarz-Miller (1998, p.139) observe that negotiating a 
standard work day contributes to the determination of rail workers earnings as possibly 
the most complex in American industry. The complexity arises from defining a work day 
based on miles of freight hauled rather than daily hours worked.  Prior to 1985, the 
standard work day for freight crews and all engine crews was set to 100 miles, where any 
distance over these 100 miles was considered as over-mileage pay. This may eventually 
distorts the wage productivity relationship when workers take advantage of this provision 
to increase their hourly wage without markedly increasing their weekly hours worked 
(Peoples, 1998, p.117).  The potential for such wage distortion is exacerbated with the 
introduction of faster locomotives. For instance, distance traveled to be considered as a 
work day took less time, therefore making it easier for rail workers to earn overtime 
wages leading to an increase in labor cost per hour (MacDonald and Cavalluzzo, 1996). 
Pre-deregulation determination of rail workers wages were further complicated due to rail 
unions negotiating worker pay without workers performing any rail related service or 
contributing to company’s productivity.  The term ‘deadheading’ is commonly used to 
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describe this type of labor activity. Specifically, according to 49 CFR 228.5, deadheading 
is defined as “the physical relocation of a train employee from one point to another as a 
result of a railroad issued verbal or written directive.” In other words a crew is 
transported from one terminal to another or to a train without performing any services.  
Last, the practice of feather beading--overstaffing or limiting preproduction in 
compliance with a union contract in order to save or create jobs—further contributed to 
wage-productivity distortion in the rail industry.  Pre-deregulation union contracts 
generally stipulated crews included firemen even though most locomotives used diesel 
fuel rather than steam by the middle of the twentieth century.  Employing workers in 
antiquated positions is a clear example of inefficient allocation of crew members relative 
to non-labor inputs. 
In sum, prior to deregulation government mandated and union negotiated work-
rules that did not create an incentive to employ an efficient allocation of labor relative to 
non-labor inputs.  Rather, workers were able to receive wage rates that were not 
commiserate with their productivity.  The last quarter of the twentieth century, however, 
witnessed a sea change in policy regarding the regulation of business practices in the rail 
industry and rail companies’ investment on cost-saving technology.  Economic theory 
predicts that both of these events should influence the employment-mix of inputs in this 
industry. Deregulation placed downward pressure on costs by relaxing the minimum rate 
restrictions to allow rail carriers to set competitive rates with trucking.  In addition, 
deregulation allowed rail carriers the opportunity to abandon unprofitable lines and 
consolidate operations with former rail rivals.  These policy changes indirectly influenced 
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labor markets by weakening the negotiation advantage of rail unions and providing 
substitutes for labor.   
Declining demand for rail workers due to abandonment of unprofitable lines, and 
consolidation of rail service contributed to weakening negotiation leverage of rail unions.  
For instance, using rail carrier data for the 1961-1990 observation period,  Hsing and 
Mixon  (1995) report findings suggesting that following deregulation the labor demand 
curve for rail workers shifted downward significantly, and became more elastic in wages, 
while the marginal product of labor increased. These post deregulation labor productivity 
gains occurred in lockstep with declines in labor wages, as past research find declining 
wages for rail workers following the passage of the 1980 Staggers act (Talley and 
Schwarz-Miller, 1998). These trends are consistent with the argument proposing the 
existence of labor market distortion arising from labor receiving wages that exceed 
marginal productivity. 
Enhanced labor substitutability linked to deregulation arises from this policy 
facilitating a business environment that places a premium on technology investment as a 
means to lower cost, in large part by reducing labor content in rail operations.  Examples 
of post deregulation labor saving technology include the introduction of electronic 
switching systems, communications technology, fuel efficient locomotives, and new track 
technology.  Innovation in switching systems constitute grouping of the switch boxes or 
posts, automation of hump-yard switching and installation of electronic transponder 
devices which makes the operating systems of trains easier with less man-handling 
involved (Schwarz-Miller and Talley, 2002). Indeed, the employment of switchmen and 
brakemen following the introduction of this system fell from 50,578 in 1983 to 7,238 by 
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2010.52 Technological improvement in radio communications further contributed to the 
loss of jobs for brakemen.  The introduction of new communications technology 
coincides with the passage of the Staggers Act. For instance, in the early 1980’s trains 
were equipped with end-of-train devices which were more dependable in communicating 
the safety condition of the train. Besides these remote radio devices that monitor trains 
operations53, hot box54 and dragging equipment detectors55 contribute to the elimination 
of caboose, which in turn eliminated the need for brakemen.56   The switch from steam to 
diesel locomotives affected the crew size by reducing the need for firemen and 
boilermakers (Schwarz-Miller and Talley, 2002). In addition, the need for diesel 
locomotive maintenance was low relative to the maintenance needs of steam locomotives 
(Rich, 1986).    
While the introduction of electronic switching systems, communications 
technology, and fuel efficient locomotives directly affected the demand for train 
operators, changes in track technology directly affected the demand for maintenance-of-
way and structures employees.57  Improvements in track technology included the use of 
stronger, low maintenance materials as well as automated improvements in the 
installation of tracks.  Such improvements in track technology reduced the long-term-
                                                 
52 Source: Unionstats.com 
53 The end-of-train device conveys information to the engineer on the braking systems such as brake 
pressure and enable him to set breaks on the trains. 
(http://www.up.com/aboutup/history/caboose/technology_overtakes/index.htm) 
54 Hot box, which are installed on the track line, monitor the wheel and brake temperature. 
55 Also provides detection on derailment. 
56 Caboose is known as a conductor office, carrying also a brakemen and a flagmen. In early years, the 
engineer whistled the brakemen in the caboose to maneuver the brake wheels while the flagmen cautioned 
other train that came closer.  
57 Improvements in track technology did not start with deregulation, however, as Schwarz-Miller and 
Talley (2002) report, deregulation promoted greater use of this technology by increasing traffic density on 
major routes. 
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demand for maintenance-of-way and structure employees, by reducing the need for their 
services (Schwarz-Miller and Talley, 2002). In addition, Schwarz-Miller and Talley 
(2002) report changes in track technology altered the work assignments of maintenance-
of-way crews in a way the further reduced the demand for their services. For instance, 
prior to the widespread use of this technology large numbers of small crews were 
assigned to repairs in fairly restricted geographic locations.  Following enhanced use of 
track technology rail companies deployed a more optimal approach that relied on a large 
crew to work periodically across several geographic locations. 
Rail labor negotiations settled after deregulation and during the introduction of 
labor saving technology weakened rail unions’ ability to retain rigid work-rules that 
protected worker job security while possibly introducing inefficiency in the input market.  
Evidence of relatively flexible work-rules following deregulation is highlighted by 
changing provisions regarding the practice of deadheading, changes in the codification of 
a standard work day, and changes in crew sizes. For instance, settlements in 1985 
modified the practice of deadheading to allow carriers to limit expenditures to no more 
than a basic day’s pay, and excluded new employees from receiving deadheading pay 
(Talley and Schwarz-Miller, 1998).  Post deregulation settlements starting in 1985 
changed the stipulation of a standard work day for a rail worker from the previous to100 
to 108 miles. Succeeding negotiations lead to a more significant increase of 130 miles as 
the definition of a day’s work by 1995. Settlements also reduced crew sizes by initially 
phasing out firemen and hostlers.58 By 1991 train crew sizes fell from consisting of an 
engineer, conductor and two brakemen to only consisting of just two workers.   
                                                 
58 A hostler is a mechanical crew, handling engines in the yards. Definition retrieved from 
http://home.cogeco.ca/~trains/rrterms.htm 
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 While union negotiations loosened previously rigid work-rules with regards to 
the practice of deadheading, and with regards to stipulating a standard work day and a 
standard crew size, federal regulation pertaining to hours of service actually did not 
change for more than twenty-five years following deregulation.  When change did occur 
it actually strengthened safety regulation by lowering maximum hours of service slightly.  
For instance, the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008 increased the minimum 
undisturbed rest time of train crews from eight to ten hours, and prohibited railroad 
employees working for the remainder of a month after spending a total of 276 hours on 
duty in any month. Imposing these hours of service regulation, however, might create a 
challenge on rail managers’ ability to employ an optimal number of workers as minutes 
from  the October 30, 2003 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
report   “ Neither the rail carriers nor the unions have an incentive to reduce the number 
of hours that employees may work. Limiting hours of service would force the railroads to 
hire additional   workers, and employees would suffer a reduction in earning power” 
(Senate Report, 108-182, 2003).    
In sum, this essay’s presentation of changing work-rule regulations following 
deregulation in the rail industry suggests rail employers face less limitations satisfying 
the condition of allocative efficiency compared to the limitations faced prior to the 
passage of legislation enacting regulatory reform.  Indeed, empirical findings from past 
research indicating labor market change employment such that actual wage more closely 
reflects labor productivity.  For instance, empirical analysis by MacDonald and 
Cavalluzzo (1996) found that ton miles per employee presenting labor productivity more 
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than doubled from 1980 to 1990, and real labor expense per ton mile decreased by almost 
60% for the same years.  These gains in productivity occurred without increases in real 
wages (Talley and Schwarz-Miller, 1998). Hence, suggesting the possibility of a 
movement toward allocative efficient use of labor relative to non-labor inputs. A direct 
test of efficient input allocation, however, is missing from the literature.  
2.3  Modeling Work-rules and Allocative Efficiency 
Producer theory identifies two components related to efficiency, which are allocative 
efficiency and technical efficiency. Technical efficiency is achieved when a firm is 
operating on the production frontier whereas allocative efficiency occurs when firm is 
using optimal combination of factor inputs given price and production technology 
(Farrell, 1957). Shi et al. (2011) examine technical efficiency of Class-1 railroads 
between 2002 and 2007 and their findings suggest class-1 carriers generally operate on or 
near the production frontier. Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) is found to operate on 
the production frontier for every year in the sample. Other companies such as Soo Line, 
Union Pacific, Grand Truck Corporation are also found to operate close to the production 
frontier. Such findings are not surprising since class-1 carriers do not face obvious 
constraints on their ability to achieve technical efficiency.  In contrast, the previous 
section of this essay presents information on railroad work-rules that might hinder 
carriers’ ability to employ an allocatively efficient mix of inputs and this hindrance 
should erode following deregulation given the easing of work-rule restrictions.  Indeed, 
this study also observes the possibility that following deregulation, real wages decline 
jointly with increases in labor productivity. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is 
possibility that following deregulation railroad carriers are better able to move toward a 
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more allocatively efficiency factor input mix between labor and non-labor inputs. This 
labor market outcome is an empirical issue whereby without a direct test of allocative 
efficiency, it is impossible to verify the possibility for improved factor inputs 
reallocation. What follows in Figure-2 is a graphical depiction of input usage used to 
provide guidance toward implementing an appropriate empirical approach for testing 
whether railroad carriers employ an efficient mix of inputs post regulatory reform. 
Two scenarios may arise if the labor-non labor combination does not satisfy the 
cost minimizing condition. As noted in the previous section it is not apparent a priori 
whether the industry is over-utilizing or under-utilizing the labor input respective to the 
non-labor inputs. If the industry is employing a small quantity of labor relative to non-
labor inputs, it may due to the fact that actual price of labor is too high due to rigid work-
rules that make the employment of non-labor inputs more cost efficient. Whereas if the 
industry is employing a large quantity of labor relative to non-labor inputs showing over 
employment of labor, it may be the case that work-rules are forcing the carriers to use 
more workers than they would without these constraints, all other inputs remaining 
constant.  
 To minimize cost, railroad carriers utilize factor inputs in an efficient proportion 
when the ratio of marginal product of one input with its price is equal to the ratio of 
marginal product of other input with its price. For example, assume a hypothetical carrier 
doesn’t face any constraints in the labor market and is thus able to satisfy the condition 
for cost minimization depicted by equation (1):  
𝑀𝑃𝐿
𝑤𝐿
=
𝑀𝑃𝑁𝐿
𝑤𝑁𝐿
           (1) 
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where 𝑀𝑃𝐿 and 𝑀𝑃𝑁𝐿  are the marginal product of labor and non-labor respectively, and 
𝑤𝐿 and 𝑤𝑁𝐿 are the input prices for labor and non-labor respectively. The ratio of 
marginal product of non-labor to labor represents the marginal rate of technical 
substitution of non-labor for labor (𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑁𝐿,𝐿) shown in the following equation: 
𝑀𝑃𝑁𝐿
𝑀𝑃𝐿
= 𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑁𝐿,𝐿 = −
∆𝐿
∆𝑁𝐿
        (2)  
where ∆𝐿 and ∆𝑁𝐿 are the changes in quantity of labor and non-labor respectively, and 
−
∆𝐿
∆𝑁𝐿
 represents the negative of the slope of an isoquant. At any given level of output, the 
least cost combination of factor inputs occurs when the marginal rate of technical 
substitution is equal to the ratio of factor prices as shown in the following equation: 
𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑁𝐿,𝐿 =
𝑤𝑁𝐿
𝑤𝐿
         (3) 
Similarly, this means that the least costly combination of factor inputs occurs when the 
slope of an isoquant equals to the slope of an isocost. This is represented at point A in 
Figure-2 where at that point, the combination of labor and non-labor minimizes cost 
when 𝐶 = 𝑤𝐿𝑥𝐿 + 𝑤𝑁𝐿:𝑥𝑁𝐿.  Now suppose the hypothetical carrier negotiates a labor 
union contract for rail workers that imposes restrictive work-rules and, the railroad carrier 
encounters difficulty attaining higher labor productivity matching the negotiated wage. 
The carrier then has an incentive to invest in more productive alternative inputs per 
dollar. This labor market outcome is depicted graphically by the factor input combination 
occurring at point B in Figure-2, where the firm decides to increase in the usage of non-
labor input (from 𝑥𝑁𝐿 to 𝑥𝑁𝐿
∗) and decrease in the usage of labor (from 𝑥𝐿 to 𝑥𝐿
∗)  as a 
result of restrictive work-rules. Clearly, at point B, cost minimization is not achieved. 
Here, the isocost is 𝐶′ = 𝑤𝐿𝑥𝐿
∗ + 𝑤𝑁𝐿𝑥𝑁𝐿
∗ and this isocost is not tangent to the isoquant. 
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Cost minimization is realized at point B only if the railroad carrier pays the shadow 
prices (𝑤𝐿
∗ and 𝑤𝐹
∗). The combination of factor inputs that can be employed if the railroad 
carrier pays the shadow prices is represented by the isocost 𝐶∗ = 𝑤𝐿
∗𝑥𝐿
∗ + 𝑤𝑁𝐿
∗𝑥𝑁𝐿
∗. 
When this isocost is tangent to the isoquant, point B becomes the least cost combination 
of factor inputs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-2: Allocative efficiency between labor ( 𝑥𝐿 ) and non-labor ( 𝑥𝑁𝐿 ) 
 
Nonetheless at point B, the railroad carrier faces factor inputs decision based on the 
shadow prices (associated with actual productivity) as a result of the restrictive work-
rules. These shadow prices actually capture the price distortion in the factor input market. 
The mix of factor inputs chosen at point B is the least cost mix when 
𝑀𝑃𝐿
∗
𝑤𝐿
∗ =
𝑀𝑃𝑁𝐿
∗
𝑤𝑁𝐿
∗           (4) 
Where 𝑀𝑃𝐿
∗ and 𝑀𝑃𝑁𝐿
∗   are the marginal product of labor and non-labor respectively, 
when employing at 𝑥𝐿
∗ and 𝑥𝑁𝐿
∗  and 𝑤𝐿
∗ and 𝑤𝑁𝐿
∗  are the shadow input prices for labor and 
non-labor respectively.   It should be noted that for this example the shadow price for 
𝑥𝐿   
𝐶 = 𝑤𝐿𝑥𝐿 + 𝑤𝑁𝐿𝑥𝑁𝐿 
𝐶′ = 𝑤𝐿𝑥𝐿
∗ + 𝑤𝑁𝐿𝑥𝑁𝐿
∗ 
𝑥𝐿 A 
𝑥𝐿
∗ B 
𝐶∗ = 𝑤𝐿
∗𝑥𝐿
∗ + 𝑤𝑁𝐿
∗𝑥𝑁𝐿
∗ 
𝑞(𝑥𝐿 , 𝑥𝑁𝐿) = ?̅? 
𝑥𝑁𝐿 
𝑥𝑁𝐿
∗ 𝑥𝑁𝐿 
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labor 𝑤𝐿
∗ is less than the actual price 𝑤𝐿 at output level ?̅? . Thus, assuming the price of 
non-labor inputs matches the marginal productivity of non-labor inputs, then  
𝑀𝑃𝐿
∗
𝑤𝐿
∗ >
𝑀𝑃𝐿
𝑤𝐿
 and 
𝑀𝑃𝑁𝐿
∗
𝑤𝑁𝐿
∗ =
𝑀𝑃𝑁𝐿
𝑤𝑁𝐿
       (5) 
The inequality on the left depicts the input price distortion associated with work-rule 
rigidity. So while the rail carrier is satisfying the condition of cost minimization for 
shadow input prices, the observed factor input combination is allocatively inefficient for 
actual prices.  The extent of this price distortion can be depicted additively by setting 𝑤𝐿
∗ 
=𝑤𝐿 + 𝑔𝐿 , where 𝑔𝐿 is the factor input distortion.  It is important to note that the 
magnitude of this factor input price distortion is influence by the curvature of the 
isoquant. The greater the curvature of the isoquant, the greater the degree of 
substitutability of the two inputs. Greater degree of substitutability is portrayed through 
the isoquant approaching linearity, shown in the following Figure-3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-3: Allocative efficiency between labor ( 𝑥𝐿 ) and equipment ( 𝑥𝑁𝐿 ) as elasticity 
of substitution increases 
 
𝐶 = 𝑤𝐿𝑥𝐿 + 𝑤𝑁𝐿𝑥𝑁𝐿 
𝑥𝐿 
𝐶′
= 𝑤𝐿𝑥𝐿
∗ + 𝑤𝑁𝐿𝑥𝑁𝐿
∗ 
𝐶∗ = 𝑤𝐿
∗𝑥𝐿
∗ + 𝑤𝑁𝐿
∗𝑥𝑁𝐿
∗ 
𝑥𝐿
′∗ 
A’ 
𝑞(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) = ?̅? 
B’ 
𝑥𝐿 
𝑥𝑁𝐿 𝑥𝑁𝐿′
∗ 
𝑥𝑁𝐿 
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At point A’, the least cost combination is achieved without restrictive work-rules. 
With restrictive work-rules, the least cost combination is preserved at point B’ after the 
firm employs less labor and more non-labor input from point A’. The magnitude of the 
changes in the factor input is larger than in Figure-3 as the elasticity of substitution59 
between labor and non-labor becomes larger and this is depicted by the isoquant 
approaching linearity60. The elasticity of substitution measures the responsiveness of a 
firm on changes in relative input prices. The larger the value of elasticity, the easier it is 
for the firm to substitute between the two factor inputs. Therefore, for a rail carrier to be a 
cost minimizer, if there is a change in the relative input prices, the carriers will shift to a 
cheaper factor input. In other words, the greater the substitutability of labor and non-labor 
inputs, the greater the input market distortion due to the shadow price varying from the 
actual price.  Therefore, this suggests that for the same shadow price, market distortion 
(inefficient proportion of input mix) is greater since the isoquant is approaching linearity 
as elasticity of substitution increases.  
In sum, the preceding graphical representation on factor input price distortion 
provides guidance for empirically examining allocative efficiency of factor inputs by 
using information on input cost to compute the input price distortion index.  Additionally, 
the preceding presentation highlights the importance of computing the elasticity of 
substitution to attain information on the potential magnitude of the price distortion. 
                                                 
59 𝜎 =
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 (
𝐿
𝑁𝐿
)𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑁𝐿,𝐿
 
60 Factor inputs for a linear production function are perfect substitutes where = ∞ .   
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2.4  Data and Empirical Approach 
The empirical analysis of allocative efficiency in the US railroad industry is achieved, in 
part, by using data from Class I Annual Reports (R-I reports) from 1983 to 2008. The 
data were not gathered in a same type/format. The data types or formats gathered were 
from raw data file, micro fiche, excel files and pdf files for the later years. Snapshots 
from the microfiche were taken and converted into pdf files. All data in the pdf files were 
extracted manually. The variables sources and construction are taken from a study done 
by Bitzan and Keeler (2003), which is similar with the first essay. The variable 
constructions used in their study are presented in Table-8 below.  Merger information 
from Dooley et al. (1991) is used when constructing the fixed effect.  
 
Table-8: Construction of variables 
Variable Construction 
 Real total cost = (opercost – capexp + roird + roilcm + roicrs)/gdppd 
opercost = railroad operating cost (schedule 410, line 620, column f) 
capexp = capital expenditures classified as operating in r1 (schedule 410, lines 12-30, 101-9, column f) 
roird = return on investment in road  = (roadinv – accdepr) * costkap 
roadinv: road investment (schedule 352b, line 31) + capexp from all previous years 
accdepr: accumulated depreciation in road (schedule. 335, line 30, column g) 
costkap: cost of capital (AAR railroad facts) 
roilcm = return on investment in locomotives = [(iboloco+locinvl) – (acdoloco + locacdl)] * costkap 
iboloco: investment base in owned locomotives (schedule 415, line 5, column g) 
locinvl: investment base in leased locomotives (schedule 415, line 5, column h) 
acdoloco: accumulated depreciation of owned locomotives (schedule 415, line 5, column i) 
locacdl: accumulated depreciation of leased locomotives (schedule 415, line 5, column j) 
roicrs = return on investment in cars = [(ibocars + carinvl) – (acdocars + caracdl)]*costkap 
ibocars: investment base in owned cars (schedule 415, line 24, column g) 
carinvl: investment base in leased cars (schedule 415, line 24, column h) 
acdocars: accumulated depreciation of owned cars (schedule 415, line 24, column i) 
caracdl: accumulated depreciation of leased locomotives (schedule 415, line 24, column j) 
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gdppd = gdp price deflator 
 
Price of factor inputs 
 Price of labor = (swge + fringe – caplab)/lbhrs  
swge = total salary and wages (schedule 410, line 620, column b) 
fringe = fringe benefits (schedule 410, lines 112-14, 205, 224, 309, 414, 430, 505, 512, 522, 611, col. e) 
caplab = labor portion of capital expenditure classification as operating in R1 (schedule 410, lines 12-30, 
101-9, column b) 
lbhrs = labor hours (Wage form A, line 700, column 4 + 6)  
 Price of equipment = weighted average equipment price (schedule 415 and schedule 710)  
 Price of fuel (schedule 750) 
 Price of material = AAR materials and supply index 
 Price of way and structure = (roird + anndeprd) / mot 
anndeprd = annual depreciation of road (schedule 335, line 30, column c) 
mot = miles of track (schedule 720, line 6, column b) 
Factor input prices are divided by gdp price deflator 
 
Outputs 
 Utgtm: unit train gross ton miles (schedule 755, line 99, column b) 
 Wtgtm: way train gross ton miles (schedule 755, line 100, column b) 
 Ttgtm: through train gross ton miles (schedule 755, line 101, column b) 
adjustment factor multiplied by each output variable = rtm/(utgtm + wtgtm + ttgtm) 
rtm: revenue ton miles (schedule 755, line 110, column b) 
 
Movement characteristics 
 Miles of road: (schedule 700, line 57, column c) 
 Speed = train miles per train hour in road service = trnmls/(trnhr-trnhs) 
 trnmls = total train miles (schedule 755, line 5, column b) 
 trnhr = train hours in road service – includes train switching hours (schedule 755, line 115, column b) 
 trnhs = train hours in train switching (schedule 755, line 116, column b) 
 Average length of haul = rtm/revtons 
revtons = revenue tons (schedule 755, line 105, column b) 
 Caboose = fraction of train miles with cabooses = cabmiles/trnmls 
cabmiles = caboose miles (schedule 755, line 89, column b) 
Note. Adapted from “Productivity growth and some of its determinants in the deregulated US 
railroad industry.” by Bitzan, J. D., & Keeler, T. E., 2003, Southern Economic Journal, p.250-251. 
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Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984) suggested a different cost minimization approach 
than the neoclassical approach. The neoclassical approach assumes cost minimization is 
subject to output constraint. However Atkinson and Halvorsen propose an additional 
constraint imposes by the regulatory environment. The neoclassical cost minimization 
problem is depicted in the following equation  
])([ QXfXPL
h
hh           (8) 
The solution to the optimization problem provides an input mix that is equivalent to the 
input combination depict by point A in the previous graph. Nonetheless, with the 
regulatory environment constraints the cost minimization problem is expressed using the 
following equation: 
 
i
ii
h
hh XPRQXfXPL ),(])([       (9) 
ℎ = 1, . . . , 𝑛 ; 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑚  
where the price and quantity are represented by 𝑃ℎ and  𝑋ℎ respectively of the input h. 
The production function is represented by (𝑋) . The symbol Q denotes output and 𝑅𝑖 
denotes firm’s regulatory condition. The symbols ∅ and i  represents the Lagrange 
multipliers. 
Solving this optimization problem provides a conceptual framework that still 
allows the firm to employ input combinations depicted by combination A presented in 
Figure-2, however costs are not minimized within this framework for the factor input 
combination associated with the actual input prices. The closer of the value of the input to 
the level required by the constraint the less binding the constraint, hence, it is assumed 
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that 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑋
< 0. For simplicity, suppose there are two inputs, input-j and input-k. The first 
order conditions in minimizing cost for input-j and input-k in ratio form is as following: 
𝜕𝑓 𝜕𝑋𝑗⁄
𝜕𝑓 𝜕𝑋𝑘⁄
=
𝑃𝑗+∑ i 𝜕𝑅𝑖 𝜕𝑋𝑗⁄𝑖
𝑃𝑘+∑ i 𝜕 𝑅𝑖 𝜕𝑋𝑘⁄𝑖
=
𝑃𝑗
∗
𝑃𝑘
∗       (10) 
where the marginal product of input-j and input-k are presented by 𝜕𝑓 𝜕𝑋𝑗⁄  and 𝜕𝑓 𝜕𝑋𝑘⁄  
respectively and the marginal rate of technical substitution between input-j and input-k is 
presented by 
𝜕𝑓 𝜕𝑋𝑗⁄
𝜕𝑓 𝜕𝑋𝑘⁄
. Following deregulation, changing to a more flexible set of work-
rules has the potential to affect factor input mixes. The null hypothesis will be that the 
railroads may find it easier to achieve allocative efficiency after deregulation.  
In this essay, the model specification of Bitzan and Keeler (2003) is followed. 
The total cost function is given by= 𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑦𝑘, 𝑎𝑚, 𝑡); 𝑤𝑖 = (𝑤𝐿, 𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝐹, 𝑤𝑀, 𝑤𝑊𝑆) ; 𝑦𝑘 =
(𝑦𝑈, 𝑦𝑊, 𝑦𝑇); 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑚 = (𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠, 𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑, 𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑢𝑙, 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒) 
where 𝐶 is total cost, 𝑤𝐿 is the labor price, 𝑤𝐸 is the equipment price, 𝑤𝐹 is the fuel price, 
𝑤𝑀 is the material and supplies price, 𝑤𝑊𝑆 is the way and structures price, 𝑦𝑈 is the unit 
train gross ton miles, 𝑦𝑊 is the way train gross ton miles, 𝑦𝑇 is the through train gross ton 
miles, 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 is the miles of road, 𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 is the train miles per train hour, 𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑢𝑙 is the 
average length of haul, 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 is the fraction of train miles operated with caboose. This 
cost function is then estimated using the translog cost specification61.  This specification 
                                                 
61 Other cost functions specification such as Cobb-Douglas, normalized quadratic and Diewert place a 
priori restrictions. Cobb-Douglas is very restrictive in terms that it does not have second order term. 
Diewert restricts the cost function to constant return to scale. Whereas for normalized quadratic, linear 
homogeneity in input prices in not achieved without sacrificing the flexibility of the functional form.  
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is derived by using Taylor expansion series to second degree polynomial. This expansion 
to the second degree is shown in the following equation: 
𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑦𝑘, 𝑎𝑚, 𝑡) =
𝐶(?̅?𝑖, ?̅?𝑘, ?̅?𝑚, 𝑡) 
0!
+ ∑
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖
1!
𝑖
(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖) + 
∑
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑘
1!
𝑘
(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘) + ∑
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑎𝑚
1!
𝑚
(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚) 
+
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑡
1!
(𝑡 − 𝑡̅) + ∑∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝜕𝑤𝑗
)
2!
𝑗
(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)
𝑖
(𝑤𝑗 − ?̅?𝑗) 
+∑∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝜕𝑦𝑘
)
2!
𝑘
(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)
𝑖
(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘) 
+∑∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝜕𝑎𝑚
)
2!
𝑚
(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)
𝑖
(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚) + ∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝜕𝑡
)
2!
𝑖
(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)(𝑡 − 𝑡)̅ 
+∑∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑘𝜕𝑤𝑖
)
2!
𝑖
(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘)
𝑘
(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖) + ∑∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑘𝜕𝑦𝑙
)
2!
𝑙
(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘)
𝑘
(𝑦𝑙 − ?̅?𝑙) 
+∑∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑘𝜕𝑎𝑚
)
2!
𝑚
(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘)
𝑘
(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚) + ∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑘𝜕𝑡
)
2!
𝑘
(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘)(𝑡 − 𝑡̅) 
+∑∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑎𝑚𝜕𝑤𝑖
)
2!
𝑖
(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚)
𝑚
(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖) 
+∑∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑎𝑚𝜕𝑦𝑘
)
2!
𝑘
(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚)
𝑚
(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘) + ∑∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑛
)
2!
𝑛
(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚)
𝑚
(𝑎𝑛 − ?̅?𝑛) 
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+∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑎𝑚𝜕𝑡
)
2!
𝑚
(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚)(𝑡 − 𝑡̅) + ∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑡𝜕𝑤𝑖
)
2!
𝑖
(𝑡 − 𝑡̅)(𝑤𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖) 
+∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑡𝜕𝑦𝑘
)
2!
𝑘
(𝑡 − 𝑡̅)(𝑦𝑘 − ?̅?𝑘) + ∑
(
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑡𝜕𝑎𝑚
)
2!
𝑚
(𝑡 − 𝑡̅)(𝑎𝑚 − ?̅?𝑚) 
+
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑡2
2!
(𝑡 − 𝑡̅)2          (11) 
  This Taylor series approximation is then transformed by taking the logarithms of 
the variables and substituting the partial derivatives with parameters. After applying the 
symmetry of second derivatives (for example,
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝜕𝑦𝑘
=
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑘𝜕𝑤𝑖
), simplifying and 
rearranging the terms, the resulting equation would become the translog cost function as 
shown in the following equation: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶 = 𝛼0 + 
+∑𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) + ∑𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
)
𝑘𝑖
+ ∑𝜎𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
)
𝑚
+ 𝜃𝑡 
+
1
2
∑∑𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑗
𝑤𝑗̅̅ ̅
)
𝑗𝑖
+ ∑∑𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
)
𝑘𝑖
 
+∑∑𝜗𝑖𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
)
𝑚𝑖
 
+∑𝜕𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) 𝑡
𝑖
+
1
2
∑∑𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑙
𝑦?̅?
)
𝑙𝑘
+ ∑∑𝜑𝑘𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
)
𝑚𝑘
 
+∑𝜋𝑘 ln (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
) 𝑡
𝑘
+
1
2
∑∑𝜎𝑚𝑛𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑛
𝑎𝑛̅̅ ̅
)
𝑛𝑚
+ ∑𝜇𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
) 𝑡
𝑚
 
+
1
2
𝛾𝑡2 + 𝜖          (12) 
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Shephard’s Lemma can be used in order to obtain each input share equations. This is done 
by differentiating the translog cost function with respect to the log of factor price as shown 
below; 
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘 + ∑ 𝜗𝑖𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑚 +𝑚𝑘𝑗 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖   (13) 
Since at the industry mean 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅, 𝑦𝑘 = 𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅, 𝑎𝑚 = 𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑡 = 0,  then 
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖.  Thus 
𝛼𝐿 , 𝛼𝐸 , 𝛼𝐹 , 𝛼𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑊𝑆 represent labor’s share of total cost, equipment’s share of total 
cost, fuel’s share of total cost, material’s share of total cost and ways and structure’s 
share of total cost respectively. In addition, the coefficient 𝛽𝑘 represents economies of 
scale and the coefficient 𝜕𝑖 represents the technologies effect on the factor inputs. The 
input shares equations together with the cost function are estimated using a seemingly 
unrelated regression method. The whole system of equations estimated is shown as 
follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶 = 𝛼0 + 
+∑𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) + ∑𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
)
𝑘𝑖
+ ∑𝜎𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
)
𝑚
+ 𝜃𝑡 
+
1
2
∑∑𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑗
𝑤𝑗̅̅ ̅
)
𝑗𝑖
+ ∑∑𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
)
𝑘𝑖
 
+∑∑𝜗𝑖𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
)
𝑚𝑖
 
+∑𝜕𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) 𝑡
𝑖
+
1
2
∑∑𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑙
𝑦?̅?
)
𝑙𝑘
+ ∑∑𝜑𝑘𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
)
𝑚𝑘
 
+∑𝜋𝑘 ln (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
) 𝑡
𝑘
+
1
2
∑∑𝜎𝑚𝑛𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑛
𝑎𝑛̅̅ ̅
)
𝑛𝑚
+ ∑𝜇𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
) 𝑡
𝑚
 
+
1
2
𝛾𝑡2 + 𝜖          (12) 
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𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘 + ∑ 𝜗𝑖𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑚 +𝑚𝑘𝑗 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇   (13) 
In estimating the translog cost function, the variable depicting carrier use of a 
caboose is computed using a Box-Cox transformation62 since the data consists null values 
which will be undefined when using a log transformation. It is also important to note that 
the share equations are estimated for all the inputs except one in order to avoid 
singularity in estimated covariance matrix in the errors. The practice of dropping 
arbitrarily one share equation while keeping the remaining share equations, is common 
(Takada et al., 1995). Furthermore, in order to correspond to a well-behaved production 
function, the translog cost function should exhibit certain properties. It needs to be 
linearly homogeneous, monotonicity and concave in all factor prices. Since the function 
is continuous and twice differentiable, symmetry of the relevant cross-term parameters 
are also assumed. The parameter estimated in the share equations also need to be 
consistent with the cost function. These homogenous and symmetry conditions requires 
that  ∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1𝑖 , ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 0𝑗𝑖  , ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑘 =𝑖 ∑ 𝜗𝑖𝑚 =𝑖 ∑ 𝛾𝑖 =𝑖 0, 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗𝑖.  
In examining the allocative efficiency in the railroad industry, the following 
represents the equations used in this study. The cost minimizing decision for the railroad 
carriers is to satisfies the condition of  
𝑀𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑃𝑗
=
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑗
          (14) 
                                                 
62 Box-Cox transformations is defined as  𝑦𝑖
𝜔 =
𝑦𝑖
𝜔
𝜔
   if 𝜔 ≠ 0 and 𝑦𝑖
𝜔 = 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖  if 𝜔 = 0. A value of 𝜔 =
0.0001 is selected since it gives almost same results with log.  
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where 𝑀𝑃𝑖 is the marginal product of i th input and 𝑤𝑖 is the price for ith input paid by 
railroad carriers.  However in order to be accurate, there is a need to use shadow prices in 
the equation which is depicted by  
𝑀𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑃𝑗
=
𝑤𝑖
∗
𝑤𝑗
∗          (15) 
where 𝑤𝑖
∗ is the shadow price for input ith. The shadow price is in the form of additive 
version as shown in the following equation. 
𝑤𝑖
∗ = 𝑤𝑖 + 𝑔𝑖          (16) 
where 𝑔𝑖 is the factor of proportionality
63 or the price efficiency parameter that accounts 
for the deviation of the shadow price from the actual price.  
𝐶∗ = 𝐶∗(𝑤𝑖
∗, 𝑦)         (17) 
In equation (17), 𝐶∗ represents the shadow total cost which is a function of shadow input 
prices and outputs. Using Sheppard’s Lemma from equation (17), the actual demand for 
the i th input is given as 
𝛿𝐶∗(𝑤𝑖
∗,𝑦)
𝛿𝑤𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖          (18) 
The actual total cost and the shadow total cost function are depicted as follows:  
𝐶 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑖           (19) 
𝐶∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
∗
𝑖 𝑥𝑖          (20) 
The following equations represent the actual cost share and shadow cost share for ith 
input respectively. 
𝑀𝑖 =
𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝐶
          (21) 
                                                 
63 The symbol 𝑔𝑖 is also known as price distortion index. This parameter estimate is derived by using non-
linear in parameter estimation procedure and is not part of the error term.  
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𝑀𝑖
∗ =
𝑤𝑖
∗𝑥𝑖
𝐶∗
          (22)  
The shadow price cannot be observed from the data set therefore in order to estimate it, 
the equations used need to have observable values. From equation (22), the actual 
demand for the ith input is  
𝑀𝑖
∗𝐶∗
𝑤𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖          (23) 
Inserting it into equation (19) and using the additive version for shadow price, the 
equation will become  
𝐶 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑀𝑖
∗𝐶∗
(𝑤𝑖
∗)
= 𝐶∗𝑖 ∑ 𝑀𝑖
∗ 𝑤𝑖
(𝑤𝑖
∗)𝑖
       (24) 
In logarithmic term this equation will become  
ln 𝐶 = ln 𝐶∗ + ln∑ 𝑀𝑖
∗ 𝑤𝑖
(𝑤𝑖+𝑔𝑖)
𝑖        (25) 
In equation (25) the difference between the actual cost and the shadow cost is 
depicted by be the second term on the right hand side. This term signifies the bias that 
exists in cost shares of each input weighted by the ratio between the actual and the 
shadow respective input prices. It also represents the misallocation in the inputs in giving 
minimum cost to the railroad carriers. The actual cost function is equivalent to the 
shadow cost function if 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑔𝑗 = 0 for input  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 , which suggests cost minimization. 
It should be noted that the first term of the right hand side of equation (25) is 
unobservable, hence some mathematical manipulations are used order to estimate this 
equation. For simplicity, assuming multiple inputs and only one output, the ln 𝐶∗ can be 
re-specify as follows 
ln 𝐶∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑦 ln 𝑦 +
1
2
𝛽𝑦𝑦(ln 𝑦)
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑦 ln 𝑦 ln(𝑔𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖) + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln(𝑔𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖)  
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ln(𝑔𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖)ln(𝑔𝑗 + 𝑤𝑗)𝑗𝑖        (26) 
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By taking differentiation of equation (26) with respect to shadow input prices, the shadow 
cost share equation can be shown as the following 
𝑀𝑖
∗ =
𝛿 ln𝐶∗
𝛿 ln(𝑔𝑖+𝑤𝑖)
= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦 ln 𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ln(𝑔𝑗 + 𝑤𝑗)𝑗     (27) 
In order to get the estimable actual cost share equation, equation (23), (24) and (27) are 
substituted into equation (21) which gives the following equation:  
𝑀𝑖 =
𝑤𝑖(
𝑀𝑖
∗𝐶∗
𝑤𝑖
∗ )
𝐶∗ ∑ 𝑀𝑖
∗ 𝑤𝑖
(𝑤𝑖
∗)
𝑖
=
𝑀𝑖
∗ 𝑤𝑖
(𝑤𝑖+𝑔𝑖)
∑ 𝑀𝑖
∗ 𝑤𝑖
(𝑤𝑖+𝑔𝑖)
𝑖
 =
{𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖𝑦 ln𝑦+∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ln(𝑔𝑗+𝑤𝑗)𝑗 }
𝑤𝑖
(𝑤𝑖+𝑔𝑖)
∑ {𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖𝑦 ln𝑦+∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ln(𝑔𝑗+𝑤𝑗)𝑗 }
𝑤𝑖
(𝑤𝑖+𝑔𝑖)
𝑖
=
𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑖
𝐶
  (28) 
Finally, equation (11) and (12) are then substituted into equation (10) to derive to the 
following estimable actual total cost equation. 
ln 𝐶 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑦 ln 𝑦 +
1
2
𝛽𝑦𝑦(ln 𝑦)
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑦 ln 𝑦 ln(𝑔𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖) + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln(𝑔𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖)  
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ln(𝑔𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖)(𝑔𝑗 + 𝑤𝑗)𝑗𝑖 + ln∑ {𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦 ln 𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ln(𝑔𝑗 + 𝑤𝑗)𝑗 }
𝑤𝑖
(𝑔𝑖+𝑤𝑖)
𝑖   
           (29) 
In order to create a benchmark for the comparison, one of the parameters for 
factor proportionality is selected to normalize all of the factor input price distortion 
measures. For this additive version, the railroad carriers’ uses efficient mix of input if the 
estimated factor for proportionality is found to be not statistically significant from zero. 
Suppose 𝑔𝑖 is found statistically significant from zero. Any values above zero will 
suggest that there exist underinvestment of input 𝑥𝑖 relative to input 𝑥𝑗 and any values 
below zero will suggest that there exist overinvestment of input 𝑥𝑖 relative to input 𝑥𝑗.  
However, the estimated 𝑔𝑖 value does not tell the magnitude of the distortion. An 
idea, whether the magnitude of under or over investment of input 𝑥𝑖 relative to input 𝑥𝑗 
for the same shadow price, can be  drawn from the value of elasticity of substitution 
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between the two factor inputs. For the case of restrictive work-rules in the railroad 
industry, computing the value of this elasticity provides important information on the 
choice of non-labor inputs that is most likely to be made in substitution for labor. 
Comparing between Figure-2 and Figure-3, the market distortion in Figure-3 is larger 
than in Figure-2. Therefore, the higher the elasticity of substitution may imply greater the 
market distortion for the same shadow price. The own and cross price elasticity are 
calculated and shown by the following equations respectively: 
𝜀𝑖𝑖 =
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
(
𝑤𝑖
𝑥𝑖
)          (30) 
𝜀𝑖𝑗 =
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑗
(
𝑤𝑗
𝑥𝑖
)          (31) 
Using Shephard’s Lemma, 𝑥𝑖 =
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖
, the own and cross price elasticity becomes 
𝜀𝑖𝑖 =
𝜕(𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝑖⁄ )
𝜕𝑤𝑖
(
𝑤𝑖
𝑥𝑖
) =
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖
2 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑥𝑖
)            𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖      (32) 
𝜀𝑖𝑗 =
𝜕(𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝑖⁄ )
𝜕𝑤𝑗
(
𝑤𝑗
𝑥𝑖
) =
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝜕𝑤𝑗
(
𝑤𝑗
𝑥𝑖
)      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗     (33) 
For the translog cost function, 𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛼𝑖𝑗 are represented by the following equations 
𝛼𝑖𝑖 =
𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑖
𝐶
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖
2 − 𝑆𝑖
2 + 𝑆𝑖        (34) 
𝛼𝑖𝑗 =
𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗
𝐶
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝜕𝑤𝑗
− 𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑗        (35) 
Now, the second order derivatives of the cost function with respect to price becomes 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖
2 = (𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖
2 − 𝑆𝑖)
𝐶
𝑤𝑖
2        (36) 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝜕𝑤𝑗
= (𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑗)
𝐶
𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗
        (37) 
Therefore the own price elasticity is depicted in following equation: 
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𝜀𝑖𝑖 = (𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖
2 − 𝑆𝑖)
𝐶
𝑤𝑖
2 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑥𝑖
) = (𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖
2 − 𝑆𝑖)
1
𝑆𝑖
     (38) 
𝜀𝑖𝑖 =
𝛼𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑖
+ 𝑆𝑖 − 1          𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖       (39) 
The following equations further show the derivation for the cross price elasticity:  
𝜀𝑖𝑗 = (𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑗)
𝐶
𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗
(
𝑤𝑗
𝑥𝑖
)        (40) 
𝜀𝑖𝑗 = (𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑗)
1
𝑆𝑖
         (41) 
𝜀𝑖𝑗 =
𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝑖
+ 𝑆𝑗                𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗       (42) 
Besides own and cross price elasticity, three other elasticity which can be examined from 
the estimated cost function are Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution (AES), 
Miroshima elasticity of substitution (MES) and McFadden shadow elasticity of 
substitution (SES). The Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution is derived from the 
following equations 
𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 =
𝐶
𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗
(
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑗
)         (43) 
𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 =
𝐶
𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝜕𝑤𝑗
=
𝐶
𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗
(𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑗)
𝐶
𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗
      (44) 
𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 =
𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑗
+ 1 =
𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝑗
            𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗        (45) 
The Morishima elasticity of substitution is a two factor, one-price elasticity of 
substitution. It categorizes a pair of inputs as direct substitutes (complements). Following 
Blackorby and Russell (1989), the MES formula is expressed as follows: 
𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝜀𝑗𝑖 − 𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑆𝑖 − 𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖(𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑖 − 𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑖)   (46) 
𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑖 = 𝜀𝑖𝑗 − 𝜀𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑆𝑗 − 𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑗 = 𝑆𝑗(𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 − 𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑗)   (47) 
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The inequality 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 > 0 suggests input j is a Morishima substitute for input i. An 
increase in jth price will lead to an increase in the ith quantity relative to jth quantity. 
Whilst, 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 < 0 suggests input j is a Morishima compliment for input i. For example, 
if price of one input increases, the quantity of the other input increase relative to the 
quantity of the input whose price has changed. This suggests that MES favors 
substitutability compared to AES. If two inputs are classified as direct substitutes by 
AES, they are direct substitutes by MES also. Nonetheless, if two inputs are classified as 
direct compliments by AES, they may or may not be direct compliments by MES.  
Sharma (2002, pp. 131) mentioned MES is preferable because it clearly represents ‘the 
adjustment of factor combinations in response to relative price changes.’ A more flexible 
measurement of elasticity is the McFadden’s shadow elasticity of substitution (SES). It is 
a two factor, two-price elasticity of substitution compared to one-price elasticity in AES 
and MES. SES represents a weighted average of MES that depicts a change in input ratio 
with respect to a change in a pair of input prices. 
𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 =
𝑆𝑖
𝑆𝑖+𝑆𝑗
𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 +
𝑆𝑗
𝑆𝑖+𝑆𝑗
𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑖       (48) 
2.5 Cost Results 
The estimated translog cost function met almost all the regularity conditions. If not, the 
percentage of observations that satisfies the condition is very high.  Around 85.5 percent 
of the observations satisfy the condition for concavity in input prices64.  
                                                 
64 Concavity in input prices is met when the sign of the principal minor is alternating in sign starting with 
negative value. For translog specification, concavity is data dependent. Each observation is tested to know 
whether it exhibits local concavity in input prices rather than globally concave. The derivation to obtain the 
elements of the Hessian matrix is shown in Appendix C. 
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Table-9: Monotonicity condition 
Monotonicity in output Percentage satisfied 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑦𝑈⁄ > 0 96 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑦𝑊⁄ > 0 82 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑦𝑇⁄ > 0 93 percent of observations 
Monotonicity in input prices  
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝐿⁄ > 0 100 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝐸⁄ > 0 100 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝐹⁄ > 0 99.6 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝑀⁄ > 0 100 percent of observations 
𝜕𝐶 𝜕𝑤𝑊𝑆⁄ > 0 100 percent of observations 
 
Table-10 presents the parameter estimates from translog cost function. The 
coefficients in the left column represent the actual cost shares or the cost function 
estimated without shadow prices. The cost shares of labor, equipment, fuel, material and 
way and structures are 33.2%, 14.2%, 6.2%, 19.2% and 27.2% respectively. The values 
for the cost shares of factor inputs resembles with paper by Bitzan and Keeler (2003) 
where the share of labor, equipment, fuel, material and way and structures are found to be 
34.86%, 14.61%, 6.57%, 18.6% and 25.36% respectively.  The coefficients in the right 
column represent the shadow input cost shares. The shadow cost shares of labor, 
equipment, fuel, material and way and structures are 31.7%, 11.7%, 0.2%, 26.5% and 
29.8% respectively. All the shadow cost shares are lower than the actual cost share except 
for material and way and structures. The shadow cost share for fuel is obviously smaller 
than the actual and it turns out to be statistically insignificant. The first order term for 
output consistently shows through train service as the largest shares of cost for both 
actual and shadow cost functions. The coefficient for time trend variable suggests 
technological advancements reduce total cost annually by 1.3%. 
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Table-10: Results of cost function 
 Cost Function without Shadow Price  Cost Function with Shadow Price 
Variables Coefficient s.e. t-value Coefficient s.e. t-value 
Intercept 15.88369*** 0.121083 131.18 15.53136*** 0.2051 75.74 
wL 0.332219*** 0.008235 40.34 0.316937*** 0.0284 11.16 
wE 0.141867*** 0.006931 20.47 0.117228*** 0.0164 7.16 
wF 0.062492*** 0.015808 3.95 0.002652 0.0436 0.06 
wM 0.19176*** 0.019363 9.9 0.265437*** 0.0564 4.7 
wws 0.271662*** 0.007604 35.72 0.297746*** 0.0268 11.12 
yu 0.021608 0.034249 0.63 0.061128 0.0455 1.34 
yw 0.021277 0.033108 0.64 0.03623 0.0492 0.74 
yt 0.410915*** 0.068071 6.04 0.360781*** 0.1062 3.4 
amiles 0.599511*** 0.11064 5.42 0.466281*** 0.1648 2.83 
aspeed -0.05144 0.124695 -0.41 -0.09982 0.1745 -0.57 
ahaul -0.08859 0.11417 -0.78 -0.15178 0.1594 -0.95 
acaboose 0.00395 0.004329 0.91 0.055662** 0.0225 2.47 
T -0.02819*** 0.00594 -4.75 -0.01332 0.011 -1.21 
0.5(yU)2 0.017508 0.011962 1.46 0.02573* 0.0151 1.71 
0.5(yW)2 0.025872 0.023104 1.12 0.035444 0.0315 1.13 
0.5(yT)2 0.405719*** 0.069854 5.81 0.325095*** 0.0959 3.39 
0.5(wL)2 0.101467*** 0.011438 8.87 0.071502*** 0.0227 3.16 
0.5(wE)2 0.021605*** 0.004741 4.56 0.023075*** 0.00738 3.13 
0.5(wF)2 -0.00974 0.008529 -1.14 -0.0281** 0.0117 -2.4 
0.5(wM)2 -0.02792 0.023423 -1.19 -0.08626** 0.0373 -2.31 
0.5(wWS)2 0.156698*** 0.008327 18.82 0.184278*** 0.0176 10.45 
0.5(amiles)2 0.144284 0.115552 1.25 0.248323 0.1826 1.36 
0.5(aspeed)2 0.356505* 0.203614 1.75 0.331681 0.2885 1.15 
0.5(ahaul)2 0.774069*** 0.233704 3.31 0.66569** 0.2964 2.25 
0.5(acaboose)2 7.84E-07 8.65E-07 0.91 0.012527** 0.00592 2.12 
0.5(t)2 0.000455 0.000291 1.56 0.000383 0.000876 0.44 
wL*wE -0.02179*** 0.004659 -4.68 -0.02223** 0.00892 -2.49 
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wL*wF 0.004 0.005044 0.79 -0.01408 0.00902 -1.56 
wL*wM -0.00256 0.012578 -0.2 0.037942 0.0247 1.53 
wL*wWS -0.08111*** 0.006785 -11.95 -0.07313*** 0.0112 -6.5 
wL*yU -0.00458** 0.00209 -2.19 -0.00416 0.00366 -1.14 
wL*yW -0.00505 0.003361 -1.5 -0.0111* 0.00611 -1.82 
wL*yT 0.021262*** 0.0064 3.32 0.023041* 0.0117 1.97 
wL*amiles 0.004015 0.009089 0.44 0.005854 0.0178 0.33 
wL*aspeed 0.011017 0.00995 1.11 0.012981 0.0178 0.73 
wL*ahaul -0.04281*** 0.008477 -5.05 -0.04879*** 0.0143 -3.42 
wL*acaboose 2.09E-06** 9.91E-07 2.11 0.005442* 0.00298 1.83 
wL*t -0.00277*** 0.000536 -5.18 -0.0021* 0.00109 -1.92 
wE*wF 0.007701* 0.004551 1.69 0.007783 0.00557 1.4 
wE*wM 0.015968** 0.00803 1.99 0.022806* 0.0119 1.91 
wE*wWS -0.02348*** 0.004246 -5.53 -0.03143*** 0.00633 -4.97 
wE*yU 0.005456*** 0.001987 2.75 0.005707** 0.0022 2.59 
wE*yW 0.009492*** 0.00324 2.93 0.009953*** 0.00378 2.63 
wE*yT 0.012769** 0.00579 2.21 0.017236** 0.00721 2.39 
wE*amiles -0.03202*** 0.008308 -3.85 -0.03768*** 0.0106 -3.54 
wE*aspeed 0.003568 0.009554 0.37 0.005396 0.0111 0.49 
wE*ahaul -0.02442*** 0.008221 -2.97 -0.02243** 0.00902 -2.49 
wE*acaboose 1.14E-06 9.42E-07 1.21 0.004082** 0.00183 2.24 
wE*t -0.00189*** 0.000419 -4.51 -0.00033 0.000671 -0.49 
wF*wM 0.032329*** 0.011354 2.85 0.069814*** 0.0152 4.59 
wF*wWS -0.03429*** 0.005023 -6.83 -0.03542*** 0.00597 -5.93 
wF*yU 0.005817 0.004678 1.24 0.002171 0.00541 0.4 
wF*yW -0.00055 0.007986 -0.07 -0.00745 0.0095 -0.78 
wF*yT -0.00699 0.012745 -0.55 0.014308 0.0163 0.88 
wF*amiles -0.00368 0.019455 -0.19 -0.01268 0.0248 -0.51 
wF*aspeed -0.01883 0.02071 -0.91 -0.00564 0.0258 -0.22 
wF*ahaul 0.03661** 0.017417 2.1 0.014014 0.0209 0.67 
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wF*acaboose -3.30E-06 2.44E-06 -1.35 0.007623 0.00463 1.65 
wF*t 0.00023 0.000938 0.24 0.002881 0.00175 1.65 
wM*wWS -0.01782* 0.009987 -1.78 -0.0443*** 0.0166 -2.67 
wM*yU -0.0144** 0.005507 -2.61 -0.01149** 0.00598 -1.92 
wM*yW -0.0149 0.009293 -1.6 -0.00146 0.0103 -0.14 
wM*yT 0.01505 0.015561 0.97 -0.00606 0.0192 -0.32 
wM*amiles 0.005476 0.023192 0.24 0.009656 0.0286 0.34 
wM*aspeed 0.028979 0.025688 1.13 0.001574 0.0293 0.05 
wM*ahaul 0.000982 0.021406 0.05 0.032981 0.0237 1.39 
wM*acaboose 4.20E-07 2.81E-06 0.15 -0.01169** 0.00503 -2.32 
wM*t 0.003085** 0.001192 2.59 -0.00016 0.00189 -0.09 
wWS*yU 0.0077*** 0.002115 3.64 0.007774*** 0.00227 3.42 
wWS*yW 0.011009*** 0.003434 3.21 0.01006** 0.00397 2.54 
wWS*yT -0.04209*** 0.006903 -6.1 -0.04852*** 0.00788 -6.16 
wWS*amiles 0.026211*** 0.009599 2.73 0.034847*** 0.0117 2.97 
wWS*aspeed -0.02474** 0.010068 -2.46 -0.01431 0.0112 -1.27 
wWS*ahaul 0.029632*** 0.008562 3.46 0.024225*** 0.00926 2.62 
wWS*acaboose -3.53E-07 1.00E-06 -0.35 -0.00546*** 0.00188 -2.91 
wWS*t 0.001346*** 0.000461 2.92 -0.00029 0.000729 -0.4 
yU*yW -0.01806 0.011705 -1.54 -0.00886 0.015 -0.59 
yU*yT -0.10382*** 0.025561 -4.06 -0.06917** 0.0347 -1.99 
yU*amiles 0.081328** 0.035357 2.3 0.009608 0.0482 0.2 
yU*aspeed 0.041548 0.037333 1.11 0.049674 0.0546 0.91 
yU*ahaul 0.063843* 0.032744 1.95 0.037896 0.042 0.9 
yU*acaboose -8.83E-06 0.000012 -0.75 0.002011 0.00833 0.24 
yU*t 0.005097*** 0.001805 2.82 0.003448 0.00359 0.96 
yW*yT -0.03031 0.023499 -1.29 -0.05763* 0.0333 -1.73 
yW*amiles 0.058338 0.044425 1.31 0.047546 0.0607 0.78 
yW*aspeed -0.02817 0.040524 -0.7 -0.07505 0.0628 -1.19 
yW*ahaul -0.06164 0.042601 -1.45 0.052439 0.0597 0.88 
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yW*acaboose 6.24E-06 5.43E-06 1.15 -0.0031 0.00884 -0.35 
yW*t 0.001061 0.001983 0.54 -0.00107 0.00437 -0.24 
yT*amiles -0.26305*** 0.071801 -3.66 -0.26938*** 0.1123 -2.4 
yT*aspeed 0.268759** 0.102769 2.62 0.19746 0.1467 1.35 
yT*ahaul -0.24484*** 0.127301 -1.92 -0.18536 0.1722 -1.08 
yT*acaboose 0.000021 0.000014 1.49 0.045065** 0.019 2.37 
yT*t -0.00919** 0.004073 -2.26 0.006988 0.0093 0.75 
amiles*aspeed -0.19674 0.124143 -1.58 -0.07462 0.1892 -0.39 
amiles*ahaul 0.317286** 0.147259 2.15 0.096591 0.2111 0.46 
amiles*acaboose -9.14E-06 0.000015 -0.62 -0.05825** 0.0247 -2.36 
amiles*t 0.007011 0.006299 1.11 -0.00601 0.0139 -0.43 
aspeed*ahaul -0.59909*** 0.187301 -3.2 -0.5527** 0.2622 -2.11 
aspeed*acaboose -0.00002 0.000013 -1.55 0.005179 0.0248 0.21 
aspeeds*t 0.001409 0.006531 0.22 0.006258 0.0112 0.56 
ahaul*acaboose -0.00003 0.000032 -0.94 -0.02126 0.0304 -0.7 
ahaul*t -0.00013 0.006571 -0.02 -0.01082 0.0116 -0.94 
acaboose*t -6.48E-07 1.26E-06 -0.52 0.000565 0.00204 0.28 
g2    0.149296 0.1157 1.29 
g3    -0.00002*** 8.78E-07 -26.12 
g4    1.091199 0.9781 1.12 
g5    0.093678 0.0679 1.38 
Note. g2 for equipment, g3 for fuel, g4 for material and g5 for way and structure. The notation 
*** means significant at 1% level, ** is significant at 5% level and * is significant at 10% level.  
 
Table-11 presents the own-price and cross-price elasticity, Allen-Uzawa partial 
elasticity of substitution, Miroshima elasticity of substitution and McFadden’s shadow 
elasticity of substitution. The results show negative own-price elasticity as expected. 
Demands for factor inputs are inelastic except for fuel. Fuel is found to be relatively 
elastic with respect to their own price. The sign of cross-price elasticity suggests that all 
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pairs of factor inputs indicate substitutability between each other except one. The sign of 
ELW is positive while the sign of EWL is negative. An increase in the price of way and 
structure increases the demand for labor implying substitutes.  On the other hand, an 
increase in the price of labor decreases the demand for way and structure suggesting 
compliments. Fuel and way and structures are found to be compliments between each 
other. The results from AES suggest equipment, fuel and material are substitutes with 
labor.  Other factor inputs are also substitutes in Allen-Uzawa sense except for labor and 
fuel are suggest to be compliments to way and structures. The estimates of MES are all 
positive, implying Miroshima substitutes except for MESWF. Generally, labor and 
equipment, labor and fuel, labor and material, labor and way and structures, equipment 
and fuel, equipment and material, equipment and way and structures, fuel and material, 
material and way and structures are Miroshima substitutes irrespective of which of the 
two prices increases. Some of the MES estimates have a larger value. The estimates for 
MESFL, MESML, MESFE, MESME, MESFM, MESMF, MESFW and MESMW are found to be 
larger than one. For example, the value of 1.17 for MESFL represents the percentage 
change in fuel-labor ratio (F/L), when the relative price (wL/wF) changes. A value of 
greater than one suggests strong substitutability for fuel-labor. One may expect that if 
price of labor increase, the railroad carriers are highly likely to substitute labor with fuel. 
As discussed previously, diesel locomotives are proven to be labor saving. Diesel 
locomotives are more fuel efficient compares to steam locomotives and also promote 
faster train. Faster trains enable the freights to be transported for longer distance in 
shorter time. Hence, railroad carriers may be better off when investing more in fuel rather 
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than labor. This confirms with the existing results that there is an over-utilization of fuel65 
relative to labor. Table-11 also provides the value for the symmetric McFadden’s shadow 
elasticity of substitution that allows for the relative prices to change and holds cost 
constant. All values are positive as expected. 
Table-11: Estimated elasticity 
OWN 
PRICE 
Average       
ELL -0.34758       
EEE -0.67746       
EFF -1.08897       
EMM -0.9032       
EWW -0.11023       
CROSS 
PRICE66 
Average AES Average MES67 Average SES Average 
ELE 0.039624 AESLE 0.285134 MESLE 0.4462633 SESLE 0.5211549 
EEL 0.098734   MESEL 0.7175421   
ELF 0.087088 AESLF 1.218333 MESLF 0.722101 SESLF 0.8091222 
EFL 0.374722   MESFL 1.1742053   
ELM 0.218324 AESLM 0.959517 MESLM 0.6436961 SESLM 0.8505323 
EML 0.296247   MESML 1.121521   
ELW 0.002533 AESLW -0.0312 MESLW 0.3384895 SESLW 0.2424007 
EWL -0.00906   MESWL 0.1119124   
EEF 0.14723 AESEF 2.226762 MESEF 0.9193537 SESEF 1.0443121 
EFE 0.240822   MESFE 1.2358169   
EEM 0.380665 AESEM 1.694411 MESEM 0.8665868 SESEM 1.1522909 
EME 0.187874   MESME 1.2838617   
                                                 
65 It is important to note that the overutilization of fuel may be argued to change over time. A reasonable 
examination would be taking annual estimations of the cost function and comparing the value of the price 
distortion indexes for fuel. Unfortunately, the parameter estimates for factor of proportionality cannot be 
compared since they do not provide a value of distorting but rather the direction of distortion. In addition, 
the degrees of freedom fall dramatically when making annual estimations. Note that there are already 104 
variables on the right hand side in the cost function. 
66 Negative value for cross price elasticity indicates compliments whereas positive values indicates 
substitutes. 
67MES is asymmetric. 
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EEW 0.051119 AESEW 0.109427 MESEW 0.699452 SESEW 0.3310974 
EWE 0.021293   MESWE 0.1623205   
EFM 0.76013 AESFM 3.553453 MESFM 1.3114749 SESFM 1.58165 
EMF 0.224194   MESMF 1.6633266   
EFW -0.29239 AESFW -1.20392 MESFW 1.0284091 SESFW 0.0582443 
EWF -0.06112   MESWF -0.1817462   
EMW 0.194881 AESMW 0.69161 MESMW 1.0606356 SESMW 0.6611666 
EWM 0.157439   MESWM 0.304974   
Note. L represents labor, E represents equipment, F represents fuel, M represents material 
and W represents way and structures 
 
Table-10 provides further results for the allocation efficiency testing. Cost results 
for railroad carriers are interpreted as suggesting railroad carriers using an efficient mix 
of factor inputs if the estimated factor of proportionality is statistically insignificant from 
zero.  Indeed, cost findings presented in Table-10 suggest that the railroad industry uses 
an allocatively efficient combination of labor and all non-labor inputs except for fuel. 
Since the benchmark factor of proportionality is labor, the negative value for fuel 
indicates the shadow price of fuel relative to its market price is low compared to labor.  
The restrictive work-rules faced by the railroad carriers induce them to find an alternative 
factor inputs that contributes better productivity. The lower shadow price of fuel relative 
to its market price coupled with strong substitutability (EFL = 0.374722, MESFL = 1.17 
and AESLF =1.218333) for fuel-labor causes an overutilization of fuel relative to labor. 
As mentioned previously, the shadow cost share for fuel is smaller than the actual share 
but is statistically insignificant. It is interesting to note that the shadow cost share for 
labor and equipment are also smaller and statistically significant. These results may seem 
to suggest that railroad carriers acknowledge that the actual price of fuel, labor and 
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equipment are low relative to their market price compared to material and way and 
structures. However, with restrictive work-rules, the productivity realized from utilizing 
fuel is better off compared to productivity realized from employing labor. As a 
consequence, the railroad carriers over-utilized fuel resulting allocative inefficiency in 
the combination of fuel and labor.   
2.6  Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
This study examines the issue of allocative efficiency in the railroad industry between 
labor and non-labor inputs.  I argue that the possibility of improvement in efficient 
allocation of input mix seems to be reasonable given easing of work-rules negotiated by 
the railroad carriers. The rigid work-rules were actually intended to facilitate more 
effective rail operation in the earlier years of rail service in the US (David and Wilson 
2003 and Cappelli 1985). However, this study shows the imposition of standard crew 
sizes, and standard work day as stipulated by negotiated work-rules actually limits 
carriers’ ability to employ and efficient combination of factor inputs.   This study also 
notes that even though work-rules are more flexible after deregulation, they still remain 
as constraints for the railroad carriers to minimize cost.  Hence, it is possible for some 
inefficiency to persist even with these less restrictive work-rules. 
 In examining the allocative efficiency of factor inputs in the class-1 railroad 
industry, cost findings suggest that three out of four non-labor inputs are found to be used 
allocatively efficiently with labor.  Specifically, the factor input combination between 
labor and equipment, between labor and material and between labor and way and 
structure are found to be efficient. Such findings are consistent with the view that less 
rigidity in work-rules enable rail carriers greater ease achieving efficient allocation of 
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labor with those inputs. In contrast, pre-deregulation findings by Kumbhakar (1988) that 
examine the allocative efficiency for Class-1 railroad for the sample years between 1951 
and 1975 find that most railroad companies used an allocatively inefficient mix of capital 
relative to labor.  In addition to the mentioned scenario, this study’s findings suggest an 
inefficient allocation of labor relative to fuel. This study’s findings also suggest that labor 
and fuel are close substitutes. A possible explanation for the labor-fuel allocative 
inefficiency results is this input market outcome arises due in part to railroad carriers 
investing more in fuel efficient locomotives. Compared to less efficient locomotives used 
in the past, these locomotives travel greater distances for every gallon of gas consumed.  
This implies that per gallon marginal productivity of fuel has increased over time. 
Therefore, if work-rules still contribute to actual wages differing from shadow wages 
then the high opportunity cost associated with employing labor relative to consuming fuel 
creates an incentive for carriers to over-invest in fuel, especially given this study’s 
finding that these two inputs are reasonable substitutes. Furthermore, the potential for 
continued over-investment in fuel relative to labor is likely, given the industry’s long-
term trend of investing in fuel efficient locomotives.  For instance, as mentioned by the 
EPA, since 1980 railroads have increased fuel efficiency by 94 percent. In the future 
railroad carriers need to comply to the new standards, which are Tier 3 and tier 4 from 
EPA adopted in 2008. Tier 3 indicates that there is 69% reduction in particulate matter 
PM and 58% reduction in nitrogen oxide (NOx) from uncontrolled level which take 
effect in 2012. Tier 4 means there is 90% reduction in PM and NOx from uncontrolled 
levels which will take effect in 2015. In order to comply with this new standard, railroad 
carriers likely continue developing and investing in new technologies, which could 
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further exacerbate the inefficient allocation of labor and fuel. However, continued 
movement toward greater work-rule flexibility could contribute to a business 
environment promoting a more efficient allocation of labor relative to fuel.    Indeed, 
findings from this study show an efficient allocation of labor and non-fuel inputs for the 
sample observation period of relatively flexible work-rules. 
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Appendix C: Derivation of elements in Hessian matrix for translog cost function  
For the translog function : 
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ESSAY 3: INPUT PRICE EFFECT ON PRODUCTIVITY GAINS IN THE UNITED 
STATES RAILROAD INDUSTRY 
3.1 Introduction 
A substantial amount of research examines railroad productivity growth following passage of the 
Staggers Rail Act of 1980 (See for instance, Berndt et al. (1993), Bereskin (1996), Wilson 
(1997), Martland (1997, 2010), Bitzan and Keeler 2003, Shi et al. (2011) and Bitzan and Peoples 
(2014)). Most of the findings from past research suggest that following regulatory reform the 
railroad industry experienced improvement in productivity (Vellturo et al. (1992), Bereskin 
(1996) and Bitzan and Keeler (2003)). In this more competitive post deregulation environment 
understanding factors contributing to enhanced productivity is important, in part to identify 
sources of cost-savings as well as identifying factors contributing to enhanced costs.  Past 
research by Bitzan and Peoples (2014) examines the influence of changes in density, firm size, 
movement characteristics and technical change on the Class-1 railroad productivity growth. 
Density and technical change are found to be the main contributors for the changes in the 
productivity growth. The density factor contributes to a 47 percent reduction in average cost for 
the 1983 to 2008 observation period and technical change contributes to an almost 56 percent  
reduction in average cost for the 1983 to 2008 observation period. While these findings provide 
new information on the determinants of productivity changes in the railroad industry, the effect 
of factor input price are not directly tested in their research.  However, the examination of input 
price effects is significant when decomposing the factors influencing productivity growth, in 
part, because of their direct effect on the ray of average cost. Standard economic theory suggests 
decreases in input prices lowers the ray of average cost and, increases in input prices raises the 
ray of average cost (Wilson and Zhou, 1997).  The dramatic change in collective bargaining 
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settlements following regulatory reform and the volatility of fuel prices underscore the 
importance of examining input price effects when examining determinants of productivity 
growth. 
Factor input prices that are commonly examined in most research on railroad costs are the 
price of labor, price of equipment, price of fuel, price of material and price of way and structure. 
Past research of productivity growth in the US railroad industry estimates a cost function using a 
translog specification to obtain information on factor input prices.  When using this estimation 
approach factor price coefficients represent the factor input share of total cost. Recent research 
by Bitzan and Keeler (2003) that uses this approach find that labor accounts for 34.86 percent of 
total cost, followed by ways and structure at 25.36 percent, materials at 18.6 percent, equipment 
at 14.62 percent and fuel at 6.57 percent68.  This findings comports well with the results from 
essay-2 of this dissertation where I find labor’s share of total cost is 33.22 percent, followed by 
way and structure at 27.17 percent, materials at 19.18 percent, equipment at 14.19 percent and 
fuel at 6.25 percent. These results provide some insight on the importance of input price changes 
as determinants of productivity in the railroad industry, when noting that changes in average 
costs depict changes in productivity.   Evidence of non-trivial changes in input prices in the 
railroad industry reported by Waters and William (2007) suggest the importance of examining 
the productivity effect of input price changes in this industry. Therefore, at issue is whether 
changes in input prices significantly affect costs.  A priori, it is not obvious that cost would 
change appreciably with changes in input costs.  For instance, increase in fuel prices might not 
                                                 
68 The cost function specification for essay-2 follows Bitzan and Keeler (2003), however, it is estimated using 
information from a population sample that includes more years of information. Essay-2 covers the period between 
1983–2008 whereas Bitzan and Keeler’s (2003) sample population covers years 1983 – 1997.   
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contribute significantly to higher total cost due to the introduction of fuel efficient locomotives 
which lowers fuel consumption, all else equal. 
Incorporating the empirical approach used by Wilson and Zhou (1997) to decompose 
productivity effects in telecommunications, this essay isolates the effect of changes in factor 
price, scale, and investment in technology on productivity growth in the US railroad industry.  
Past research by Bitzan and Peoples (2014) is the only other study to decompose productivity 
effects for this industry.  However, they use the empirical approach developed by Gollop and 
Roberts (1981), which differs slightly from the approach used in this study. Their approach does 
not allow for analysis of the productivity effect of input prices. This study’s approach does allow 
for analysis of factor input price effect on productivity gains and therefore, contributes to 
existing railroad literature by focusing on the significance of input price effects on railroad 
productivity. The factor price effects consist of labor price, equipment price, fuel price, material 
price and way and structures price. The price effect for each input on the ray of average cost is 
directly examined. This study uses information derived from estimating the translog cost 
specification used by Bitzan and Peoples (2014) to examine railroad costs. The findings from the 
translog estimation (given in Appendix D) are used to calculate cost elasticities which is used to 
capture the price effect on productivity. Hence, I am able to compare decomposition results from 
this study with past results derived using a different technique developed by Gollop and Roberts 
(1981).  Since Gollop and Roberts’ (1981) approach does not allow for the isolation of price 
effects, using the approach used by Wilson and Zhou (1997) reveals distortions in productivity 
effects arising from confounding the effects of factor input prices. 
This essay consists of six sections. The preceding section provides reviews on research that 
examine production gains in the railroad industry. This follows with section 3.3 that comprises  
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the presentation of conceptual framework. Section 3.4 represents the empirical approach used 
and followed by section 3.5 which explains the results in examining the factors that affect 
productivity growth in the railroad industry.  Last, Section 3.6 elaborates on the concluding 
remarks. 
 
3.2 Literature Review  
Passage of the Staggers act created a business environment that promotes productivity gains in 
the railroad industry. The growth in railroad productivity is a result, in part, of flexible regulatory 
rules such as the freedom to set rates and abandon unprofitable lines. Berndt et al. (1993) 
mentioned that these freedoms in rate setting, abandonment of profitable lines and mergers act as 
catalysts opening the door for the railroad carriers to reduce cost and increase revenue. They 
examine the contribution of deregulation and stepped-up merger activity to cost savings for the 
Class-1 railroads from 1974 to 1986. Their findings suggest that by 1986, 91 percent of the cost 
savings was attributable to deregulation and the 9 percent was attributable to mergers and 
acquisition. Another paper by Wilson (1997) examined empirically the effects of deregulation on 
costs and productivity growth in railroad industry. He finds that “pricing innovations” for factor 
inputs (p. 22) in the non-regulated period promotes cost savings. Examples of the pricing 
innovations mentioned are contract rates and multi-car rates.  The direct and indirect effects of 
deregulation on cost are calculated as: 
(
𝐶𝑃−𝐶𝑅
𝐶𝑅
) ∗ 100           (1) 
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where 𝐶𝑃 depicts the cost under partially
69 deregulated setting and 𝐶𝑅 depicts the cost under 
regulated setting. Wilson further examined the effect of deregulation on productivity gains 
adapting Caves et al. (1981) approach with the following productivity measures, PGX and PGY.  
𝑃𝐺𝑋 = −
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕𝑡
      (2) 
𝑃𝐺𝑌 = −
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶 𝜕𝑡⁄
∑ 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖⁄𝑖
      (3)  
Caves et al. (1981, p.995) defined PGX as “the common rate at which all inputs can be decreased 
over time with outputs held fixed.” PGY is defined as “the common rate at which all outputs can 
grow over time with inputs held fixed”. The measurement for productivity used by Wilson 
(1997) is the yearly percentage change in costs which is calculated as follows: 
𝜕 ln𝐶
𝜕𝑡
            (4) 
He suggested from the findings that deregulation has caused a “dramatic downward shift” (p.39) 
in cost function where by 1989, the cost reduction reached 44 percent.  Productivity rose with an 
average of six to seven percent decrease in cost. 
Another crucial aspect regarding railroad productivity gains is the components of the 
productivity growth. Decomposing productivity gains and analyzing the magnitude and 
significance for each source is important. Shi and Lim (2011) examine the decomposition of 
productivity growth of Class-1 railroad companies individually rather than using industry 
averages. The sources for changes in productivity are technical efficiency change, technical 
change and scale efficiency change. The data covers the period between 2002 and 2007. 
Sequential data envelopment analysis is used and Malmquist productivity indexes are calculated 
                                                 
69 The Staggers Rail Act is considered as partially deregulation. All regulatory rules were not totally terminated for 
this industry. 
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using sequential frontiers70. The decomposition method distinguishes the cause for changes in 
productivity. Results suggest that CSX, NS and KCS seemed to be the least efficient railroad 
carriers. BNSF and UP productivity growth are found to be primarily determined by 
technological advancement. Technological advancement in CSX and NS are not evident.  
Research by Bitzan and Peoples (2014) also identify the underlying sources of 
productivity gains and cost savings in the railroad industry. The main sources of productivity 
gains considered are scale/density, firm size, movement characteristics and technological 
changes. In contrast to Shi and Lin, their analysis is based on the estimation of a long-run cost 
function. They specify the  cost function such that total cost is dependents on factor input prices 
(price of labor, price of fuel, price of equipment, price of materials and supplies and price of way 
and structures), revenue ton-miles (density), technological characteristics and time variable 
(technical change). The technological characteristics consist of route miles (firm size), average 
length of haul (movement characteristic), percent of tons originated, loss/damage expense per 
ton-mile and speed. A system of seemingly unrelated equations is estimated and the 
decomposition of productivity gains developed by Gollop and Roberts (1981) is attained by 
estimating the reduction in average costs while holding factor prices constant. The results 
suggest that over the 15 year observation period average cost savings is reduced by 47 percent 
due to density, reduced by 9 percent due to movement characteristics and reduced by almost 56 
percent due to changes in technical changes. Average cost increased around 23 percent due to 
                                                 
70 Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric estimation approach that examines technical efficiency. It 
does not rely on any production or cost function, therefore does not need to specify any functional form. A linear 
programming is conducted and sample data representing firms are observed whether it lies on a production frontier. 
Sample points that lie on the production frontier depict efficient firms (Oum et al., 1999). The Malmquist 
productivity index is a measurement of productivity change over time and is calculated based on distance functions. 
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increase in route miles. Overall for the observation years 1983 to 2008, the results suggest in 
total, around 90 percent of productivity growth is due to factors chosen in that study.  
While the model of decomposing productivity growth in previous railroad studies does 
not consider input price effects directly, these studies do examine the contribution of input price 
effects on productivity growth by interpreting information gleaned from the interaction variables 
between time and input prices (Bitzan and Peoples, 2014). Their results from estimating a 
translog cost function showed a negative coefficient for time input price interaction labor and 
equipment and positive coefficient for time input price interaction for fuel, material and way and 
structures. These findings suggest that in the sample period, the unexplained technological 
advancement are labor saving, equipment saving, fuel using, material using, and way and 
structure using. For instance, over time an increase in labor price, or equipment price, or way and 
structure price increases the usage of technology that use less labor, or less equipment, or more 
way and structure. Evidence of such technology- factor input effects on costs is depicted by the 
elimination of caboose which is labor saving (Bitzan and Keeler, 2003), double-stack cars which 
is equipment saving (Schwarz-Miller and Talley, 2002) and improvement of tracks for higher 
capacity cars which are way and structure using (Schwarz-Miller and Talley, 2002). In other 
words, an increase in input price that creates an incentive for investing in input-saving 
technologies decreases cost whereas increases in input prices that lead to input-using 
technologies increases cost. Realizing the importance of input price effect as one of the sources 
affecting the changes in productivity gain, this essay adopts the approach by Wilson and Zhou 
(1997) that decomposes explicitly the price effects and the non-price effects when examining the 
telecommunication industry. This essay contributes to literature by applying Wilson and Zhou’s 
approach to the railroad industry.  
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3.3 Theoretical Framework 
In order to develop a framework for empirically testing the effects of changes of factor input 
prices on cost, I firstly consider the analysis for one output setting. The “economic environment” 
of an industry can be influenced by various factors such as technological advancement, market 
conditions, government regulations and also changes in the factor input prices (Freeman et al., 
1987). An increase in factor input price can be initially thought as a cost past-through to 
customers, where any changes in factor input is transferred to customer in order to maintain the 
same profit margin. However, what only matters is the change in relative factor input prices. In 
the long run, changes in relative factor input prices stimulate changes in the “relative input 
utilization” (Freeman et al., 1987).  
A change in an input price effects the firms in two ways; through the substitution effect 
and scale effect. The substitution effect measures the change in the combination of inputs used 
with output held constant whereas the scale effect measures the change in output produced with 
input price held constant. The following Figure-4 illustrates these two effects resulting from 
changes in an input price. Suppose there is an increase in price of labor from 𝑤𝐿 to 𝑤𝐿′. The 
slope of isocost becomes flatter as the ratio on input prices changes from −
𝑤𝑁𝐿
𝑤𝐿
  to −
𝑤𝑁𝐿
𝑤𝐿′
. With 
substitution effect, the optimal point now moves from point 𝐴 to A′. At point A′, there is a 
reduction in the usage of input (labor) that experiences a price increase (wage) and an increase in 
the usage of substitute input (non-labor). The magnitude of the substitution effect depends on the 
level of substitutability between the two inputs. If the isoquant is more linear, an increase in 
wage will result a greater reduction in the labor usage. In addition, moving from point from 𝐴 to 
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A′ influences average cost by changing the expense paid to labor with higher price and also by 
changing the expense paid for the increase usage of non-labor inputs. However, the effect of a 
change in the price of labor is not purely substitution. Scale effects suggests that an increase in 
an input price will reduce the scale of operation. As wages increases from 𝑤𝐿 to 𝑤𝐿′ the 
production cost and the output price will also increase. Less output will be demanded which then 
reduces the amount of production and therefore reduce the inputs usage. In Figure-4, the optimal 
point will again move from point 𝐴′𝑡𝑜 𝐴′′.  At point 𝐴′′ the firm experiences a reduction in 
output with lower labor usage and lower non-labor usage. At the new production level, the 
isocost curve shifts inwards. The shift magnitude may be influenced by the marginal productivity 
of the input that experiences the price change (labor). If marginal productivity increases with the 
increase in its price, average cost should not increase substantially. For example, paying labor a 
higher wage may promote greater productivity and eventually offset the effect of increase in 
wage.  
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Figure-4: Substitution effect and scale effect 
 
Freeman et al. (1987) highlight that the relationship between changes in factor prices and its 
cost share is not straight forward.  Input substitution, “productivity-enhancing technological 
change” and combined changes in cost share of other inputs are the three elements that are 
considered when examining the relationship. Similar to declining average cost for single product, 
the concept of ray average cost can be used to analyze the effect of changes in factor prices in a 
multi-product setting. Baumol et al. (1988) define ray average cost71 as: 
𝑅𝐴𝐶 = 𝐶(𝑡𝑦°)/𝑡 
                                                 
71 Baumal et al. (1988) are referring to the average cost of the composite goods. 
𝑥𝐿   
A 
A’ 
𝑞(𝑥𝐿, 𝑥𝑁𝐿) = ?̅? 
A’’ 
−
𝑤𝑁𝐿
𝑤𝐿
 
 
−
𝑤𝑁𝐿
𝑤𝐿
′  
𝑥𝑁𝐿 
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where RAC represents ray average cost, 𝑦° represents the unit bundle for a specific mixture of 
outputs and t represents the number of units in the bundle = 𝑡𝑦°. In other words, a bundle of 
outputs is chosen arbitrarily as a reference point where its quantity is assigned with the value of 
unity.  From here, this reference point is used to measure the size of the composite commodity 
by a fixed proportion analysis. According to Baumol et al. (1988, p.49), the ray average cost is 
declining when “a small proportional change in output leads to a less than proportional change in 
total cost”. The graphical presentation of the ray average cost is further illustrated in the 
following Figure-5. The ray average cost and total cost intersect at unit output level 𝑦°. The ray 
average cost is minimum at output level 𝑦𝑚. At this point, the total cost curve is tangent to ray 
OT in the hyper plane of ray OR. Ray OR depicts the composite commodity. The cost behavior 
for the ray average cost is “analytically equivalent” to the cost behavior in a single product 
setting (Baumol et al. 1988, p. 58). This is shown in Figure-5 where the ray average curve is U-
shaped which represents the composite commodity.    
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Figure-5: Ray average cost 
Adapted from Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (p.50), Baumol, W. J., 
Panzar, J. C., & Willig, R. D., 1988, New York, Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 
 
 Examining factors that contribute to a reduction in average cost over time is similar to 
examining the sources of productivity growth. A general construct for productivity measurement 
is the index number procedures.  Oum et al. (1999) discussed the index number procedures and 
one of the categories is total factor productivity72. The total factor productivity index is defined 
as “the ratio of a total (aggregate) output quantity index to a total (aggregate) input quantity 
index” (pp. 16). Oum et al. (1999) further emphasizes the requirement to decompose total factor 
productivity index in several components. They argue that changes in “operating environments” 
                                                 
72 The two other categories are partial factor productivities and data envelopment analysis method (Oum et al., 1999)  
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𝑅  
𝑇  
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and scale economies may mislead any inferences made on productive efficiency. Two 
procedures are discussed by Oum et al. (1999) in decomposing total factor productivity. The first 
procedure is a formula derived by Denny et al. (1981) and the second procedure is by using 
regression techniques. In their paper, Denny et al. (1981) examine the sources of changes in the 
unit production costs for Bell Canada for the years 1952-1976. The cost function is differentiated 
with respect to time, and the expression of changes in the unit production cost is shown as the 
following: 
?̇? − 𝑄?̇? = ∑ (
𝑃𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝐶
)𝑖 𝑃?̇? + (∑ 𝜀𝐶𝑄𝑗 − 1𝑗 )𝑄
?̇? + ?̇?       (5) 
where X are inputs, Q are outputs, T are technical change indicators. 
?̇? =
1
𝐶
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑡
 ;           (6) 
𝑄?̇? = ∑ (
𝜀𝐶𝑄𝑗
∑𝜀𝐶𝑄𝑗
)𝑗 (
1
𝑄𝑗
𝑑𝑄𝑗
𝑑𝑡
);         (7) 
𝑃?̇? =
1
𝑃𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝑖
𝑑𝑡
 ;          (8) 
?̇? = ∑ 𝜀𝐶𝑇𝑘𝑘 (
1
𝑇𝑘
𝑑𝑇𝑘
𝑑𝑡
);         (9) 
𝜀𝐶𝑄𝑗the cost elasticity with respect to 𝑄𝑗 
𝜀𝐶𝑇𝑘the cost elasticity with respect to 𝑇𝑘 
The left hand side of the equation depicts the change in the unit production costs. The first 
term in right hand side represents the effect of change in factor prices, the second term represents 
the scale effect and the third term represents the technical change effect. The task of 
decomposing productivity growth into various sources can be accomplished when using the 
translog specification when estimating cost. Past research on rail productivity using results 
derived from estimating the translog specification of the cost function presents mixed findings. 
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These finding may differ extensively due to estimation procedure, sample period and therefore 
comparisons among research may not be reliable (Oum et al., 1999). For example, Bitzan and 
Peoples (2014) find the total productivity gains is estimated at an average of 3.6 percent yearly 
for the period 1983-2008. Whereas Bereskin (1996) finds the average rate of productivity growth 
is 1.62 percent yearly for the period 1983-1993. 
The objective of this essay is to provide some insight on the influence of input prices as one 
of the sources of productivity growth in railroad industry. Productivity growth is related to 
reduction in unit cost of production. In a multi-output setting, this is equivalent to examine the 
sources of reduction in the ray average cost. Earlier in this section, a change in the relative input 
price is shown to induce substitution effect and scale effect. In essence, the magnitude of the 
impact of input price change to average cost is influenced by the marginal productivity of the 
input. If the marginal productivity of the factor input increases as its price increases, the changes 
in average cost due to price changes may not be substantial. The most recent research on 
decomposition of productivity growth in the transportation industry is done by Bitzan and 
Peoples (2014). However in their paper, the decomposition of productivity growth does not 
include factor input price effects. Therefore, examining the sources of productivity growth in the 
railroad industry with explicit contribution of factor input price effect is a natural extension to 
previous work presented in railroad productivity literature. I follow the method used by Wilson 
and Zhou (1997) where input price effect is considered as one of components affecting the 
changes in ray average cost.  
3.4 Empirical Approach and Data 
This essay examines the decomposition of productivity gains in the railroad industry considering 
price effects as one of the factors. Other factors taken into account are scale and technical 
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change. As discussed before, there are various approaches used to decompose the effects of 
determinants on productivity gains. Duality theory that links the production function and cost 
function is applied in this essay where a cost function is firstly estimated and later used in 
decomposing the productivity gains. Transcendental logarithmic (translog) is the specific 
functional form of cost function applied in this essay. The specification cost function is adapted 
from Bitzan and Keeler (2003) and shown in the following equation: 
𝐶 = 𝑓(𝑤𝑖, 𝑦𝑘, 𝑎𝑚, 𝑡)           (10)  
𝑤𝑖 = (𝑤𝐿 , 𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝐹 , 𝑤𝑀, 𝑤𝑊𝑆)         (11) 
 𝑦𝑘 = (𝑦𝑈, 𝑦𝑊, 𝑦𝑇)          (12) 
𝑎𝑚 = (𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠, 𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑, 𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑢𝑙 , 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒)       (13) 
where  𝐶 is the total cost, 𝑤𝐿 is the labor price, 𝑤𝐸 is the equipment price, 𝑤𝐹 is the fuel price, 
𝑤𝑀 is the material and supplies price, 𝑤𝑊𝑆 is the way and structures price, 𝑦𝑈 is the adjusted unit 
train gross ton miles, 𝑦𝑊 is the adjusted way train gross ton miles, 𝑦𝑇 is the adjusted through 
train gross ton miles, 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 is the miles of road, 𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 is the train miles per train hour, 𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑢𝑙 is 
the average length of haul, 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 is the fraction of train miles operated with caboose
73 and  𝑡 
represent time trend capturing the technological change. The above cost function is then 
specified using second order Taylors approximation around the mean.  The expansion is 
simplified by taking the natural logarithms on both sides of the equations and replacing partial 
derivative with parameters shown in the following equation:  
𝑙𝑛𝐶 = 𝛼0 + +∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅̅̅
) + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅̅
)𝑘𝑖 + ∑ 𝜎𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅̅
)𝑚 + 𝜃𝑡 
                                                 
73 Bitzan and Keeler (2003) considered eliminating caboose as a technological innovation in post-deregulation 
period for two reasons. Automated and electronic safety and controls eradicate the role of caboose. Diesel 
locomotive replacing steam locomotives eliminates the need for firemen and therefore reduced crew size and 
caboose space. 
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+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅̅̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑗
𝑤𝑗̅̅ ̅̅
)𝑗𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅̅̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅̅
)𝑘𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝜗𝑖𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅̅̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅̅
)𝑚𝑖   
+∑𝜕𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖
𝑤𝑖̅̅ ̅
) 𝑡
𝑖
+
1
2
∑∑𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑙
𝑦?̅?
)
𝑙𝑘
+ ∑∑𝜑𝑘𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅
)
𝑚𝑘
 
+∑ 𝜋𝑘 ln (
𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅̅
) 𝑡𝑘 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜎𝑚𝑛𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅̅
) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑛
𝑎𝑛̅̅ ̅̅
)𝑛𝑚 + ∑ 𝜇𝑚𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚̅̅ ̅̅̅
) 𝑡𝑚  +
1
2
𝛾𝑡2 + 𝜖   
            (14) 
By applying Shephard’s Lemma, the input share equations are obtained shown in the following 
equation.   
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘 + ∑ 𝜗𝑖𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑚 +𝑚𝑘𝑗 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖    (15) 
where  𝛼𝐿 , 𝛼𝐸 , 𝛼𝐹, 𝛼𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑊𝑆 represent labor’s share of total cost, equipment’s share of total 
cost, fuel’s share of total cost, material’s share of total cost and ways and structure’s share of 
total cost respectively. In addition 𝛽𝑘 depicts the effect of of economies of scale on the 
employment of factor inputs and 𝜕𝑖 depicts the effect of unexplained technological change on the 
employment of factor inputs. This system of equations (the cost function and input share 
functions) is estimated within a seemingly unrelated system74. One of the input share equations is 
left out to avoid perfect collinearity. Linear homogeneity with respect to factor input prices is 
imposed where holding output constants, any proportional increase in all factor input prices 
raises the cost by the same proportion.  The homogeneity and symmetry restrictions on the 
parameters require that ∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1𝑖 , ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 0𝑗𝑖  , ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑘 =𝑖 ∑ 𝜗𝑖𝑚 =𝑖 ∑ 𝛾𝑖 =𝑖 0, 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗𝑖 . 
The estimation of the system of equation, which gives the values of cost elasticity enables me to 
further adapt the approach by Wilson and Zhou (1997) in decomposing productivity gains.  
                                                 
74 The variable caboose consists of zero values. Box-Cox transformations is applied to this variable where 𝑦𝑖
𝜔 =
𝑦𝑖
𝜔
𝜔
   
if 𝜔 ≠ 0 and 𝑦𝑖
𝜔 = 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖  if 𝜔 = 0. A very small value of 𝜔 (0.0001) is selected since it gives almost same results 
with log.  
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Assuming cost minimizing behavior, the cost function in equation (10) is differentiated with 
respect to time. Dividing both sides with total cost and applying Sheppard’s Lemma, the rate of 
change in the minimum cost function is given in the following equation (Wilson and Zhou, 1997, 
pp. 294): 
?̇? = ∑
𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑖
𝐶
𝐼
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖̇ +  ∑
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘
𝐶
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑦?̇? + ∑
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚
𝐶
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝑎?̇? + 𝜏                  (16) 
where 
 ?̇? =
1
𝐶
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑡
  
𝑤𝑖̇ =
1
𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕𝑡
 
𝑦?̇? =
1
𝑦𝑘
𝜕𝑦𝑘
𝜕𝑡
 
𝑎?̇? =
1
𝑎𝑚
𝜕𝑎𝑚
𝜕𝑡
 
𝜏 =
1
𝐶
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑡
 
The cost share of factor input i-th is given as   
𝑆𝑖 =
𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑖
𝐶
           (17) 
The cost elasticity with respect to output 𝑦𝑘 is given as  
𝜇𝐶𝑌𝑘 =
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑦𝑘
𝑦𝑘
𝐶
           (18) 
The cost elasticity with respect to technological characteristics is 
𝜇𝐶𝐴𝑀 =
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑚
𝐶
          (19) 
Therefore, equation (16) can be written as: 
?̇? = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖̇ +  ∑ 𝜇𝐶𝑌𝐾
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑦?̇? + ∑ 𝜇𝐶𝐴𝑀
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝑎?̇? + 𝜏              (20) 
Furthermore, the rate of change in the weighted product mix is represented as   
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𝑦?̇? =
∑ 𝜇𝐶𝑌𝑘𝑦?̇?𝑘
∑ 𝜇𝐶𝑌𝑘𝑘
               (21) 
This equation then replaces the second term in equation (20) and therefore,  
?̇? = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖̇ +  ∑ 𝜇𝐶𝑌𝐾𝑦
?̇?𝐾
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝜇𝐶𝐴𝑀
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝑎?̇? + 𝜏        (22) 
Subtracting equation (21) from both sides of equation (22), the rate of change in ray average cost 
(?̇? − 𝑌𝐶)̇  is shown in the following equation 
?̇? − 𝑦?̇? = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖̇ +  (∑ 𝜇𝐶𝑌𝑘𝑘 − 1)𝑌
?̇? + ∑ 𝜇𝐶𝐴𝑀
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝑎?̇? + 𝜏      (23) 
where  ∑ 𝑆𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖̇  represents factor price effects, (∑ 𝜇𝐶𝑌𝑘𝑘 − 1)𝑌
?̇? represents scale effect, 
∑ 𝜇𝐶𝐴𝑀
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝑎?̇?  represents movement characteristics effects and 𝜏 represents the unexplained 
technological change. Wilson and Zhou (1997) mentioned that the factor price effect may be 
negative or positive depending on its effect on the ray average cost. The scale effect also may be 
negative or positive. The sign for coefficient estimates on movement characteristics may be 
negative or positive but the sign for the coefficient estimates on technological change is expected 
to be negative on the ray average cost.   
The data used in this essay is gathered from Class-1 Annual Report (R1 reports) from 
1983 to 2008. Three types of data are collected during the process and most of the data are re-
entered manually due to its availability in micro fiche and pdf forms. The variable sources are 
taken from Bitzan and Keeler (2003) and the merger information from Dooley et al. (1991) is 
used in constructing the fixed effects. The descriptive statistics of data are summarized in Table-
12. The findings suggest on average, the largest mean share of factor input cost is attributable to 
labor. Labor cost represents more than one-third of the factor input cost. The next largest is input 
expense from way and structure (27.8 percent), follows by material (22.7 percent) and equipment 
(11.28 percent). The smallest mean share of factor input cost is fuel which constitutes around 7 
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percent. Freeman et al. (1987) highlighted that changes in any cost share is not only attributable 
to its own price and quantity, but also other input prices and quantities. However, with nearly 
two-third of the input cost is attributable to labor and way and structure, any increase in these 
input prices could have non-trivial cost effects.  
Table-12: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis 
Variables Mean Standard deviation 
Adjusted unit train gross ton miles (in thousands) 38923011 72505151 
Adjusted way train gross ton miles (in thousands) 4388682 4995210 
Adjusted through train gross ton miles (in thousands) 70752648 91492490 
Labor price per hour  34.195 8.104 
Weighted average equipment price 43838.86 28286.15 
Price per gallon 1.0619 0.44 
AAR materials and supply index 176.4059 47.4997 
Price of way and structures75 (in thousands) 69.96603 31.84221 
Miles of road or route miles 10869.67 9901.63 
Train miles per train hour 25.9824 6.467284 
Average length of haul76  465.5535 218.2851 
Fraction of train miles with caboose 0.000353 0.000418 
Labor share 0.3093 0.06495 
Equipment share 0.1128 0.03446 
Fuel share 0.0729 0.08201 
Material share 0.2270 0.09992 
Ways and structure share 0.2779 0.06881 
                                                 
75 Price of way and structures is calculated by (ROIRD + ANNDEPRD) / MOT where ROIRD is the return of 
investment in road, ANNDEPRD is annual depreciation in road and MOT is miles of track  
76 Average length of haul is calculated by dividing revenue ton miles with revenue tons.  
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3.5  Presentation of Result 
The results derived when estimating the cost equation are presented in the Appendix D, rather 
than presented in the text, since the emphasis of this study is the examination of productivity 
results derived from using the parameter estimates to compute the elements of productivity.  
Before presenting the productivity results, a brief interpretation of the results of the parameter 
estimates on the time-factor input price interactions is reported. These estimates are analyzed to 
specify whether unexplained technology change is input saving or input using. Findings of a 
negative estimated coefficient on the interaction terms between time and labor and between time 
and equipment suggest that technology is labor saving and equipment saving. Whereas the 
interaction term between time and fuel, between time and materials and between time and way 
and structures suggest technology is fuel using, materials using and way and structures using. 
Findings for the estimated coefficient on these interaction terms are consistent with findings 
from railroad cost research by Bitzan and Peoples (2014) and Bitzan and Keeler (2003). Table-
13 and Figure-6 further reports the rate of change of the input price for the sample period. In the 
early years of this observation period the rate of change in the input price does not exhibit 
regular pattern. For the year 2000 onwards, most of the input prices show increasing trend except 
for the price of labor.  
 
Table-13: Annual rate of change for factor input price 
Year Labor Equipment Fuel Material Way & structure 
1983-1984 -0.00694 0.000338 -0.11128 -0.00515 0.097579 
1984-1985 -0.01391 0.183298 -0.04033 0.038545 -0.08047 
1985-1986 -0.00586 -0.13545 -0.36455 -0.0114 -0.08689 
1986-1987 0.059382 0.019961 -0.06704 -0.05148 0.035742 
1987-1988 0.040767 0.054636 -0.02771 0.044568 0.005421 
1988-1989 -0.00229 0.093815 0.093809 0.055291 -0.01984 
1989-1990 0.011942 -0.00599 0.18121 0.039987 0.088533 
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1990-1991 -0.02419 0.157129 -0.05312 0.138369 0.05022 
1991-1992 -0.00404 0.009505 -0.08472 0.055334 0.010554 
1992-1993 -0.0245 0.033542 0.002865 0.035676 0.0766 
1993-1994 0.031052 0.155352 -0.06645 0.017413 0.125922 
1994-1995 -0.00149 0.084085 -0.05361 0.033785 0.253525 
1995-1996 0.341365 0.258941 0.11256 -0.00606 0.091615 
1996-1997 -0.18045 -0.19989 -0.02438 0.016725 -0.1317 
1997-1998 -0.07492 -0.06027 -0.22093 0.00933 -0.0714 
1998-1999 0.025566 0.346894 0.050127 0.023206 0.054978 
1999-2000 -0.02139 -0.12966 0.552941 0.008622 -0.00587 
2000-2001 0.006883 0.033016 -0.05976 0.022784 -0.02569 
2001-2002 0.017849 0.008705 -0.14479 -0.01813 0.007207 
2002-2003 0.013432 -0.00163 0.172662 0.001408 0.013009 
2003-2004 0.027013 0.067565 0.219808 0.069531 0.23569 
2004-2005 -0.00444 0.084689 0.358394 0.097882 0.248533 
2005-2006 -0.00212 -0.12654 0.215591 0.103925 -0.13831 
2006-2007 -0.04822 0.1932 0.068549 0.075579 0.165678 
2007-2008 -0.0209 0.014507 0.420555 0.093915 0.067314 
 
 
Figure-6: Annual rate of change for factor input price 
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Table-14 displays the annual rate of change for non-price factor; miles of road, speed, 
average length of haul and caboose. The annual rate of change for miles of road, speed, and 
average length of haul do not show neither a consistent pattern nor trend within the sample 
period. However, almost all annual rate of change for caboose is negative implying that the 
fraction of trains using caboose is becoming lesser and lesser. “The emergence of the caboose-
less train” as mentioned by Duke et al. (1992) eliminates the cost of fuel usage, maintenance and 
service associated with caboose operations.  
Table-14: Annual rate of change for non-price factors 
Year Milesroad Speed Avehaul Caboose 
1983-1984 0.014617 0.002081 0.015467 -0.13291 
1984-1985 0.192904 0.047171 0.094769 -0.13879 
1985-1986 0.183598 0.078261 -0.01028 -0.25078 
1986-1987 -0.05193 0.003898 0.041247 -0.20153 
1987-1988 0.0834 -0.05687 0.022065 -0.24328 
1988-1989 0.033162 0.047979 0.064201 -0.27723 
1989-1990 0.037807 0.00396 -0.01819 -0.16254 
1990-1991 -0.02515 0.010668 0.012486 -0.12928 
1991-1992 0.047048 0.000964 0.034171 -0.15967 
1992-1993 -0.0198 -0.04885 0.020188 -0.18124 
1993-1994 0.079805 -0.03275 -0.00055 -0.28484 
1994-1995 0.104495 0.001042 0.033389 -0.52795 
1995-1996 0.115953 -0.08176 -0.05457 -0.50318 
1996-1997 0.067152 -0.06795 0.046368 -0.37298 
1997-1998 -0.01526 0.015393 -0.0017 -0.51375 
1998-1999 0.474384 0.059774 0.18675 0.279924 
1999-2000 -0.0029 0.062055 0.013209 -0.01299 
2000-2001 0.003542 -0.00038 -0.00941 -0.31884 
2001-2002 -0.00986 0.063269 0.014444 -0.22705 
2002-2003 -0.00754 -0.06006 0.010899 -0.26739 
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2003-2004 -0.01055 -0.03846 0.014367 -0.23226 
2004-2005 -0.00654 -0.06307 0.011775 -0.23667 
2005-2006 -0.00775 0.029654 0.016884 0.036434 
2006-2007 -0.00056 0.03119 0.039673 0.161531 
2007-2008 -0.00212 -0.00196 -0.0012 -0.14494 
 
Contents in Table-15 depict the results of decomposing productivity growth into price 
effects and non-price effects. From 1983 to 2008, the unit cost has changed in total by 22.09 
percent. The component that most affects productivity growth is the scale effect, followed by 
changes in miles of road, input prices and unexplained technology. Summary results presented in 
the second to last row of Table-15 suggest the factor input prices are associated with an increase 
in average cost (decrease in productivity). However, the magnitude of the average annual factor 
input price effect on productivity is relatively small.  Indeed, productivity decline due to 
changing input prices declines less than a half of a percent annually for three out of five factor 
inputs.  Only price changes of materials and way structures contribute to a decrease in annual 
productivity growth exceeding a half of a percent.  For instance, annual changes in the price of 
way and structure reduce productivity by an annual average of 0.97 percent. Changes in the price 
of materials reduce productivity by an average of 0.8 percent annually.  In contrast, changes in 
the price of equipment are found to reduce productivity by only 0.4 percent annually. The 
smallest productivity effect occurs from changes in labor and fuel prices. For the non-price 
effects, the results suggest that scale effects are apparently the dominant factor contributes to the 
unit cost changes. Scale effects have reduced the ray average cost by an average of 6.29 percent 
and have become the major source of changes. The yearly findings for average length of haul, 
speed and caboose suggest that these variables have a relatively small productivity effect. The 
average length of haul is expected to have negative relationship with cost. When the average 
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length of haul is longer, the fixed costs are likely to spread over more miles and therefore reduce 
the cost (Wilson, 1997). On the other hand, results in Table-15 suggest in total the changes in 
average length of haul increase the ray average cost by 18.43 percent with an average of 0.74 
percent. It is important to note that the annual rate of change for average length of haul is not 
necessarily positive. As depicted in Table-14, the annual rate of change is positive consistently 
between the year 2001 and 2007. Similarly, the speed and caboose are predicted to have positive 
relationship with cost. As the train increases the speed, the more cost incurs and as more caboose 
are used in train operation, the more cost needed to operate. Results in Table-15 suggest that in 
total speed decreases ray average cost by 1.43 percent with an average of 0.06 percent and 
caboose decreases ray average cost by almost 2 percent in total with an average of  0.08 percent. 
Table-14 shows that for some years speed experience positive annual rate of change but some are 
negative. However, the annual rate of change for the usage of caboose is negative except for very 
a few years. Therefore, result for caboose is expected since with lesser fraction of train operated 
by caboose every year, the lesser the cost will be. However, these three technological and 
movement characteristics are initially found not statistically significant in translog estimation 
results.  
Changes in miles of road is the second pronounced source affecting the changes in ray 
average cost. In total, miles of road has increased the unit cost by almost 108 percent. Miles of 
road is expected to increase cost since it is associated with firm size or as a degree of network 
size (Bitzan and Peoples, 2014). Furthermore since 1983, changes in unobserved technology 
affects the change in ray average cost by 57.14 percent with an average of approximately 2.29 
percent yearly. This technological effect, which is proxied by time trend, is consistently 
decreasing the unit cost every year.   
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Table-15: Decomposition of productivity growth due to factor price effects, scale effects, movement characteristic effects and 
unexplained technology effect.  
 
 
       Movement Characteristic Effects 
Unexplained 
Technology 
Effect 
 
Cost 
Changes 
PL 
effect 
PE 
effect 
PF effect PM 
effect 
PW 
effect 
Price 
effect 
Scale 
effect 
Mileroad Speed Avehaul Caboose 
 
83-84 -0.2410 0.0026 -0.0129 -0.0103 -0.0007 0.0204 -0.0009 -0.2336 0.0515 0.0042 0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0626 
84-85 -0.0003 -0.0073 0.0180 -0.0027 0.0075 -0.0015 0.0139 -0.0787 0.1041 0.0018 0.0111 -0.0006 -0.0519 
85-86 -0.1139 -0.0010 -0.0148 -0.0293 -0.0026 -0.0187 -0.0663 -0.0833 0.1180 -0.0236 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0560 
86-87 -0.0568 0.0203 0.0027 -0.0061 -0.0110 0.0082 0.0141 -0.1396 0.0914 0.0164 0.0039 -0.0008 -0.0422 
87-88 -0.0632 0.0153 0.0047 -0.0015 0.0097 0.0031 0.0313 -0.0540 -0.0032 -0.0076 0.0108 -0.0009 -0.0397 
88-89 -0.0791 -0.0008 0.0129 0.0075 0.0117 -0.0043 0.0270 -0.0162 -0.0415 -0.0068 0.0026 -0.0010 -0.0432 
89-90 -0.0168 0.0043 -0.0008 0.0142 0.0088 0.0185 0.0450 -0.0360 0.0190 -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0394 
90-91 0.0068 -0.0087 0.0207 -0.0042 0.0293 0.0110 0.0482 -0.0190 0.0147 -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0358 
91-92 -0.0057 -0.0015 0.0012 -0.0065 0.0123 0.0023 0.0079 -0.0876 0.0953 -0.0017 0.0078 -0.0006 -0.0268 
92-93 -0.0277 -0.0085 0.0042 0.0002 0.0081 0.0169 0.0210 -0.0224 -0.0167 0.0124 0.0041 -0.0005 -0.0256 
93-94 0.0058 0.0110 0.0195 -0.0052 0.0038 0.0277 0.0569 -0.1014 0.0652 0.0039 0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0197 
94-95 0.0422 -0.0005 0.0104 -0.0041 0.0076 0.0554 0.0687 -0.0104 0.0122 -0.0005 -0.0054 -0.0021 -0.0202 
95-96 -0.1418 0.1216 0.0326 0.0088 -0.0013 0.0200 0.1816 -0.4043 0.1057 -0.0029 0.0004 -0.0021 -0.0202 
96-97 0.2164 -0.0640 -0.0246 -0.0019 0.0038 -0.0289 -0.1156 0.1490 0.1557 0.0155 0.0282 -0.0012 -0.0152 
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97-98 -0.1569 -0.0267 -0.0072 -0.0171 0.0021 -0.0157 -0.0646 0.0153 -0.0759 -0.0029 -0.0088 -0.0020 -0.0180 
98-99 0.2755 0.0093 0.0250 0.0028 0.0089 0.0052 0.0512 -0.2564 0.4230 -0.0142 0.0773 0.0006 -0.0060 
99-00 -0.0116 -0.0078 -0.0039 0.0452 -0.0017 0.0054 0.0372 -0.0313 -0.0027 -0.0119 0.0054 -0.0001 -0.0083 
00-01 -0.0169 0.0025 0.0039 -0.0045 0.0053 -0.0054 0.0019 -0.0099 0.0034 0.0001 -0.0040 -0.0012 -0.0071 
01-02 -0.0336 0.0065 0.0010 -0.0107 -0.0042 0.0015 -0.0058 -0.0048 -0.0095 -0.0106 0.0054 -0.0009 -0.0073 
02-03 0.0007 0.0049 -0.0002 0.0123 0.0003 0.0026 0.0199 -0.0185 -0.0073 0.0104 0.0044 -0.0011 -0.0073 
03-04 0.0470 0.0098 0.0087 0.0154 0.0165 0.0478 0.0981 -0.0463 -0.0103 0.0061 0.0062 -0.0009 -0.0059 
04-05 0.0974 -0.0016 0.0113 0.0260 0.0225 0.0499 0.1080 -0.0155 -0.0065 0.0114 0.0057 -0.0009 -0.0049 
05-06 -0.0533 -0.0008 -0.0172 0.0154 0.0236 -0.0287 -0.0077 -0.0377 -0.0077 -0.0045 0.0084 0.0001 -0.0042 
06-07 0.0703 -0.0171 0.0259 0.0050 0.0172 0.0347 0.0658 -0.0088 -0.0006 -0.0057 0.0219 0.0006 -0.0029 
07-08 0.0357 -0.0074 0.0019 0.0316 0.0217 0.0140 0.0618 -0.0218 -0.0023 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0011 
Average  -0.0088 0.0022 0.0049 0.0032 0.0080 0.0097 0.0279 -0.0629 0.0430 -0.0006 0.0074 -0.0008 -0.0229 
Total -0.2209 0.0545 0.1231 0.0801 0.1993 0.2415 0.6984 -1.5733 1.0752 -0.0143 0.1843 -0.0199 -0.5714 
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3.6 Concluding Remarks 
A substantial amount of research has examined productivity growth in the US railroad 
industry following passage of the 1980 Staggers Act.  This literature includes research 
that decomposes productivity growth by determinants of cost. Recent research on 
decomposition of productivity growth by Bitzan and Peoples (2014) adopts Gollop 
and Roberts (1981) approach for their analysis. In their paper, the annual rate 
productivity growth is decomposed into density, firm size, movement characteristics 
and technical change. Technological advancement generally is believed as the most 
important factor in reducing the ray average cost. However, factor price effect should 
not be excluded in discussing the sources of changes in ray average cost.  Grifell-
Tatjé and Lovell (2000) highlight an important benefit decomposing productivity is it 
acts as an industry cost benchmark for the producers. It also gives an insight on the 
sources that contribute to cost variation that are within managerial control. Moreover 
Tatjé and Lovell (2000, p.29) mention the analysis on input price effect are useful 
when “long term contracts with relatively efficient suppliers are under management 
control”. Therefore, following the approach used by Wilson and Zhou (1997), this 
essay highlights the price effects as one of the sources in productivity gains.  
Findings from this essay reveal the magnitude as well as the direction of the 
sources of productivity effects. A negative (positive) sign indicates the source that 
contributes to productivity growth (loss). The non-price determinants include scale 
effect, miles of road, average length of haul, speed, caboose and unexplained 
technological effect.  In total within the sample period, four of them contribute to 
productivity growth; scale, speed, caboose and unexplained technology with the 
largest source of changes in productivity gains comes scale effects.  In total, the scale 
effect contributes around 157 percent with a yearly average of 6.29 percent to the 
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changes in ray average cost, followed by unexplained technology by 57.1 percent with 
a yearly average of 2.29 percent. The other two non-price sources; miles of road and 
average length of haul contributes to productivity loss. In total, miles of road 
increases the ray average cost by approximately 107 percent with an average of 4.30 
percent and average length of haul by 18.43 percent with an average of 0.74 percent. 
From the overall productivity change attributable to non-price determinants, Table-15 
suggests two factors; scale and miles of road, contribute in a large magnitude to the 
changes of the ray average cost. The unobserved technological change is also found to 
be consistently reducing the ray average cost every year. In other words, a continual 
investment in technology is still expected to boost productivity growth in the railroad 
industry.  
Furthermore, Table-15 depicts factor input price contribution in cost variation. In 
total, changes in the factor input price increase the ray average cost by almost 70 
percent with a yearly average of approximately 3 percent. The average price effect for 
each factor input is not the same. Among the price effects, the price of way and 
structures and the price of material show larger and significant magnitudes in 
explaining the sources of changes in unit cost compared to other prices. On average, 
the changes in price of way and structure contributes to a 0.97 percent decline in 
productivity growth. This is followed by the changes in price of material with an 
average of 0.8 percent. The changes in price of labor, price of equipment and price of 
fuel contributes on average of less than 0.5 percent in productivity loss. Interestingly, 
the changes in price of labor and price of fuel are the factor input prices that 
contribute the least to changes in unit cost. These input price effect on productivity is 
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consistent with the notion that high marginal productivity of labor77 and fuel 
contribute to relatively low increases in average cost due to increases in labor and fuel 
prices. In examining productivity growth, the inclusion of price effects highlights 
several significant revelations on the determinants of such growth in the railroad 
industry.  For instance, while labor’s share of total cost is non-trivial, findings suggest 
that fairly stagnant changes in real wages have helped carriers to avoid relatively large 
productivity losses78. Input price findings also reveal that despite increasingly higher 
fuel prices for the 2003-2008 sample observation period, the productivity loss was 
relatively small. 
Changes in the price of equipment, price of material and price of way and 
structure resemble the pattern of increasing fuel prices for the period 2003-2008.  Yet, 
unlike productivity trends for fuel, productivity trends for these inputs suggest 
relatively large declines in productivity compared to losses due to changes in labor 
and fuel prices for the 2003-2008 observation period.   Such productivity losses may 
be attributable to a business environment that requires huge expenditure and 
investment in infrastructure, especially compared to the trucking industry. For 
instance, railroad companies generally need to set-up their own building structures 
and lay their own tracks whilst trucking industry use roads that are constructed by the 
government. At the same time, the expense of renewal and maintenance of track ties 
and locomotives ties is proportional to traffic volume as mentioned by Martland 
(2010). Nonetheless findings from this essay suggest that annual productivity loss due 
to changes in these prices have been limited to an average of less than one percent for 
                                                 
77 High labor productivity is mainly due to “technological and institutional innovation” (Martland, 
2012). 
78 The productivity loss comports with Martland (2010) findings that suggest the increasing fuel price 
is “more than offset all the fuel economy gains” for the period 1995-2004. Prior to 1995, he finds net 
benefit for the rail industry due to the combination of decreasing fuel price and fuel efficiency.    
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the entire observation period. An explanation for such constrained productivity loss is 
offered by Duke et al. (1992) who highlight the contribution of technology 
improvement to the construction and maintenance of rail infrastructure. For example, 
advancement in rail and yard design, computerized and automatic system in operation 
and highly mechanized equipment have eventually increased the efficiency and 
productivity of equipment, material and way and structure. 
In sum, findings from this essay underscore the importance of  including factor 
prices in the decomposition exercise in part because doing so reveals the key role 
these cost determinants play in rail companies’ ability to attain rates of productivity 
growth that allow them to compete with low cost competitors in the trucking industry. 
Notable among these findings is uncovering evidence suggesting that it is the price of 
materials and way and structures, not wages and fuel prices that are the main input 
price impediments to productivity growth.  
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Appendix D: Translog cost results  
Variables Coefficient s.e. t-value 
Intercept 15.88369*** 0.121083 131.18 
wL 0.332219*** 0.008235 40.34 
wE 0.141867*** 0.006931 20.47 
wF 0.062492*** 0.015808 3.95 
wM 0.19176*** 0.019363 9.9 
wws 0.271662*** 0.007604 35.72 
yu 0.021608 0.034249 0.63 
yw 0.021277 0.033108 0.64 
yt 0.410915*** 0.068071 6.04 
amiles 0.599511*** 0.11064 5.42 
aspeed -0.05144 0.124695 -0.41 
ahaul -0.08859 0.11417 -0.78 
acaboose 0.00395 0.004329 0.91 
T -0.02819*** 0.00594 -4.75 
0.5(yU)2 0.017508 0.011962 1.46 
0.5(yW)2 0.025872 0.023104 1.12 
0.5(yT)2 0.405719*** 0.069854 5.81 
0.5(wL)2 0.101467*** 0.011438 8.87 
0.5(wE)2 0.021605*** 0.004741 4.56 
0.5(wF)2 -0.00974 0.008529 -1.14 
0.5(wM)2 -0.02792 0.023423 -1.19 
0.5(wWS)2 0.156698*** 0.008327 18.82 
0.5(amiles)2 0.144284 0.115552 1.25 
0.5(aspeed)2 0.356505* 0.203614 1.75 
0.5(ahaul)2 0.774069*** 0.233704 3.31 
0.5(acaboose)2 7.84E-07 8.65E-07 0.91 
0.5(t)2 0.000455 0.000291 1.56 
wL*wE -0.02179*** 0.004659 -4.68 
wL*wF 0.004 0.005044 0.79 
wL*wM -0.00256 0.012578 -0.2 
wL*wWS -0.08111*** 0.006785 -11.95 
wL*yU -0.00458** 0.00209 -2.19 
wL*yW -0.00505 0.003361 -1.5 
wL*yT 0.021262*** 0.0064 3.32 
wL*amiles 0.004015 0.009089 0.44 
wL*aspeed 0.011017 0.00995 1.11 
wL*ahaul -0.04281*** 0.008477 -5.05 
wL*acaboose 2.09E-06** 9.91E-07 2.11 
wL*t -0.00277*** 0.000536 -5.18 
wE*wF 0.007701* 0.004551 1.69 
wE*wM 0.015968** 0.00803 1.99 
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wE*wWS -0.02348*** 0.004246 -5.53 
wE*yU 0.005456*** 0.001987 2.75 
wE*yW 0.009492*** 0.00324 2.93 
wE*yT 0.012769** 0.00579 2.21 
wE*amiles -0.03202*** 0.008308 -3.85 
wE*aspeed 0.003568 0.009554 0.37 
wE*ahaul -0.02442*** 0.008221 -2.97 
wE*acaboose 1.14E-06 9.42E-07 1.21 
wE*t -0.00189*** 0.000419 -4.51 
wF*wM 0.032329*** 0.011354 2.85 
wF*wWS -0.03429*** 0.005023 -6.83 
wF*yU 0.005817 0.004678 1.24 
wF*yW -0.00055 0.007986 -0.07 
wF*yT -0.00699 0.012745 -0.55 
wF*amiles -0.00368 0.019455 -0.19 
wF*aspeed -0.01883 0.02071 -0.91 
wF*ahaul 0.03661** 0.017417 2.1 
wF*acaboose -3.30E-06 2.44E-06 -1.35 
wF*t 0.00023 0.000938 0.24 
wM*wWS -0.01782* 0.009987 -1.78 
wM*yU -0.0144** 0.005507 -2.61 
wM*yW -0.0149 0.009293 -1.6 
wM*yT 0.01505 0.015561 0.97 
wM*amiles 0.005476 0.023192 0.24 
wM*aspeed 0.028979 0.025688 1.13 
wM*ahaul 0.000982 0.021406 0.05 
wM*acaboose 4.20E-07 2.81E-06 0.15 
wM*t 0.003085** 0.001192 2.59 
wWS*yU 0.0077*** 0.002115 3.64 
wWS*yW 0.011009*** 0.003434 3.21 
wWS*yT -0.04209*** 0.006903 -6.1 
wWS*amiles 0.026211*** 0.009599 2.73 
wWS*aspeed -0.02474** 0.010068 -2.46 
wWS*ahaul 0.029632*** 0.008562 3.46 
wWS*acaboose -3.53E-07 1.00E-06 -0.35 
wWS*t 0.001346*** 0.000461 2.92 
yU*yW -0.01806 0.011705 -1.54 
yU*yT -0.10382*** 0.025561 -4.06 
yU*amiles 0.081328** 0.035357 2.3 
yU*aspeed 0.041548 0.037333 1.11 
yU*ahaul 0.063843* 0.032744 1.95 
yU*acaboose -8.83E-06 0.000012 -0.75 
yU*t 0.005097*** 0.001805 2.82 
yW*yT -0.03031 0.023499 -1.29 
yW*amiles 0.058338 0.044425 1.31 
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yW*aspeed -0.02817 0.040524 -0.7 
yW*ahaul -0.06164 0.042601 -1.45 
yW*acaboose 6.24E-06 5.43E-06 1.15 
yW*t 0.001061 0.001983 0.54 
yT*amiles -0.26305*** 0.071801 -3.66 
yT*aspeed 0.268759** 0.102769 2.62 
yT*ahaul -0.24484*** 0.127301 -1.92 
yT*acaboose 0.000021 0.000014 1.49 
yT*t -0.00919** 0.004073 -2.26 
amiles*aspeed -0.19674 0.124143 -1.58 
amiles*ahaul 0.317286** 0.147259 2.15 
amiles*acaboose -9.14E-06 0.000015 -0.62 
amiles*t 0.007011 0.006299 1.11 
aspeed*ahaul -0.59909*** 0.187301 -3.2 
aspeed*acaboose -0.00002 0.000013 -1.55 
aspeeds*t 0.001409 0.006531 0.22 
ahaul*acaboose -0.00003 0.000032 -0.94 
ahaul*t -0.00013 0.006571 -0.02 
acaboose*t -6.48E-07 1.26E-06 -0.52 
Note. The notation *** means significant at 1% level, ** is significant at 5% level and * is 
significant at 10% level. 
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